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Summary
This thesis consists of three independent chapters on innovation and tech-
nology transfer.1
The first chapter studies a model of research joint venture (RJV) compe-
tition where all firms, including firms in the RJV, independently choose their
investments for process innovation before they compete in a Cournot market.
Even with perfect spillovers between RJV firms, an industry-wide RJV does
not lead to a better technological development and a higher consumer surplus,
compared to the case without any RJV. Yet, every non-industry-wide RJV
lead to strict improvements for both measures. Moreover, the improvements
are larger when firms may license their technologies after making R&D invest-
ments. Government should encourage innovation through collaboration with
technology transfer as an alternative to concerting an industry-wide coopera-
tive effort.
The second chapter studies reverse licensing imposed by an upstream mo-
nopolist that requires downstream producers to surrender their patents so that
the upstream monopolist may incorporate all the technologies into the inter-
1The first and second chapter is co-authored with my supervisor Professor Chiu Yu Ko,
while the third chapter is co-authored with my supervisor, Professor Chiu Yu Ko, and Bo
Shen.
viii
mediate goods. Qualcomm, the world largest smartphone chip producer and
the monopolist in the Chinese market, was ruled by Chinese government that
its reverse licensing was anticompetitive, and that it must compensate down-
stream producers for patents surrendered. The chapter shows that reverse
licensing yields the highest consumer surplus, aggregate profit, and hence so-
cial welfare, compared to the cases without licensing, with independent royalty
licensing, and patent pool. Moreover, the remedy that requires compensation
for surrendered patents will lead to a greater incentive to innovate, especially
to firms with better technologies.
The third chapter studies the optimal environmental tax under the possi-
bility of corruption and licensing of a clean technology. In an environment-
oriented country, the firm with dirty technology may choose to bribe the bu-
reaucrat to mislead the actual emission, rather than adopt the clean technol-
ogy. Government should set a very high environmental tax, and corruption
may improve social welfare in comparing with licensing. Higher wage for bu-
reaucrat could effectively reduce corruption, but also hinder the incentive for
the clean firm to license the technology. Technology transfer is more likely to
occur in an output-oriented country. Government should set a low tax rate to
induce high incentive for the license and adoption.
ix
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Chapter 1
Research Joint Venture with
Technology Transfer
1.1 Introduction
Research joint ventures (RJVs) are analyzed under the rule of reason in US
since 1984. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 (PL-98-42) states that
“...the conduct of any person in making or performing a contract to carry out a
joint research and development venture shall not be deemed illegal per se ...”. 1
Antitrust authorities should be lenient towards the formation of a research
joint venture (RJV) if it does not reduce competition. Since then, RJVs have
becoming increasingly popular around the world.2
When RJV firms cooperate in research development, they are more will-
1Before 1984, antitrust authorities have prevented firms from forming RJVs (Grossman
and Shapiro 1986). In 1993, a new amendment (PL-98-462) was passed to further reduce
potential antitrust liability for a research joint venture. In 2004, the latest amendment
(PL-108-237) included standard development organization into the Act.
2Hernan et al. (2003) document that there are 1229 and 892 RJVs formed in EU from
1986 to 1996 in information technology and aerospace industries respectively.
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ing to spend resources on research due to positive spillovers. As RJV firms
have lower costs of productions, there will be more intense competition in the
product market and thereby leading to a lower price and a higher level of
consumer surplus. However, in a seminal paper by Kamien et al. (1992), a
RJV may fail to achieve any one of these objectives, and may even be worsen
than no RJV at all. They consider a RJV competition where every firm simul-
taneously chooses research level followed by non-cooperative competition in
the product market.3 They show that the formation of an industry-wide RJV
reduces effective investment level and consumer surplus comparing with firms
doing individual research. First, this industry-wide RJV is not plausible in
reality. Second, this anti-competitive nature of RJV is at odds with develop-
ment of antitrust law in US. Their key assumption is that all firms either form
a single RJV or no RJV. However, when all firms are in the RJV, they have
very little incentive to do research given spillover to the other firms, and thus
this rules out the important channel to promote competition in the research
phase (Proposition 1.1).
We relax this assumption to allow an RJV formed by only some firms in
the industry. We show that any RJV that is not industry-wide leads to strictly
3An RJV competition resembles the case that firms are assigned different tasks, and the
whole project is the combination of the tasks. One example is software industry. They also
consider RJV cartel where firms cooperate in their R&D activities to maximize the joint
profit. Pharmaceutical industries seems to fall in this category.
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lower total production costs and a higher level of consumer surplus (Theorem
1.1). This is consistent with the motivation that taking RJVs under the rule
of reason in US.
With RJV firms possessing a more advanced technology than non-RJV
firms, technology transfers through licensing is an important channel to recoup
costs from research. As RJV firms do not share the full burden of research
cost, they should have stronger incentive to innovate. However, licensing may
reduce firms’ incentive to innovate due to substitution between innovation
and licensing.4 We find that the timing for licensing is crucial for the welfare
analysis due to strategic behavior of licensees.5 On the one hand, if licensing
agreement is signed before the research stage (ex-ante licensing), the licensees
have no incentive to do any investment. On the other hand, if firms reach
licensing agreement after research stage (ex-post licensing), licensees have in-
centive to do research to improve the bargaining position with the RJV firms.
We show that ex-post licensing leads to more advanced technological develop-
ment and improved consumer surplus, in comparison with no licensing. For
ex-ante licensing, although technological investment is reduced compared with
no licensing, consumer surplus could be improved compared to no licensing if
4Chang et al. (2013) show that when only one firm can do innovation, an (ex-post)
licensing may reduce incentive to innovate and welfare.
5Gallini and Winter (1985) consider a dynamic duopoly model with different initial cost
for firms, and stochastic process for the R&D. They show that when initial cost are close,
ex-post licensing encourages R&D; while ex-ante agreement is unlikely to be formed.
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(i) R&D cost is high, (ii) RJV size is small relative to the industry size, and
(iii) number of licensee is few (Theorem 1.2).
To determine the equilibrium RJV size, we consider a simple RJV for-
mation game. Without licensing, an industry-wide RJV does not maximize
profits of its members, implying that if an industry features only one single
RJV with closed membership, the RJV will not include all of the firms in the
industry (Proposition 1.5). This suggests that policy implication based on
the analysis on industry-wide RJV may require further scrutiny. For welfare
analysis, our equilibrium RJV size is less than the social optimal one because
RJV firms restrict innovation to lessen product market competition. Under
ex-ante licensing, the equilibrium RJV is smaller because there will be tech-
nology transfer to non-RJV firms. For ex-post licensing, the equilibrium RJV
size shrinks further. In particular, when research is not too efficient, the equi-
librium size of RJV is always two regardless of number of firms in the industry.
This implies that when institutional environment is conducive to licensing (for
example, adequate protection of property right), then it may be difficult for the
government to encourage an industry-wide agreement to consolidate research.
In the RJV literature, most focuses on RJV cartel and few studies RJV
competition.6 Katz (1986) shows that a RJV competition delivers better con-
6Our paper parallels Poyago-Theotoky (1995) that studies equilibrium and optimal size
of RJV using numerical method under a setting of RJV cartel.
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sumer surplus than the absence of a RJV, when RJV firms share their research
costs according to some explicit rule. d’Aspermont and Jacquemin (1998) com-
pare welfare consequence under RJV competition and RJV cartel in a duopoly,
which is extended to a more general framework by Suzumura (1992).7 Kaimen
et al. (1992) show that in an oligopoly model, RJV cartel is consumer-surplus
dominate no RJV which in turn dominates RJV competition. Greenlee (2005)
studies RJV competition under some coalition formation games, and show
that an industry-wide RJV improves welfare when spillover is low. To our
knowledge, this is the first paper to formally study RJV competition for non-
industry-wide RJV without cost sharing.
Our paper also contributes to the recent development in licensing literature
to endogenzie the innovation process. Gallini and Winter (1986) study how
ex-ante or ex-post licensing in a R&D game in a duopoly market. Recently, Sen
and Tauman (2007) study how ex-post licensing affects incentive to innovate
in an oligopolistic industry where only one innovator can do R&D. Ding and
Ko (2016) study how ex-post licensing changes patent competition when all
firms may invest in R&D.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents a
motivating example. Section 1.3 presents a model of RJV competition. Section
7In RJV cartel, firms cooperate in their R&D activities to maximize the joint profit but
still choose their product non-cooperatively.
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1.4 extends the model with technology transfer, and Section 1.5 discusses the
equilibrium size of RJV. Section 1.6 considers robustness and extensions, and
Section 1.7 concludes. For exposition, some of precise statements of formal
results and most of the proofs are relegated to Appendix.
1.2 A Motivating Example
Consider four firms competing in a Cournot market with positive marginal
cost of production and zero fixed cost. Firms can invest in R&D to reduce this
marginal cost. Consider a complete-information two-stage game where firms
simultaneously decide their investments followed by production.
First consider a RJV formed by firms 1 and 2. Assume perfect spillover
within the RJV that the reduction of marginal cost of any RJV firm is the
aggregation of technological development of both firms 1 and 2. Compare the
equilibrium with the case of four firms doing research individually, we have a
two-firm RJV is superior to individual research in terms of both technological
improvements and consumer surplus.8 We will later show that this result holds
in general in our Theorem 1.1.
As RJV firms spend more on R&D, they may license their advanced tech-
nology to non-RJV firms to increase their profits. Following Gallini and Winter
8The same result holds for the case where 3 firms form the RJV. However, in a simple
RJV formation game in Section 3.3, the equilibrium RJV consists of two firms. Details of
calculation can be found in Appendix A.2.1.
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(1985), the licensing can be before research stage (ex-ante licensing) or after
research stage (ex-post licensing). Consider a licensing auction by Katz and
Shapiro (1986) where the licensor announces the number of license for sale. In
equilibrium, RJV firms will license to two non-RJV firms in both ex-ante and
ex-post licensing cases, if the research cost is sufficiently high. We can show
an ex-post licensing further improves technology development and consumer
surplus. RJV firms (firms 1 and 2) have more incentive to do R&D, because
research cost can be recovered from the licensing fees. However, an ex-ante
licensing reduces the technological development and consumer surplus, due to
the free riding effect from the licensees. As our Theorem 1.2 shows, the result
about ex-post licensing continues to hold in general setup but ex-ante licensing
could still improves consumer surplus under some plausible conditions.
1.3 Model
We first study the benchmark case where all firms choose their research in-
vestment individually. Then we study the case when a single RJV formed by
all firms in order to compare our result with Kaimen et al. (1992). Finally,
we consider the cases when some firms are not in the RJV.
For tractability, there are two important departures from Kamien et al.
(1992). First, we follow other papers (for example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
7
1988; Poyago-Theotoky 1995) in the literature to consider a standard linear
demand function and a quadratic research cost function instead of a general
demand function and a concave cost reduction function. Second, patent pro-
tection is perfect such that firms belonging to the RJV (referred as RJV
firms) have a perfect information sharing, while firms outside RJV (referred
as non-RJV firms) could not enjoy any spillover.9 As discussed in Section
1.6, our main results remain valid when we remove the second departure.
1.3.1 Individual Research
There are N ≥ 3 firms in a homogeneous good market with no fixed cost of
production. Firms are indexed as i ∈ {1, ∙ ∙ ∙ , N} and firm i has the marginal
cost ci. With a small abuse of notation, let the set {1, . . . , N} be denoted
by N as well. Initially, all firms have the same production cost ci = c for all
i ∈ N . The inverse demand function is p = a − Q where Q = ∑i∈N qi is the
aggregate production and qi is the production by firm i.
We consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, each firm
i ∈ N simultaneously chooses to level of marginal cost reduction xi so that
the new marginal cost is ci = c − xi. To reduce marginal cost by xi, firm
i has to incur a research cost αx2i where α captures research efficiency and
9Majewski (2008) documents that RJVs registered with US antitrust authority and found
that RJVs exert huge effort to avoid unintended spillover to third parties.
8
the quadratic expression reflects the decreasing return in investment. 10 In the
second stage, firms simultaneously choose their production. The profit for firm
i is πindi = (p− ci)qi−αx2i . Throughout this paper, we assume α is sufficiently
large such that production costs are non-negative after research. Following the
standard assumption in the literature, all N firms remain active in the Cournot






. The following lemma characterizes the subgame-perfect
equilibrium.11
Lemma 1.1. Under individual research, every firm i ∈ N invests xindi =
N
α(N+1)2−N (a−c), produces qindi = α(N+1)α(N+1)2−N (a−c) and earns a profit of πindi =
α(α(N+1)2−N2)
(α(N+1)2−N)2 (a− c)2.
1.3.2 Research Joint Venture
Consider a research joint venture (RJV) formed by K ⊆ N firms. RJV firms
share their research progress so that the cost reduction for firm k ∈ K is
XK ≡
∑
i∈K xi. We first consider an industry-wide RJV (K = N) to compare
our model with Kaimen et al. (1992). By backward induction, we have, for
10We require α to be not too small to guarantee non-negativity of production cost and
second-order conditions as d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Poyao-Theotoky (1995).
The conditions can be found in the proof.
11From Lemma 1, it is evident that marginal costs are non-negative if and only if α >
α∗ind ≡ aNc(N+1)2 .
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all i ∈ N ,
xalli =
a− c
α(N + 1)2 −N =
xindi
N
, and qalli =
α(N + 1)(a− c)
α(N + 1)2 −N = q
ind
i .
With the formation of the RJV, each firm is investing less than the case with-
out the RJV because α(xalli )
2 < α(xindi )
2, but they can achieve the same level






i . Therefore, the formation of the
RJV reduces overlapping research efforts due to spillover within RJV firms.
Moreover, consumer surplus, measured by (
∑
i∈N qi)
2, is the same for both
individual research and industry-wide RJV cases. This results is consistent
with Kamien et al. (1992) that they show an industry-wide RJV leads to no










2 ≤ (∑i∈N qindi )2), where equalities hold if and only if spillover
within RJV is perfect. Our first proposition summarizes the above observa-
tion.12
Proposition 1.1. An industry-wide RJV leads to the same technological im-
provement and consumer surplus compared to the case of individual research.
Now we consider a K-firm RJV (K ( N), and will show that a K-firm
RJV could achieve the higher level of technological development and consumer
12 Throughout this paper, we will use the term technological improvements (or develop-
ments) as a short-hand notation for industrial level technological improvements.
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surplus. The profit functions for RJV and non-RJV firms are
πnoi = (p− (c−
∑
k∈K
xk))qi − αx2i for all i ∈ K, and
πnoj = (p− (c− xj))qj − αx2j for all j ∈ N\K.13
By backward induction, technological improvements and quantity produced
by RJV firms and non-RJV firms (assuming solution is interior) are
xnoi =
(N −K + 1)[α(N + 1)2 −N(N + 1)]
Dno
(a− c) for all i ∈ K,
xnoj =
N(α(N + 1)2 −K(N −K + 1)(N + 1))
Dno
(a− c) for all j ∈ N\K,
qnoi =
α(N + 1)2(α(N + 1)−N)
Dno
(a− c) for all i ∈ K,
qnoj =
α(N + 1)2(α(N + 1)− k(N −K + 1))
Dno
(a− c) for all j ∈ N\K, and
where Dno = (α(N + 1)2 −N(K + 1))(α(N + 1)2 −K(N −K + 1)2)− (N −
K)(N−K+1)NK2. We assume α is large enough to guarantee non-negativity
of production cost and production.14 It is easy to check qnoi > q
no
j for all i ∈ K
and j ∈ N\K. RJV firms will produce more than the non-RJV firms, due to








Comparing equilibrium outcomes under a K-firm RJV, an industry-wide
RJV and independent research, we can show that any K-firm RJV achieves
13The superscript “no” refers to no licensing to be distinguished from ex-post licensing
“Ex-post” and ex-ante licensing “Ex-ante” in next section.
14The sufficient conditions are α > α∗no(a, c) and α ≥ K(N−K+1)N+1 respectively where α∗no
is the larger root for the quadratic function Kxnoi = c for i ∈ K.
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higher level of cost reduction and consumer surplus.
Theorem 1.1. Every RJV formed by K ( N firms yields a higher technolog-
ical development and consumer surplus than the cases of individual research
and an industry-wide RJV.
Even though an industry-wide RJV does not improve the technological de-
velopment and consumer surplus, a K-firm RJV leads to strict improvements
on them. Comparing the cases of K-firm RJV and of independent research,
RJV firms have additional incentive to spend more on research in aggregate
level due to the advantageous position by information sharing nature of RJV.
15However, as number of firms in a K-firm RJV increases, the advantageous
position eventually diminished because more RJV-firms share advanced tech-
nology but non-RJV firms becomes fewer. Hence, after the number of firms
belonging to the RJV exceeds some threshold, they will start decreasing in-
vestment, in order to reduce the production level competition. Eventually,
when K = N , firms just want to maintain the aggregate level of technology
as if they are doing individual research.16
15Even though individual firm is spending less in R&D, xnoi < x
ind
i , due to free-riding






i , due to the information
sharing nature of RJV.
16Whenever α is not too small, the profit of an RJV firm is single peak in the size of the
RJV. The threshold value of α is around one-seventh of N . When α is very small, then the
profit of an RJV firm has two peaks in the size of the RJV.
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1.4 Technology Transfer
Since RJV firms tend to possesse superior technology to non-RJV firms, they
may find it beneficial to transfer technology if the licensing fees exceed the neg-
ative spillover from technology diffusion. Under RJV competition, since RJV
firms choose their investments independently, the licensing decision should
be approved unanimously.17 However, this does not pose a problem in our
framework because all RJV firms are symmetric in the unique equilibrium.
Following Gallini and Winter (1985), we consider licensing before (ex-ante
licensing) and after (ex-post licensing) the research being done. An ex-
ample of ex-ante licensing is package licensing where licensees are entitled
to enjoy all the subsequent technology development. Ex-post licensing is a
very common method to transfer technology in many industries such as smart
phone industry. Formally, we define a dynamic game of three stages, namely
licensing stage, research stage and production stage. In an ex-ante licensing
scenario, the game proceeds from licensing stage to research stage and finally
to production; while in ex-post licensing scenario, the game proceeds from
research stage to licensing stage and finally to production stage. For the li-
censing mechanism, we follow Katz and Shapiro (1986) to consider licensing
17However, under RJV cartel, this is implicitly assumed as licensing decision is made to
maximize joint profits of RJV firms under the same assumption imposed on investment




Due to the research sharing nature, RJV firms should always process higher
technological level than the non-RJV firms. We assume the technologies de-
veloped by RJV firms and non-RJV firms are not compatible so that non-RJV
firms will never have better technology after the transfer. Thus the aggregate
technological development of the RJV represents the highest technological level
in the entire industry.
1.4.1 Ex-ante Licensing
In the first stage, RJV firms transfers technology to L ⊆ N\K licensees.18
Since all firms are symmetric, we assume the auction revenue
∑
j∈L bj is shared
equally among RJV firms where bj is the bid by firm j. In the second stage,
all firms choose the level of research investment simultaneously. The profits of
RJV firms, licensees and non-licensees are





bj for all i ∈ K,
πEx−antej = (p− (c−XEx−ante))qj − αx2j − bj for all j ∈ L, and





i . It is clear to see that xj = 0 for all j ∈ L
because no licensee has incentive to spend on research given that they would
18In our framework, the implicit form of this optimal number of licensees could be found.
Numerical results on this could be found in Section 1.5.2.
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have the technology transferred from RJV-firms.
In the last stage, firms engage in quantity competition. For the RJV firms







i ≥ xEx−antem for i ∈ K and m ∈ N\(L ∪K),
which is true if and only if L ≤ (N−K)(K−1)
K
. Our numerical analysis suggests
that the equilibrium number of licensee always satisfy this relationship. 19
By computing and comparing the investment level and total quantity pro-
duced, we reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 1.2. Technological improvement under no licensing case is al-
ways higher than which under ex-ante licensing case.
As RJV firms will develop a better technology, non-RJV firms are potential
licensees. While licensing seems to reduce non-RJV firms incentive to innovate,
the effect for RJV firms depends on marginal revenues from innovation. The
increase in innovation reduces production costs and increases licensing fee, but
also intensify competition due to technology transfer from RJV firms to the
licensees. The competition effect is dominating in the ex-ante case, leading to
a lower investment for RJV firms.
19It is possible for RJV firms to possess even lower technology level than non RJV firms,
if there are too many licensees. The incentive for RJV firms to innovate will be significantly
reduced, since the licensees will produce the same amount of output as the RJV firms. The
competition level in production stage will be too intense such that the profit gain from
licensing could not cover the profit loss from the production competition. In such case, the
non-RJV firms actually become the licensor. But this is not equilibrium as suggested by
our numerical analysis, and it is not plausible in reality.
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Proposition 1.3. Unless research efficiency is low, RJV size is small, and
number of licensee is few, consumer surplus in no licensing case is always
higher than that in ex-ante case.
Even though RJV firms have lower incentive for technological development,
ex-ante licensing could still improve consumer surplus, when cost of R&D is
high, RJV size is small relative to the size of industry, and there are only few
licensees.20 First, with high cost of R&D, the gap in technology level between
RJV firms and non-RJV firms are smaller under ex-ante licensing case than
which under no licensing case, i.e. Kxnoi − xnom > KxEx−antei − xEx−antem for
all i ∈ K and m ∈ N\(K ∪ L). On the one hand, RJV firms will produce
fewer due to lower technology level, comparing with no licensing case. On the
other hand, non-RJV firms will produce more. Second, due to the small size
of RJV and fewer number of licensees, the extra quantities produced by all
the non-RJV firms will exceed the production reduction from the RJV firms;
and hence, consumer surplus is improved.
1.4.2 Ex-post Licensing
Firms will do R&D competition in the first stage, followed by the licensing
stage, and then production stage. The profits of RJV firms, licensees and
20As shown in the Appendix A.2.3, the condition is satisfied, for example, when α = 100
and K ∈ [2, 13].
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non-licensees are





bj(x1, ..., xn) for all i ∈ K,
πEx−postj = (p− (c−XEx−post))qj − αx2j − bj(x1, ..., xn) for all j ∈ L, and





i . The difference between the ex-ante and ex-
post case is that the bids depends on the investment levels in the first stage.
The non-RJV firm’s equilibrium bid is the difference of profits between winning
and losing the auction. When L ( N\K, the equilibrium bid of firm j ∈ L is
bj(x1, ..., xN) = πj(Winning) − πj(Losing)
= ((p− c +
∑
i∈J
xi)qi − αx2j)− ((p− c + xj)qj − αx2j)
= (p− c +
∑
i∈J
xi)qi − (p− c + xj)qj,







xh)qi − αx2i −
L
K
(p− c + xj)qj , and (1.1)
πEx−postj = (p− (c− xj))qj − αx2j for all i ∈ K and j ∈ N\K. (1.2)
The maximization problems above reflect that licensees and non-licensees are
identical in the first stage. Unlike an ex-ante licensing, the winner(s) of the
auction is unknown in the first stage. All the non-RJV firms will do some re-
search, since they are not guaranteed winning the advanced technology in the
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second stage. In the case of losing, they are still able to compete in production
stage, with their own R&D outcome. By computing and comparing the in-
vestment level and total quantity produced, we reach the following conclusion:
Proposition 1.4. When research efficiency is low, the technological develop-
ment and consumer surplus under ex-post licensing is higher than which under
no licensing.
For ex-post licensing, RJV firms have stronger incentives to do research
than no licensing case as extra cost could be recovered from licensing fees.
However, licensing may reduce incentive to do investment due to higher level of
competition under production. Investment level is higher only when research
cost is sufficiently high. With little investment, the aggregate technological
development will be large. Non-RJV firms possess lower technologies, and
hence are willing to bid higher in the auction, in order to place themselves
at a better position in the production stage. This high bidding will raise the
incentive for RJV firms to do research, as the costs will be recovered from
licensing. These two effects will reinforce each other, so that the whole society
ends up with a higher technology level and higher consumer surplus.
If research cost is low, non-RJV firms could do approximately the same level
of technology development as RJV firms. The cost sharing nature of RJV will
become less significant, and hence RJV firms will lose some of their advantages
18
in research. We will conclude this section with the following theorem:
Theorem 1.2. For every RJV formed by K ( N firms, compared with no
licensing case, ex-post licensing improves the technological development and
consumer surplus; while an ex-ante licensing will always harm technological
development but improve consumer surplus if (i) RJV size is small, (ii) number
of licensee is few and (iii) research efficiency is low.
1.5 RJV Formation
We will determine the equilibrium size of the RJV in a simple RJV formation
game under the cases with and without licensing.
1.5.1 No Licensing
Consider a simple RJV formation game that each firm votes to change mem-
bership with no side payments made between firms.21 The dynamic game
with discrete time, t = 1, 2, ...,∞ starts with a tentative K1-firm RJV where
K1 ⊆ N and K1 6= ∅. In round t with a Kt-firm RJV, a randomly chosen firm
from the Kt-firm RJV may propose to admit new members or exclude existing
members. Including new members requires approvals from all existing mem-
bers and the candidate but excluding an existing member requires only the
approvals from all members except the candidates to be excluded. Regardless
21Our equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to the coalition unanimity game considered in
Greenlee (2005) if we impose a restriction that only one coalition can be formed.
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of K1, in a steady state, the equilibrium RJV must maximize the profit of each
RJV firm.22 The following proposition shows that the equilibrium RJV is a
K-firm RJV where K ( N and |K| 6= 1.
Proposition 1.5. In a simple RJV formation game, individual research and
an industry-wide RJV are never in an equilibrium.
Due to the complexity of the analytical form of firm’s profit function, we
find the equilibrium RJV size by numerical simulations. The profit of an RJV
firm is single peak in the size of the RJV whenever α is not too small.23 As
shown in Table 1, the equilibrium RJV size is around one-third of N , and
increasing in N and non-decreasing in α.
Numerical results of welfare analysis of RJV size are presented in the On-
line Appendix. We only mention two interesting observations here. First,
the equilibrium RJV size is too small for consumer surplus, producer surplus
and social welfare. This is a natural consequence that consumers benefit from
more technological innovation but firms would prefer less competition in the
research market. Second, the size of social-welfare-maximizing RJV is very
22Our definition of equilibrium size requires that RJV firms do not want to admit more
members or exclude some of its member while Poyago-Theotoky (1985) which only requires
no single firm wanted to be admitted or excluded from the RJV. As will be discussed in the
numerical analysis, the profit of each RJV firm is single-peaked in the size of the RJV so
that the two definitions coincide in our setup.
23As discussed in footnote 16, the minimum α required for an RJV firm’ profit to be single-
peaked is close to 15 when N = 100. This is why Table 1.1 starts from α = 16. Therefore,
if an RJV can only admit or expel one member each round as in Poyago-Theotoky (1985),




5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
[16, 25] 3 4 8 11 14 18 21 24 28 31 34
[26, 342] 3 5 8 11 14 18 21 24 28 31 34
[343, 1013] 3 5 8 11 15 18 21 24 28 31 34
[1014, 2041] 3 5 8 11 15 18 21 25 28 31 34
[2042,∞) 3 5 8 11 15 18 21 25 28 31 35
Table 1.1: Equilibrium RJV Size under various research efficiencies and indus-
try size.
closed to the size of consumer-surplus-maximizing RJV. Regulation authori-
ties with the goal to maximize social welfare could mainly focus on consumer
surplus because the estimation of producer surplus is often noisy and difficult.
Our results in a RJV competition draw very different policy implication
from numerical exercise on RJV cartel in Poyago-Theotoky (1995). First, it
was suggested that producer surplus is a natural choice for social planner in
a RJV cartel. However, in a RJV competition, it may not be appropriate if
the social planner cares consumer surplus, social surplus or technology devel-
opment, because the suggested RJV according to the producer surplus can be
much larger than the optimal sizes under the other criteria. Second, Poyago-
Theotoky (1985) suggests that consumer surplus can be assumed away for the
social planner. However, our result suggests that the regulator should mainly




30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Kno 11 14 18 21 24 28 31 34
α = 30 Kex−ante 6 (8) 8 (10) 18(0) 21(0) 24(0) 28(0) 31(0) 34(0)
Kex−post 2 (27) 2 (29) 2 (31) 2 (33) 2 (35) 2 (37) 2 (39) 2 (40)
Kno 11 14 18 21 24 28 31 34
α = 100 Kex−ante 6 (9) 7 (12) 7 (17) 8 (20) 9 (24) 10 (28) 11 (31) 12 (35)
Kex−post 2 (27) 2 (37) 2 (47) 2 (57) 2 (67) 2 (77) 2 (87) 2 (90)
Kno 11 15 18 21 24 28 31 34
α = 1000 Kex−ante 5 (10) 6 (13) 7 (17) 8 (21) 8 (26) 9 (30) 9 (34) 10 (38)
Kex−post 2 (27) 2 (37) 2 (47) 2 (57) 2 (67) 2 (77) 2 (87) 2 (97)
Table 1.2: Equilibrium RJV Size and Licensee under different research effi-
ciencies.
We conduct simulation exercise to determine the equilibrium size of RJV,
summarized in Table 1.2.24 The equilibrium RJV sizes under no licensing,
ex-ante licensing, and ex-post licensing are denoted by Kno, Kex−ante, and
Kex−post respectively. The number inside the brackets is the equilibrium num-
ber of licensees for each case. First, RJV size is much smaller under licensing
because non-RJV firms can obtain innovation from technology transfer. It is
because RJV firms prefer earning more licensing fee from non-RJV firms to
sharing research cost by admitting more members. Second, the size of RJV
under ex-ante licensing is larger than that under ex-post licensing. Compared
with an ex-post licensee, an ex-ante licensee would not spend on R&D but
24Appendix A.2.3 contains additional numerical results.
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wait for technology transfer. More licensing fees can be collected with a larger
innovation which requires a larger RJV size to share research cost.
Third, similar to the case without licensing, the equilibrium size of RJV
is non-decreasing in N . Forth, RJV size is now non-increasing in research
efficiency α indicating that RJV prefers recovering research cost through li-
censing rather than expansion of the RJV size. As research cost becomes
higher, a smaller RJV is sufficient to create the technology leadership, as the
non-licensee firms have less incentive to do research.
Table 1.2 also shows some simulation results for the equilibrium number
of licenses under ex-ante and ex-post licensing. First, the number of licenses
is non-decreasing in α and N for both licensing schemes. When α increases,
it is more expensive to conduct independent research for non-RJV firms com-
pared with RJV firms, and RJV firms are more willing to recover research
cost through licensing. As N increases, the competition effect becomes less
severe as the market size expands. Hence, the pressure on price in the product
market due to technology diffusion would be lessen so that RJV firms would
be inclined to license to more firms. Second, ex-post licensing leads to more
licensees than ex-ante licensing because RJV size is much smaller in ex-post
licensing. Generally, an RJV with two firms are sufficient to create the opti-
mal technology advantage when the research cost is covered by having more
23
licensees.
Third, an ex-ante licensing may not occur when α is small and N is large
while ex-post licensing always happens. Ex-ante licensing is less attractive
because RJV firms want to retain the advantage of research given a large
number of non-RJV firms. Finally, it is never optimal to licensee to all non-
RJV firms except for the case when N = 4 as in the motivating example.
Technology diffusion is not complete because RJV firms want to restricting
the number of licensee so as to create a larger wedge between licensees and
non-licensees.25
While the numerical results of welfare analysis of RJV size are presented
in the Online Appendix, we only mention two interesting observations. First,
ex-post licensing always leads to higher consumer surplus than ex-ante and no
licensing regardless of the size of RJV. This suggests that govnerment should
promote technology diffusion together with the encouraging the formation of
RJVs. Second, when RJV is determiend by the simple RJV formation game,
ex-ante licensing leads to a lower consumer surplus than no licensing but still
higher than the case of an industry-wide RJV. This is because, as shown in
Table 1.2, the RJV firms transfer technology to too many licensees so that
technological development is reduced due to free-riding effect, and thus con-
25This is similar to Creane et al. (2013) that a complete technology transfer from one firm
to another always increases joint profit when at least three firms remain in the industry.
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sumer surplus is reduced in a less competitive product market.
1.6 Robustness and Extensions
We extend our model in several directions. First, we show that our main
result remains valid in markets with multiple RJVs. Then we briefly discuss
how our results may change when research outputs between RJV firms may
not be fully compatible, and there is spillover between RJV firms and non-
RJV firms. Detailed discussions are presented in the Appendix and Online
Appendix.
1.6.1 Multiple RJVs
We have so far assumed that firms outside the RJV are doing individual re-
search. We can show that Theorem 1 remains valid even when we allow those
firms to overcome coordination problem by forming another RJV. Hence, there
will be two competing RJVs in the market.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose all firms belong to either one of the two RJVs.
Technological development and consumer surplus are higher than those in in-
dividual research or an industry-wide RJV.
This shows Theorem 1.1 is still valid even if we allow all non-RJV firms
to form a second RJV. Greenlee (2005) studies a coalition formation game,
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and shows the equilibrium coalition structure is at most three RJVs, when
the spillover effect is small. Theorem 1.1 and Proposition 1.6 show analytical
result for one and two RJVs. For three competing RJVs, while the analytical
result is not tractable, our numerical analysis show the result remains valid.
1.6.2 Imperfect Compatibility
Consider firms within the RJV are doing some overlapping researches. Let
β ∈ (0, 1) measures the compatibility of the researches done by the RJV
firms.26 Note that β = 0 and β = 1 are equivalent to the cases of individual
research and a K-firm RJV in section 1.3 respectively. The technological
development for firm k ∈ K is XK = xk + β
∑
i∈K\{k} xi.
Proposition 1.1*. An industry-wide RJV with imperfect compatibility leads
to strictly more technological improvement and consumer surplus compared to
the case of individual research.
The results above explain the relationship between research sharing incen-
tive and free-riding effect among RJV firms. When technologies are perfectly
incompatible, i.e. β = 0, firms are just doing individual research. There is no
research sharing and free ride. As β increases, firms are more willing to do
research due to the research sharing effect. However, the free-riding effect will
become dominant, when β becomes large, i.e. beyond 1
2
. Eventually, when the
26In the Appendix A.2.4, we also consider the special cases of β = 0 and β = 1.
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technology becomes perfectly compatible, an industry-wide RJV will act as if
firms doing research individually.
Theorem 1.1*. Every RJV formed by K ( N firms under imperfect com-
patibility yields a higher technological development and consumer surplus than
the cases of individual research and an industry-wide RJV. Furthermore, when
RJV size is large and technologies are sufficiently compatible, technological de-
velopment and consumer surplus are strictly higher than the case under perfect
compatibility.
We can still show that any K-firm RJV improves technological develop-
ment and consumer surplus, thereby confirming the robustness of Theorem
1. Furthermore we can show that, when RJV size is large, slight incompat-
ibility encourages RJV firms to do more research by reducing the free-riding
effect within the RJV, resulting even higher technological development and
consumer surplus.
1.6.3 Spillover
When patent protection is not perfect or imitation is easy, there will be
spillover between RJV firms and non-RJV firms, and spillover among non-
RJV firms.27 Let γ ∈ [0, 1] measures the spillover effect. Note that γ = 0
27RJV-firms have perfect spillover because they are sharing their research results.
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corresponds to the model is the same as Section 1.3, whereas γ = 1 corre-
sponds to the case of industry-wide RJV. The cost reduction for firm k ∈ K is




i∈N\K xi but firm j ∈ N\K is xj +γ
∑
i∈N\{j} xi.
Similar to the imperfect compatibility case, Proposition 1 no longer holds
unless γ = 0 or γ = 1, that an industry-wide RJV results in better technol-
ogy improvement and consumer surplus than the case of individual research.
Improvement is also not monotonic in γ due to positive sharing effect and
free-riding effect under the same logic.
However, different from imperfect compatibility case, K-firm RJV may
lead to lower cost reduction and consumer surplus if spillover γ is high due to
free-riding effect. In particular, our numerical results suggest that free-riding
is more serious when the size of RJV becomes larger due to increasing benefit
from free-riding.
1.7 Conclusion
We have shown that improvement on technology level, producer surplus, and
consumer surplus are higher for a K-firm RJV than an industry-wide RJV
and individual research. We also consider the effect of technology transfer by
introducing patent licensing. With licensing, the equilibrium size of RJV is
much smaller than the case without licensing. This explains the phenomenon
28
that RJV becomes increasingly popular, the size of RJV are small, and it is
very difficult to establish an industry-wide RJV.28 Hence, policymakers should
also encourage the formation of RJV but need not facilitate an industry-wide
agreement. Unde ex-post licensing, would further improve consumer surplus.
Therefore, government should encourage technology transfer from RJV than
forming a larger RJV. 29
28In 2009, Taiwanese government establishes a new government-backed company, Taiwan
Memory Company (TMC) to consolidate research development for all memory-chip pro-
ducers in Taiwan. However, major producers including Micron Memory Taiwan, Nanya
Technology Corp. and Powerchip Semiconductor Corp. refuse to join the venture.
29Even ex-ante licensing may not improve consumer surplus compared to no licensing, it





It has been a long discussion on how to license process innovation, i.e. the tech-
nology reducing production cost, since Katz and Shapiro (1986). In the most
recent development, Lerner and Tirole (2004) and (2015) discuss about how
patent pool is formed and such innovations should be priced under the patent
pool and Standard Setting Organization. These analysis focus on horizontal
markets. Even if the innovator is an outsider research lab, as in standard
licensing case, there is no strategic connection between this outsider and the
downstream market.
We would like to consider a market with both upstream manufacturers and
downstream producers. The upstream firm not only sell intermediary input
to the downstream firms, but also licensing process innovations used in down-
stream productions. For the downstream firms, we allow heterogeneity among
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them. Some firms may have done some R&D, thus possess some of the process
innovation; while the others does not. Under this setup, we are considering not
only the licensing strategies between upstream and downstream firms, but also
the strategies among the downstream firms. Schmalensee (2009) discusses the
solution to royalty-stacking and hold-up problem in standard setting, under
this setup.
However, we would like to focus on ”pass-through right” problem under
this vertical structure. The pass-through rights refer as the patent holder
gives the third party permission to license the patent without infringing the
right of patent holder. A particular real life example we have in mind is the
Qualcomm Incorporated’s (Qualcomm) anti-trust case in China.
Qualcomm is the world’s largest smartphone chipmaker1, and a near monopoly
in the Chinese market: 100% market share in the market for licensing of each
relevant wireless communications standard essential patents (“SEPs”), 2 and
above 50% market share in CDMA, WCDMA and LTE baseband chip mar-
kets. According to China’s Anti-monopoly Law (AML) article 18, Qualcomm
is considered to be in a market dominance position.
In November 2013, China’s National Development and Reform Commis-
1According to Strategy Analytics report,Qualcomm is the leader with a share of 42
percent in the global smartphone processor market.
2By Shapiro (2001), a standard-essential patent is a patent that claims an invention that
must be used to comply with a technical standard.
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sion (”NDRC” who is responsible for price-related violations of China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law) began the investigation on whether Qualcomm abused its
dominant market position.3 On March 2, 2015, NDRC published its decision
regarding the anticompetitive conducts and ordered Qualcomm to cease these
conducts and to pay a fine of RMB 6.088 billion (approx. US$975 million). 4
Qualcomm announced that it would not contest the NDRC decision and agreed
to change certain of its patent licensing and baseband chip sales practices in
China.
While NDRC ruled that Qualcomm has several anti-competitive conducts
according to AML article 17, we focus on the charge of reverse licensing,5 i.e.
requiring Chinese licensees to cross-license their relevant SEPs and non-SEPs
to Qualcomm and its customers without compensation and without offsetting
royalties,6 because it has not been studied formally in the literature.
In Chinese market, there are two major patent holders in the smartphone
3China is not the only country investigating Qualcomm’s anticompetitive conducts. Be-
fore reaching an agreement in 2008, Nokia had complaint Qualcomm for charging expired
patent and high royalty rates. In 2009, South Korea fined Qualcomm Won 260 billion (USD
207 million), for abusing market dominance positions. More recently, in 2015, EU started
an investigation on predatory pricing, i.e. Qualcomm is driving his competitors out of the
market.
4According to AML article 47, the applicable antimonopoly enforcement authority may
order the operator to cease the objectionable activities, confiscate its illegal gains and levy
a fine between 1%-10% of the trunover of the business from the previous year.
5Also referred as “pass through rights” as we mentioned above.
6The anti-competitive conducts include bundling SEPs and non-SEPs without justifica-
tion, imposing unreasonable sales terms on baseband chip customers, charging royalties for
expired patents, etc.
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production market: Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd (“Huawei”) and Zhongxing
Telecommunication Equipment Corporation (“ZTE”), with roughly 30,000 and
52,000 patents respectively. On contrary, Xiaomi Inc. (“Xiaomi”) and OPPO
Electronics Corp. (“OPPO”) have only 10 and 103 patents in this market.7
Qualcomm adopted the practice of reverse licensing without offsetting pay-
ment: (1) when Huawei and ZTE purchase chips and patents from Qualcomm,
they have to surrender their own patents to Qualcomm for free, and (2) when
Xiaomi and OPPO purchase the chips from Qualcomm, they get not only
patents from Qualcomm, but also patents from Huawei and ZTE, without
paying to them. Such a practice clearly hinders the incentive to innovate for
not only Huawei and ZTE, as they gain nothing from their research; but also
Xiaomi and OPPO, as they could free ride on the others.8
However, the practice of reverse licensing promotes the smartphone com-
petition among the domestic Chinese producers. According to TrendForce, an
analytical firm’s report, the market share of Huawei and ZTE are 8.4% and
3.1% respectively in the year of 2015. Despite of few number of patents, Xi-
aomi and OPPO occupy 5.6% and 3.8% market share respectively.9 Our model
7Source: Di Yi Cai Jing Ri Bao, 03 December 2014. Accessed online
“http://tech.sina.com.cn/t/2014-12-03/02259846574.shtml” on 04 December 2014.
8Recently, Chinese government announced a new develop plan that stressed innovation.
The main purpose of this investigation is to promote innovation and protect domestic smart-
phone producer. (According to newspaper article)
9Accessed online ”http://press.trendforce.com/press/20160114-2265.html” on 08 June
2016
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is consistent with data, by showing that reverse licensing improves consumer
surplus.
We consider a model with an upstream monopolist (Qualcomm) selling
an intermediate good (smartphone chips) to downstream firms who produce
homogeneous final goods (smartphones) to consumers. Downstream firms are
heterogeneous: two leading firms (such as Huawei and ZTE) have advanced
technologies and the rest of firms have standard technologies of production.
We consider the following three-stage model of reverse licensing.
In the first stage, the upstream monopolist collects technologies from down-
stream firms and incorporate the technology into the intermediate goods sold
to all downstream firms. This resembles the Chinese smartphone chipset mar-
ket. In the second stage, the upstream monopolist sets a uniform price for each
smartphone chip and license all the collected technologies to all n downstream
firms including those who possesses technology initially. We do not allow price
discrimination against retailers as it is widely considered to be anticompeti-
tive worldwide including US and China. In the third stage, downstream firms
engage in a quantity competition.
We find that the upstream monopolist would charge uniform price and
zero royalty. The intuition is straightforward: the upstream monopolist has
a strong incentive to create a more competitive downstream market because
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of its full control of the intermediate product. He could, then, extract more
profits from the downstream market.
Next, we study the model under the regulation that the upstream man-
ufacturer cannot force downstream producer to surrender the technologies.
To incentivize the downstream producers to provide the technologies, the up-
stream producer needs to compensate them adequately. We consider a general
two-part tariff compensation scheme, showing that consumer surplus and ag-
gregate producer surplus will always be improved compared to the reverse
licensing case. In this way, the regulation by the Chinese government protects
domestic industry without a sacrifice of consumer surplus and social welfare. 10
Next we consider technology transfers in the first stage occurs other than
reverse licensing. We will consider three different licensing regimes: (1) under
no licensing, there is no technology transfer between any firms; (2) under inde-
pendent licensing, the two leading firms could license their respective technolo-
gies through royalties as in Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Kamien and Tauman
(1986); (3) under patent pool, the two leading firms combine their patents
into a single bundle to be licensed to potential rivals where licensing fee is set
to maximize profit of each firm.11 In all four regimes, we find that reverse
10We propose four different fixed fee compensation schemes in Appendix B.2.
11 We depart from Shapiro (2001) and Lerner and Tirole (2004). Instead assuming firms
set royalty rate to maximize pool members’ joint profit, we assume the royalty rate maximize
pool member’s individual profit. Because we focus on anti-trust studies, it may not be
plausible for Huawei and ZTE to form a Cartel in the downstream market, as Cartel itself
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licensing yields the highest consumer surplus, aggregate producer surplus, and
hence social welfare. The intuition is similar to double marginalization. Since
the upstream manufacturer is monopoly of the input and the two leaders in
the downstream are monopoly of their respective technology, reverse licensing
concentrates all market power into the hand of upstream manufacturer and
thereby avoid the problem of double marginalization.
Alongside with this result, our paper also addresses the complements prob-
lem proposed by Cournot (1838), and studied by Shapiro (2001). Our paper
is consistent with literature that when technologies are perfect complements,
patent pool could solve the complement problem in the vertical structure we
proposed above, i.e. the consumer surplus under patent pool is higher than
which under independent licensing. We could further show with a small pertur-
bation, when the technologies possess some degree of substitutability, patent
pool may not be the best solution to the problem. However, reverse licensing
could always improves consumer surplus, regardless of compatibility of the
technologies.
Lastly, we study the effect of the compensation on research incentive of
downstream firms. Clearly, under reverse licensing without offsetting payment,
firms have the least incentive to do research. We show that offsetting payment
is against anti-trust laws. Then we assume the two pool members will share the licensing
profit equally.
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will encourage firms to do research. Morevoer, to keep the leading position in
the market, Huawei and ZTE have more incentive than the other downstream
firms.
We will discuss the benchmark model of reverse licensing in section 2.2.
Section 2.3 discuses remedy under licensing. Section 2.4 studies independent
licensing and patent pool as alternatives to reverse licensing. Section 2.5 con-
siders R&D decisions and Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Model
We consider a vertical structure with one upstream manufacturer (Qualcomm)
of an intermediate good (chipset) and n downstream firms (smartphone pro-
ducers).
Assume one unit production of final good requires one unit of input (pro-
ducing one smartphone requires one chip). For simplicity, we assume the
marginal cost of producing the chips is 0. The profit for the manufacturer is
πm = dQ, where Q is the market demand for the final product and d is the
price for one unit of input.
The n downstream firms are heterogeneous: firms 1 and 2 have some pro-
cess innovation, i.e. technologies reduce cost of production, ²1 and ²2, and
thus they are the leader of the industry (for example, Huawei and ZTE in
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Chinese market). For simplicity, we assume ²1 = ²2 = ². However, the two
technologies may not be perfectly compatible. Combination of the two will
reduce production cost by α², where 1 ≤ α ≤ 2. Note that α is the measure of
compatibility, with α = 2 indicating the technologies are perfect complements,
and α = 1 implies perfect substitutes.
For the downstream market, assume marginal cost of production of firm 1
and firm 2 are c1 = c2 = c − ², and for the rest of the firms, are ci = c for
i 6= 1, 2. For tractability, we consider inverse demand function for the final
good is linear, P = a − Q = a −∑i qi where a > 0. Therefore the profit for
downstream firms is given by πi = (P − d− ci)qi for all i ∈ N where N is the
set of downstream firms.
2.2.1 No licensing
We consider the benchmark case where no licensing takes place. This case
is relevant when property right protection is weak so that licensing is not
possible. In this two-stage game, the upstream firm first chooses input price d
and then every downstream firm i simultaneously chooses their production qi.
The following Lemma shows the subgame perfect equilibrium when all firms
are active in the market.
Lemma 2.1. When there is no technology transfer and all firms are active in
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the market, the price of the intermediary input is dno = n(a−c)+2²
2n
and produc-




n(a− c) + 2(n2 − n− 1)²
2n(n + 1)
,
qno3 = ... = q
no
n =
n(a− c)− 2(2n + 1)²
2n(n + 1)
.







and profits for the




n(a− c) + 2(n2 − n− 1)²
2n(n + 1)
)2,
πno3 = ... = π
no
n = (





n(a− c) + 2²
2n
)(
n(a− c) + 2²
2(n + 1)
) =
(n(a− c) + 2²)2
4n(n + 1)
.
Note that we require ² < n
2(2n+1)
(a− c) to ensure firms without technology
are active in the market.
2.2.2 Reverse Licensing
We now consider a model where reverse licensing is imposed by an upstream
manufacturer. The upstream manufacturer requires that the sale of input
is conditional on surrender innovation. The upstream manufacturer combine
the technologies to the intermediate input sold to the downstream producers.
Hence, in first stage, the upstream manufacturer not only sets the price of the
chip, dr, but also the royalty fees rri for the cost reducing technology to firm






In the second stage, firms make purchasing decision on both chips and
technology, then engage in Cournot competition. If firm i purchases technol-
ogy, the profit for downstream firms is πri = (P − d − ci − rri )qi, otherwise,
πri = (P − d− ci)qi. The following Lemma shows the subgame perfect equilib-
rium when all firms are active in the market.
Proposition 2.1. When the upstream manufacturer engages in reverse licens-
ing, the upstream manufacturer sets the price of chips to be dr = 1
2
(a− c+α²)
and royalty fee to be zero (rri = 0 for all i ∈ N) and the production of down-
stream producers are qri =
1
2(n+1)
(a− c + α²) for all i ∈ N .
Note that the upstream manufacturer sets the same royalty fee for all down-
stream producers even if some of the downstream firms have already possessed
part of the technology. The intuition is that the upstream manufacturer would
be benefited from a more competitive downstream Cournot market due to the
profits from the intermediary good. This explains why Qualcomm has treated
downstream firms equally, despite the fact that Huawei and ZTE possess some
technologies at the very beginning.
2.3 Remedy
Under the ruling of Chinese government, Qualcomm has to compensate down-
stream firms for patents surrendered. This implies that Qualcomm cannot
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exercise the market power to force downstream producers to surrender their
patents, and it has to provide incentives for downstream producers to transfer
their technologies.
Consider the manufacturer offers a two-part tariff compensation scheme to
both firms 1 and 2.12 Let rti be the royalty fee of technologies α². Let r
d
j and
Fj , for j = 1 and 2, be the royalty discount and fixed fee compensation for
firms 1 and 2 respectively. Define ri = r
t
i − rdi + d be royalty fee and the price
of chips for all i ∈ N . Note that rdi = 0 for all i ∈ N\{1, 2}. Let Γ be the
profit of firms 1 and 2, if they choose not to surrender the technologies to the





riqi − F1(r1, ..., rn)− F2(r1, ..., rn),
π1 = (a−Q− (c− α² + r1))q1 + F1,
π2 = (a−Q− (c− α² + r2))q2 + F2,
πj = (a−Q− (c− α² + rj))qj for j = 3, 4, ..., n.
Using backward induction, the downstream firms will produce
q1 = q2 =
(a− α²)− (n− 1)r + (n− 2)rˉ
n + 1
,
q3 = ... = qn =
(a− α²) + 2r− 3rˉ
n + 1
.
12In appendix B.2, we consider compensation involving only fixed fee.
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Note that, first, the fixed fee compensation is exogenous to firms 1 and 2.
Second, by firms’ symmetric property, we have r1 = r2 ≡ r and r3 = ... = rn ≡
rˉ in equilibrium.
From the manufacturer’s prospective, the fixed fee compensation is defined
to be the profit difference between firms surrendering the technology and the
outside option, i.e. F1(r, rˉ) = Γ−π1 = Γ−q21 and F2(r, rˉ) = Γ−π2 = Γ−q22. By
symmetry, F1(r, rˉ) = F2(r, rˉ) ≡ F (r, rˉ). Therefore the maximization problem
of the manufacturer becomes
max
r,rˉ
r(q1 + q2) + rˉ
n∑
i=3
qi − 2F (r, rˉ)
We have two cases to consider: F > 0 if and only if γ ≡ √Γ > 1
4
(a−c+α²);
otherwise, F ≤ 0.
If F > 0, solve manufacturer’s problem to get
r =








q1 = q2 =
a− c + α²
4
,
q3 = ... = qn = 0
Due to the royalty compensation, firms 1 and 2 have a lower production
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cost. They will become duopoly in the downstream market. However, con-
sumers are still better off. Comparing with reverse licensing case, note that












If F ≤ 0, it is the corner solution, where only royalty discount is imple-
mented by the manufacturer. In this case, let γ =
√




2rγ + (n− 2)rˉ (a− c + α²) + 2r− 3rˉ
n + 1
subject to γ =




n(a− c + α²)− 2(n + 1)γ
2(n− 1) ,
rˉ =
a− c + α²
2
,
q1 = q2 = γ,
q3 = ... = qn =
a− c + α²− 4γ
2(n− 1)
Note in this case, γ = q1 = q2 <
a−c+α²
4
, as firms 1 and 2 are getting less
royalty discount than the previous case. And hence r > 0 and q3 = ... = qn > 0.







(a− c + α²). Because







2(n− 1)(a− c + α²)
>
n− 2
2(n− 1)(a− c + α²)
>
a− c + α²
4
as n ≥ 3.
Aggregate producer surplus is
Πtt ≡2Γ + (n− 2)(a− c + α²− 4γ
2(n− 1) )
2 + γ
n(a− c + α²)− 2(n + 1)γ
(n− 1)
+ (n− 2)a− c + α²
2
a− c + α²− 4γ
2(n− 1) .
The reverse licensing case should be the worst outside option for firms 1
and 2, i.e. they have to surrender the technologies to the manufacturer for free.
Check that when γ = qri =
1
2(n+1)
(a−c+α²), Πtt = Πr. When γ = 1
4
(a−c+α²),
it reduces to the interior solution case, where Πtt = 1
4
(a− c + α²)2 > Πr. Note
that Πtt is quadratic on γ, with leading coefficient −4
(n−1)2 < 0. Therefore, for




(a− c+α²)], the aggregate producer surplus under
two-part tariff is weakly higher than which under reverse licensing case. We
summarize the results as below:
Proposition 2.2. Consider the upstream manufacturer offers two-part tariff
compensation for the surrendered patents. The royalty discount is always pos-
itive. If the outside option is sufficiently large, i.e. Γ > 1
16
(a − c + α²)2, the
upstream manufacturer also provides positive fixed compensation. Otherwise,
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the fixed compensation is zero. In both cases, consumer surplus and aggregate
producer surplus are further improved than those under reverse licensing.
From the two cases discussed above, we may infer that the manufacturer
charges 1
2
(a − c + α²) for the smartphone chips, firms 1 and 2 will always
get a royalty discount, while the other firms will not. The higher the royalty
discounts, the higher the quantity produced, and the lower the fixed compen-
sation is required. The manufacturer has to balance these three effects. When
outside option for firms 1 and 2 is large, the manufacturer uses both royalty
discount and fixed compensation to acquire the technologies, giving large pro-
duction advantage for firms 1 and 2, and resulting all the other firms leaving
the market. When the outside option is small, royalty discount is sufficient for
the compensation. All firms will stay in market, as the difference of production
cost between firms 1 and 2 and the rest of firms are not significant. With the
positive compensation, firms will produce more smartphones in the produc-
tion market, yielding higher consumer surplus. For the manufacturer’s profit,
the loss from the compensation is recovered from the increase in the output
production. Since firms 1 and 2 are better-off, by earning the profit equals
to the outside option, the overall aggregate producer surplus is also improved.
Policy makers should encourage such compensation, as both consumers and
the domestic leaders, i.e. Huawei and ZTE, will be better-off. Moreover, the
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aggregate producer surplus, and thus social welfare are also higher under this
compensation scheme.
2.4 Alternative Licensing Regimes
In this section, we consider two alternative licensing regimes other than reverse
licensing: (1) downstream producers may transfer their technologies to their
rival; and (2) downstream producers with innovation may form a patent pool
to transfer technology.
2.4.1 Independent licensing
Now we consider the standard independent royalty licensing case. The leading
firms, i.e. firms 1 and 2, transfer technology through royalty licensing. Let the
royalty rate be ri1 and r
i
2 respectively.
13 Consider the standard licensing game.
In first stage, upstream firm set the price for intermediary input di. Firms 1
and 2 set the royalty rate for their technologies respectively in second stage. In
the last stage, downstream firms purchase the input; make purchasing decision
on the technologies, and then engage in Cournot competition.
The profits for firms are14
πim = dQ,
13We use superscript i to denote the case independent licensing.
14According to Kaimen and Tauman (1986), all the firms will be purchasing the technol-
ogy, as long as the royalty fee is no greater than the cost reduction by the technology.
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πi1 = (P − d− (c− α²)− ri2)q1 + ri1(q2 + q3 + ... + qn),
πi2 = (P − d− (c− α²)− ri1)q2 + ri2(q1 + q3 + ... + qn),
πij = (P − d− (c− α²)− ri1 − ri2)qj for all j ∈ N\ {1, 2}.





2(n− 1) + (n + 1)(n− 1)
(5n− 7)(n + 1)− 2(n− 1)(n− 3)(a− c− d + α²) ≡ r
i∗.
However, we have three restrictions on the general royalty rate ri: (i)
qi3 = ... = q
i
n ≥ 0 if and only if ri ≤ 14(a − c − d + α²), (ii) For firms 1 and 2:
they will purchase patent from each other if and only if ri < ²(α− 1), and (iii)
For firms 3, 4...n: they will purchase the patent from firm 1 and 2 if and only
if ri < 1
2
α².15
First of all, we note that 1
2
α² ≥ ²(α− 1), with equality holds when α = 2,
i.e. the technologies are perfectly compatible. Intuitively, firms without any
technology would like to pay more to improve their productions. It suffices to
check the conditions (i) and (ii) only. Second, note that ri∗ > 1
4
(a− c−d+α²)
if and only if n2 + 2n + 1 > 0, which is true for all n. Therefore ri∗ cannot be
the solution to the constraint optimization problem.
Hence, we only have corner solutions left, i.e. firms 1 and 2 charge the
royalty fee such that firms without technology exit the market, or the royalty
15Standard royalty licensing results according to Kamien and Tauman (1986).
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fee is the maximum firms 1 and 2 to pay each other. We have two cases to
discuss, i.e. ri = min{1
4
(a− c− d + α²), ²(α− 1)}.
Lemma 2.2. Under independent licensing, when ri = (α − 1)², the upstream
















Lemma 2.3. When r = 1
4
(a− c−d+α²), the upstream manufacturer sets the
price of input and royalty rates to be di = 1
2
(a− c+α²) and ri = 1
8
(a− c+α²).






c + α²) and qi3 = ... = q
i
n = 0.
Proposition 2.3 below provides a sufficient condition for firms to exit the
market. Under independent licensing, the market power of firms 1 and 2
increases as the technologies are more and more compatible, i.e. they are more
of a complements. Furthermore, when technologies are efficient in reducing
production cost, firms 1 and 2 would like to further increase their market
power by cross licensing the technologies to each other, and hence achieving
higher profits by driving all the other firms out of the market. Otherwise, they
would like to license the technology to all the other firms, in order to achieve
higher profit through the collection of licensing fees.
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Proposition 2.3. When technologies holding by firms 1 and 2 are compatible,
i.e. α > 12n+2
7n
, and the production cost reduction is sufficiently high, i.e.
1
7α−8(a− c) < ² < n2(2n+1)(a− c), firms 3, 4, ..., n will exit the market.
2.4.2 Patent Pool
Consider firms 1 and 2 form a pool, licensing the technology α² at a royalty
fee rp, and sharing the profit equally. The game structure is similar to inde-
pendent licensing. In first stage, upstream firm set the price for intermediary
input dp. In the second stage, firms 1 and 2 charges rp for the combined
technology. In the last stage, downstream firms purchase the input; make pur-
chasing decision on the combined technologies, and then engage in Cournot
competition. We assume that firms 1 and 2 do not need to pay each other for
their technologies respectively. Once they agree to combine the technologies,
they have the knowledge of the new technology, and hence could use it for
their own production.
Even though firms are forming a patent pool, we assume that they still
choose the level of production to maximize own profit. It is not realistic for
them (e.g. Huawei and ZTE) to form a collusion to maximize joint profits, i.e.
there is no Cartel in the market. Pool members will agree to license the patent
at some royalty rate rp. By our model setup, since firms 1 and 2 symmetric,
the royalty fee rp1 = r
p
2 ≡ rp should be the agreement outcome in equilibrium.
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The profits for firms are16
πpm = dQ,
πp1 = (P − d− (c− α²))q1 +
1
2
rp(q3 + ... + qn),
πp2 = (P − d− (c− α²))q2 +
1
2
rp(q3 + ... + qn),
πpj = (P − d− (c− α²)− rp)qj for all j ∈ N\ {1, 2}.
By backward induction,
q1 = q2 =
(a− c− d) + α² + (n− 2)rp
n + 1
,
q3 = ... = qn =
(a− c− d) + α²− 3rp
n + 1
.






rp(q3 + ... + qn)
gives us rp∗ = n+5
2(n+7)
(a−c−d+α²). Firms 3 and 4 will purchase the patent







if and only if n + 1 > 0. Therefore rp∗ cannot be the
solution of the constrained optimization problem. Combine the conditions, we
have rp = min{1
3
(a− c− d + α²), α²}.
Proposition 2.4. Consider firms 1 and 2 form a patent pool. (a) When
1
5α
(a − c) < ² < n
2(2n+1)
(a − c), firms without initial technology will exit the
16Following Kaimen and Tauman (1986).
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market, the upstream manufacturer sets the price of chips dp = 1
2
(a− c + α²)
and royal rate rp = 1
6
(a− c+α²), and the production of downstream producers





(a − c + α²) and qp3 = ... = qpn = 0. (b) When ² < 15α(a − c),
all the firms stay in the market, the upstream manufacturer sets the price of
chips dp = n(a−c)+2α²
2n
and royal rate rp = α², and the production of downstream











In comparing with Proposition 2.3, under patent pool, compatibility be-
tween the technologies is no longer a factor for firms without initial technology
to exit the market, as firms 1 and 2 will combine the technologies and license
them as a whole. It is easy to check that 1
5α
(a − c) < 1
7α−8(a − c), indicating
firms 1 and 2 are more likely to foreclose the other firms under patent pool,
even if the technologies are not very efficient in improving production efficiency.
By forming a pool, there is no more competition between firms 1 and 2 in li-
censing the technologies, and hence market dominance is easily achieved. Our
policy implication is that if the government wants to promote the downstream
market competition, independent licensing should be preferred to patent pool.
2.4.3 Comparison
In section 2.2 and 2.4, we have two bounds for all firms producing in the
downstream market and firms without initial technology leaving the market.
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So there are 3 cases: (1) 0 < ² < 1
5α
(a − c), all firms will stay in market; (2)
1
5α
(a − c) ≤ ² < 1
7α−8(a − c), firms without initial technologies will exit the
market under patent pool; and (3) 1
7α−8(a − c) ≤ ² < n2(2n+1)(a − c), firms
without initial technologies will exit in both independent licensing and patent
pool.
In the following analysis, we consider the reverse licensing without rem-
edy. Since we have shown that remedy will further improve consumer surplus,
aggregate producer surplus and social welfare, it is suffices for us to show
without remedy, reverse licensing improves these three measures in comparing
with independent licensing and patent pool. We will focus on the analysis
of consumer surplus in this section, the proof for aggregate producer surplus
could be found in Appendix B.1.
Lemma 2.4. When all firms stay in the market, i.e. 0 < ² < 1
5α
(a − c),
reverse licensing is the best for consumer.






(a− c + α²) < n(a− c) + 2α²
2(n + 1)
= Qp
because the competition becomes a duopoly with technology level α². Con-
sumer surplus under duopoly is lower.
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(a− c + α²) < n(a− c + α²)− 2(n− 1)(α− 1)²
2(n + 1)
= Qi
because the competition becomes a duopoly with cross licensing, and hence
consumer surplus is lower.
In all the cases, we can conclude that consumer surplus under reverse
licensing is highest.17 In fact, the aggregate producer surplus and hence, social
welfare are also highest under reverse licensing.
Theorem 2.1. Reverse licensing yields highest consumer surplus, aggregate
producer surplus, and hence social welfare.
Since the upstream manufacturer is monopoly of the input and the two
leaders in the downstream are monopoly of their respective technology, reverse
licensing concentrates all market power into the hand of upstream manufac-
turer and thereby avoids the problem of double marginalization.
Theorem 2.1 addresses also the “complements problem” which was pro-
posed by Cournot in 1838, and studied by Shapiro (2001). When two (or
more) perfectly complements are used as input for downstream firms’ produc-
tion, patent pool could internalize the externality; and hence yields higher
consumer surplus and producer surplus.
17More comparisons for consumer surplus are presented in Appendix B.1.
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First of all, when α = 2, i.e. the two technologies are perfect complements,
patent pool could solve this complements problem. In addition, we show that
reverse licensing is an even better way of solving the problem, as the consumer
surplus is highest under reverse licensing. The upstream firm could internalize
the complementary externality better than the two downstream leaders.
Second, we shall notice that patent pool fails to solve the complements
problem, once the technology deviates a little from perfect compatibility (or
perfect complements). Consider the case where all the firms stay in market
in all the different licensing cases, i.e. 0 < ² < 1
5α
(a − c). When α < 2(n−1)
n
,
from the proof of Theorem 1, we have Qp < Qi. 18 However reverse licensing
always yields highest consumer surplus, for all the compatibility level.
We further study the complements problem by varying the degree of com-
patibilities between the two technologies. Focusing on the case 0 < ² <
1
5α



















Figure 2.1 shows the relationship of consumer surplus with respect to com-
18In Appendix B.1, we also show that When α < 2(n−1)n , we have Π
p < Πi, which is









Figure 2.1: Consumer surplus varies with compatibility
patibility level α for the three different licensing regimes. As the technologies
become more compatible, reverse licensing and patent pool could fully utilize
these technologies, and hence leading to higher consumer surplus. Consumer
surplus is decreasing as the technologies become more compatible under inde-
pendent licensing, as firms 1 and 2 will raise the production cost of the down-
stream market, by charging higher royalty fees for their own technologies. Note
that when the technologies are more of substitutes, firms would compete more
intensively under independent licensing, leading to a higher consumer surplus
than which under patent pool. The fact that reverse licensing solves the double
marginalization problem is reflected by the highest consumer surplus curve,
which also indicates the double marginalization problem is more serious in
affecting consumer surplus, comparing with the complements problem.
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2.5 Research and Development
Before surrendering the technologies to the upstream firm, downstream firms
could invest fixed amount I to get a technology ². We would like to study
the investment decision of all the firms under the reverse licensing game. For
simplicity, we assume all technologies are perfectly compatible in this section.
But we also want to extent our study to k firms possess some initial technolo-
gies. Let K be the set of firms possess initial technology, and N\K be the set
of firms does not possess any initial technology. Note that K = 2 is the case
which we have studied in previous sections.
2.5.1 Before remedy
We determine the threshold I∗, such that all firms will be doing research.
Suppose all firms are doing the investment, and hence, the aggregate tech-
nology level will be (n + k)². Downstream firms’ profits are Π1 = ... = Πn =
1
4(n+1)2




(a − c + (n + k − 1)²)2. Therefore, the firms i ∈ K will invest if
and only if I < (2(a−c)+(2n+3)²)²
4(n+1)2
≡ I∗.
If firm j ∈ N\K deviates, i.e. he does not invest. Then Π ′j = 14(n+1)2 (a −





Consider another symmetric equilibrium, where no firms are investing.
Firms’ profits are: Π1 = ... = Πn =
1
4(n+1)2
(a − c + k²)2. If firm i ∈ K
deviates, i.e. he invests. Then Π′i =
1
4(n+1)2
(a− c+(k +1)²)2. Similarly, if firm
j ∈ N\K deviates, his profit will be Π′j = 14(n+1)2 (a− c+(k +1)²)2. Therefore,
firms will deviate to invest if and only if I < (2(a−c)+(2k+1)²)²
4(n+1)2
= I∗∗.
Proposition 2.5. If I < I∗∗ < I∗, there is only one symmetric equilibrium
where all firms invest. If I∗∗ < I < I∗, either all firms invest or no firm invest.
One implication of this proposition is that firms try to free ride each other,
as I∗∗ < I∗. When no one is doing investment, firms are reluctant to become
the first one to do research. Before the anti-trust policy takes effect, reverse
licensing harms the research incentive.
2.5.2 After remedy
We consider the simple case, where the manufacturer uses fixed fee as the
compensation.19 If one firm keeps his technology, he could only use it for
himself. There is no licensing option. The manufacturer will pay the compen-
sation as the profits difference between providing the technology and keeping
it. Consider firm i ∈ K will keep the technology, and he will do investment
if and only if ( a−c+(3n+k−2)²
2(n+1)
)2 − I > (a−c+(2n+k−2)²
2(n+1)
)2 which is equivalent to
19We depart from the two-part tariff compensation scheme in this section, as we need an
explicit expression for the outside outside option, Γ. Otherwise, it is not possible for us to




≡ Iˆ. Consider firm j ∈ N\K will keep the technology,
and he will do investment if and only if ( a−c+(2n+k−1)²
2(n+1)
)2 − I > (a−c+(n+k−1)²
2(n+1)
)2
which is equivalent to I < (2(a−c)+(3n+2k−2)²)n²
4(n+1)2
≡ Iˉ.
Proposition 2.6. Compensation from upstream firm encourages firms to in-
vest. Leading firms have more incentive to research.
First of all, I∗ < Iˉ < Iˆ, indicating all firms have more incentive to research.
Second, leading firms, i ∈ K, are more willing to invest than firms j ∈ N\K to
keep their technological dominance in the market, because they could receive
more compensation from the upstream firm. The Chinese mobile producers
have indeed increased their R&D expenditure. Huawei has put USD9.2 billion
in 2015, increasing 41.6% from 2014. In the research on the 5G technology,
ZTE will spend USD400 million annually and adding 800 engineers to the
research lab. 20 The cease of anti-competitive conducts of Qualcomm really
stimulates the R&D incentive for the technology leaders in China.
Note that all the I∗(k), I∗∗(k), Iˆ(k) and Iˉ(k) are increasing in k. When
there are more firms possessing initial technologies, all the firms are more
willing to do investment, so that they could have more competitive power in
the market.
20The R&D expenditure figure for Xiaomi and OPPO is not publicly announced.
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2.6 Conclusion
Compared to patent pool or independent licensing among downstream firms,
reverse licensing performs better in terms of consumer surplus, aggregate pro-
ducer surplus and hence social welfare. A two-part tariff compensation from
the manufacturer will further enhance the three measures. However, from long-
run perspective, reverse licensing reduces incentive to innovate. Yet, under the
pure fixed fee remedy, more incentive to innovate can be induced. Hence, for
anti-trust regulation, this suggests that reverse licensing should be under rule
of reason instead of per se illegal. In particular, the ruling of Qualcomm case
in China exactly follows our policy suggestion.
Our model also sheds light on the classical complementary inputs problem
by Cournot (1838). Shapiro (2001) considers the input to be technology such
that patent pool can avoid this problem. In our vertical structure setup, we






Corruption and pollution are the top two worried-list in China according to
Spring 2015 Global Attitude survey. Beijing, the capital, is well-known for
its haze and air pollution since 1998. 1 To ensure a clean environment for
Beijing Olympic Games 2008, the most notorious polluter, Shougang Group,
started moving its production from Beijng to Tangshan City, Hebei Province,
since 2005. By 2010, the transfer of production is complete, and from 2013
onwards, the cities in Hebei Province became top polluted cities in China. The
iron and steel production became one of the root problems for the air pollution
in Hebei Province. World bank approved a loan of USD500 million to help
1According to World Health Organization’s report 1998.
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Hebei to fight for the air pollution in June 2016. 2 Hebei Province also put
new regulations on improving the air quality since October 2016.
The presence of corruption will make the regulation even more difficult.
Bribes between bureaucrats and firms could have devastating effect on un-
dermining the environment. In a seminal paper, Liao and Geng (2014) have
concluded that anti-corruption practices do have a significant negative effect
on pollution suggesting corruption as one of the main factors of pollution in
China. In June 2016, one officer in Tangshan Municipal Environmental Pro-
tection Bureau was arrested, by the charge that allowing hundreds of firms
polluting. 3
In Indonesia, corruption is often cited as the root cause of the haze problem
in recent years.4 Government officials turn a blind eye to (palm oil) compa-
nies who burn the crops generating devastating air pollution. Clean technol-
ogy, such as using machines to clear the cultivated land, is not adopted by
these firms due to the higher cost. In many empirical literatures, Fredriksson




3According to ”http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2016-06/14/c 1119042616.htm” Ac-




has decreased the stringency of environmental regulations.5 Ivanova (2010)
has shown that under corruption, emissions tend to be significantly under-
reported.6
Even there is indeed transferring of the clean technology, pollution may
still increase due to higher production of the industries.7 In the worst cases,
the dirty firms may not be able to adopt the clean technology on their out-of-
date machines. So shutting down these firms may be a better solution than
transferring the technologies. In recent years, China had shut down thousands
of heavily polluted firms to fight the pollution, and in 2016, Beijing is planning
to shut down 2500 firms to improve the environment. To our knowledge, this
is the first IO paper discussing government regulation in promoting technology
transfer or shutting down dirty firms in the presence of corruption. We find
that corruption may undermine the government policy in shutting down the
heavily polluting firms, but also increases the likelihood of technology transfer.
If we consider socially optimal taxation, even though corruption induces more
pollution, it is possible to be the equilibrium outcome.
We consider two firms competing in a homogenous good market, with pol-
5Both papers uses tax as government regulation.
6Our model will be built on this point that firms could bribe the bureaucrat to under-
report the emission.
7Takarada (2005) studies a trade model between two countries, and shows clean technol-
ogy transfer may increase the pollution in both donor country and recipient country under
certain conditions.
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lution accompanied with production, which is not observed by the social plan-
ner. There is a clean technology, which could effectively reduce pollution. We
consider one firm (firm 1) has the clean technology but the other firm (firm
2) does not.8 Our paper departs from the literatures (for example, Acemoglu
and Verdier (2000), and Stathopoulou and Varvarigos (2013) ), i.e. they study
homogeneous firms choosing clean or dirty technology. Under our setup, we
could offer an alternative explanation for dirty firms not adopting the clean
technology, despite of the low willingness to purchase. We find that firms with
clean technology may not be willing to sell it to other firms; hence maintaining
the dominance position in the market.
Firm 2 could make a private decision on purchasing the clean technology
from firm 1 through fixed fee licensing. There is a bureaucrat inspecting the
firms’ technology adoption, and reporting these publicly. The environmental
tax is then collected based on the report. The bureaucrat will always truthfully
report firm 1 to be clean. However, he is corruptible, and will misreport the
actual emission if he accepts bribe from the firm 2. Therefore, government
needs to implement anti-corruption policy to monitor the bureaucrat.
Government cares about both consumer surplus and environment. We say
a country is output-oriented, if government weighs consumer surplus more
8We consider the technology owner is an outsider in Discussion section and Appendix
C.2.4.
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than environment; otherwise, the country is environment-oriented. He will
use environmental tax as an instrument to reduce pollution. Clearly, the tax
has two opposing effects on social welfare. On the one hand, higher tax rate
will reduce pollution inducing better environment. On the other hand, it will
reduce firm’s production, and hence lowers consumer surplus.
We study the model from three aspects. First of all, we find that there is
substitution effect between corruption and technology transfer. In the absence
of corruption, for an intermediary tax range, government taxation fails to
promote technology transfer, leading to lower consumer surplus and higher
pollution level. In this scenario, firm 1 would like to charge a high licensing
fee for the technology to foreclose firm 2, thus gaining a monopoly position in
the market. While under the presence of corruption, technology transfer will
occur under such tax range. Intuitively, knowing the ease of bribing, firm 1
will set a lower fee on the clean technology, to induce firm 2 to come clean
and compete in the open and equal terms. In this sense, allowing cheating
disciplines firm 1, i.e. firm 1 could no longer forecloses firm 2 by charging high
licensing fee, to reduce firm 2’s incentive to cheat.
Second, strategic effect is not the driving force to the corruption equilib-
rium. We find that corruption may be the equilibrium when two heterogenous
firms competing in the market. If the clean technology is owned by an outsider
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innovation, and there is only a monopoly in the production market. Corrup-
tion may still be the equilibrium under high environmental tax rate. In such
case, the government would like to shut down the firm, but the firm will bribe
the bureaucrat to remain active in the market. Therefore, corruption may
occur regardless of competition among the firms.
Third, we have several policy implications, i.e. the regulatory effects. We
show that a more output-oriented country would set a low tax rate to achieve
highest social welfare. In such case, the competition effect will always ensure
the technology transfer from firm 1 to firm 2, and hence consumer surplus will
be higher and pollution will be lower. With low tax rate, firm 2 is competitive
even without the clean technology. Firm 1, then, will always set a lower price
on the technology, to ensure the transfer is profitable to him. Firm 2 will never
bribe the bureaucrat, facing such a low price of the technology.
In a more environment-oriented country, the government should always
set a high tax rate, aiming to shut down the heavily polluting firm 2, and
hence reducing pollution in the market. With weak anti-corruption policy,
when the bribing cost is low, firm 2 would choose from licensing or bribing in
order to stay in market. In such case, bribing the bureaucrat may be socially
optimal. Comparing with licensing, even though bribing will lower the total
output, and hence lower consumer surplus; it lowers pollution level as well.
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The later effect outweighs the former, and hence social welfare is improved.
Nevertheless, firm 2 is not shut down, and government regulation fails in the
presence of corruption.
Our paper is related to literatures in corruption and pollution. Lui (1985)
and Beck and Maher (1986) have studied the efficiency-enhancing effect of
corruption on resource allocation. Acemoglu and Verdier (2000) has studied
the relationship between market failure and government intervention. In the
Laissez-Faire equilibrium, all firms will choose the dirty technology, leading
to market failure. government should both set an environmental tax and hire
bureaucrats to monitor these firms, as ways of intervening the firms to adopt
the clean technology. They have shown that the optimal intervention involves
a fraction of bureaucrats accepting the bribes from the firms. In line with the
insights, our paper suggests that in an environment-oriented country, social
optimal taxation indeed induces corruption, if the clean technology is not very
effective in reducing pollution.
The structure of our analysis are organized as follows: section 3.2 will be
the model setup. We study the benchmark case without corruption in section
3.3, and include corruption in section 3,4. Section 3.5 is a discussion on outside
innovator, i.e. technology is owned by domestic research lab. We conclude the




We consider a simple model in which taxation policy and corruption may affect
firms’ adoption of clean technology. Consider a homogeneous good production
market, with linear demand function P = 1−Q. The production of the good
accompanies with pollution, E. Pollution is not observable by the government
or social planner, thus is measured by production.9 There are two types of
technology: dirty technology and clean technology. For dirty technology, we
assume each unit of production generates one unit of pollution, while for clean
technology each unit of production generates only α unit of pollution, where
0 < α < 1. In other words, compared to dirty technology, clean technol-
ogy could effectively reduce the pollution, but does not improve production
efficiency.
There are two firms in the market that are engaged in Cournot competition.
Both firms have the same production technology and the cost of production
is normalized to zero. The two firms have different technologies in generating
pollution: firm 1 has the clean technology while firm 2 has the dirty technology.
The technology of each firm is common knowledge. Then we have e1 = αq1
9Product tax is a form of environmental tax in the U.S., for example gas guzzler tax and
tax on fertilizers.
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and e2 = q2, where qi is output of firm i and ei is the amount of pollution
generated by firm i. Denote the aggregate output by Q and the total amount
of pollution by E, where Q = q1 + q2 and E = e1 + e2.
Though there is no cost of production, it is not costless for each firm to
produce given that production generates pollution. Suppose government has
set an environmental tax t for the production of each firm. And the total
amount of tax paid by each firm depends on the technology level. Firm 2,
then, may want to purchase the clean technology in effectively reducing the
environmental tax. We assume that the technology transfer process is private
so that whether firm 2 adopts the clean or dirty technology eventually is not
publicly observed. Therefore, the government hires a bureaucrat, who may
be corruptive, to check the technology of firm 2. The bureaucrat is risk-
neutral and receives a fixed wage w (exogenous). If the bureaucrat is not
corruptive, then he always reports the technology of firm 2 truthfully.10 We
also consider the possibility that the bureaucrat may be corruptible so that
he may misreport the technology adopted by firm 2. This can be the case
where the bureaucrat reports the technology of firm 2 be “clean”, while in fact
firm 2 has not purchased the clean technology from firm 1. The bureaucrat
has an incentive to misreport if firm 2 has offered enough money as a bribe.
10We assume the bureaucrat will always truthfully report firm 1’s technology to be clean,
which is consistent with Ivanova (2011).
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However, such a corruptive behavior is not costless. With a probability of
σ, the bureaucrat’s report will be checked, and thus be detected whether the
report is true or not. If false report is discovered, the bureaucrat loses all his
wage (including the bribe he has received, if any). Therefore, the bureaucrat
is only willing to accept the bribe, denoted by b, if the expected gain from
bribing is non-negative, i.e., (1 − σ)(b + w) ≥ w. Thus the minimum bribe
offer that the bureaucrat will accept is b = σw
1−σ .
We consider the following game. In stage 1, firm 1 sets a fixed licensing
fee F for the clean technology and firm 2 decides whether to purchase the
clean technology from the rival, or to bribe the bureaucrat by offering b, or
to keep using the dirty technology. In stage 2, the bureaucrat inspects firm 2
and makes a report on the technology used by firm 2. Two firms compete in
quantities and taxes are collected based on the report made by the bureaucrat.
We analyze two cases depending on whether the bureaucrat is corruptive
or not. In each case, we first study firm 2’ choice of whether to purchase the
clean technology based on different taxation policies. We further discuss how
different taxation policies affect pollution and consumer surplus. Lastly, we
investigate the optimal taxation policy, which may depend on the nature of
the government, i.e. output-oriented or environment-oriented.
69
3.3 Without Corruption
We first consider the benchmark case without corruption. In other words, the
bureaucrat will always truthfully report the true technology of the firm being
monitored (i.e., firm 2). In this sense, there is no scope for the firm with dirty
technology to bribe the bureaucrat. Thus, we can just focus on two options
of firm 2: purchasing the clean technology from the rival, or keeping using the
dirty technology.
3.3.1 Equilibria
We analyze the equilibrium of this case using backwards induction.
3.3.1.1 Stage 2: Competition
In this stage, we just need to consider two possible cases depending on whether
licensing takes place in stage 1.
Case 1: No Licensing
If licensing does not take place in stage 1, firm 1 produces with the clean
technology which generates pollution e1 = αq1, while firm 2 produces with the
dirty technology which generates pollution e2 = q2. Therefore firms’ profits
are
πN1 = (1− q1 − q2)q1 − αtq1,
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πN2 = (1− q1 − q2)q2 − tq2.
Standard Cournot competition leads to
qN1 =
1 + (1− 2α)t
3
, qN2 =

























, πN2 = 0,
if 1
2−α < t ≤ 1. In other words, when the tax rate is high, firm 2 will exit the
market due to a high environmental tax.
Case 2: Licensing
If firm 1 licenses the clean technology to firm 2 at a fixed fee F , then firms’
profits are
πL1 = (1− q1 − q2)q1 − αtq1 + F,




















3.3.1.2 Stage 1: Firm 2’s choice
From Wang (1998), we know that firm 2 would choose to purchase the clean
technology (i.e., licensing) if and only if the joint profit of the firms increases
after technology transfer taking place. Therefore, licensing will be the equilib-
rium if and only if
πL1 + π
L
2 ≥ πN1 + πN2 ,
i.e., t ≤ 2
5−3α ; otherwise, no licensing will be the equilibrium.
The following Proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose there exits no corruption. When t ≤ 2
5−3α , licens-
ing takes place in equilibrium; otherwise, no licensing takes place in equilib-
rium.
From Proposition 3.1, we know that a low tax rate leads to low cost of
production. Firm 1 will have less advantage in the production level competi-
tion, and thus he will set a lower fee for the technology, which would lead to
technology transfer among firms. In contrast, a high tax rate would prevent
the adoption of clean technology of firm 2. In fact, firm 2 will exit in this case.
3.3.2 Consumer Surplus and Pollution
From Proposition 3.1, we know that firm 2’s choice of whether to purchase the
clean technology (i.e., licensing option) could affect competition between the
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two firms and result in different outputs (or consumer surplus) and the levels of
pollution. The Proposition summarizes how licensing affects consumer surplus
and pollution for any given taxation policy.
Proposition 3.2. For any given tax rate, licensing always improves consumer
surplus compared to no licensing. Licensing also reduces the total emission if
and only if 0 < t ≤ 1
2
.
Since technology transfer from licensing improves the technology used by
firm 2, this further intensifies competition between the two firms and increases
the total output produced by the firms. Therefore, licensing always results in
higher consumer surplus regardless of the tax rate.
The effect of licensing on pollution depends on the tax rate. When the
tax rate is low (i.e., 0 < t < 1
2
), licensing improves the technology adopted
by firm 2 and thus reduces the pollution generated by it, despite that firm 2
produces more. Furthermore, stronger competition between both firms lowers
the output produced by firm 1, and reduces the pollution generated as well. As
a result, the total pollution is reduced after technology transfer takes place.
When tax rate is high (i.e., 1
2
< t < 1), firm 2 will exit the market in the
absence of licensing (or technology transfer). In this case, firm 1 becomes the
monopoly, and hence generates less total pollution. Therefore, compared to
no licensing, licensing leads to both higher outputs and higher pollution.
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However, our model also suggests that government policy alone may not
be sufficient to achieve the first-best outcome. Consider the case where the
clean technology is very efficient in reducing pollution, i.e. α < 1
3
. In such
case, for tax rate 2
5−3α < t ≤ 12 , i.e. licensing will lead to higher consumer
surplus and lower emission, but no licensing will be the equilibrium, following
Proposition 3.1. Indeed, it is not jointly profitable for licensing to take place,
and firm 1 would charge a high price for the technology to maintain its market
dominance position by foreclosing firm 2. Since the private incentive does not
perfectly align with the social incentive, government taxation policy may not
be efficiently by inducing technology transfer.
3.3.3 Optimal Taxation Policy
Since the diffusion of clean technology between firms would effectively reduce
pollution, a low tax rate seems more favorable. However, a lower tax rate will
also lower the cost of production of firms, which in turn leads to higher outputs
and higher levels of pollution. Thus, it is not clear what is the optimal tax
rate that leads to the lowest level of pollution. Moreover, the social planner
does not only care about the pollution level, but also the outputs produced
by the firms. For the socially optimal tax level, it must maximize the social
welfare.
We assume social welfare function takes the quadratic form in both the
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total output and the level of pollution, i.e., W ≡ Q2 − βE2.11 Here β is an
exogenous parameter that measures how government weighs environment in
the country’s development plans in comparing with consumer surplus. We say
the country is output-oriented if β is low; otherwise the country is environment-
oriented. The term E2 assumes the marginal damage of the pollution on our
environment is increasing.12























2−α < t ≤ 1.
The optimal taxation policy would depend on whether the country is more
output-oriented or environment oriented. We consider these two cases sepa-
rately.
3.3.3.1 Case 1: β < 1
α2
, output-oriented country
When β < 1
α2
, we aim to show that the optimal tax rate is zero. To show
this, we first present the following lemma, which suggests that any tax rate
t ∈ [ 2
5−3α , 1] can never be optimal.
Lemma 3.1. WL(0) > W N (t) for t ∈ [ 2
5−3α ,
1
2−α ], and W
L(0) > W N
′
(t) for
11We also show in Appendix C.2.3 that our results hold if we use a linear welfare function,
i.e. W = Q− βE.
12In Damania (2002) and Ivanova (2010), it is assumed that the damage function by
emission on social welfare is increasing and convex. Ivanova’s study is on air pollution, and
hence there is transboundary spillovers from (or to) the other countries. This explanation fits
the Indonesia air pollution case, which firms burn the crops, generating pollution affecting
other ASEAN countries.
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t ∈ [ 1
2−α , 1].
Following Lemma 3.1, given that WL(t) is decreasing in t, WL(0) ≥ WL(t)
for t ∈ [0, 2
5−3α ]. Thus t = 0 is the optimal tax rate which maximizes the social
welfare.
3.3.3.2 Case 2: β > 1
α2
, environment-oriented country
Similarly, we first present the following lemma which suggests that any tax
rate t ∈ [0, 1
2−α ] can never be optimal.
Lemma 3.2. WN
′
(1) > W L(t) for t ∈ [0, 2
5−3α ], and W
N ′(1) > W N (t) for




Following Lemma 3.2, given that WN
′





(t) for t ∈ [ 1
2−α , 1). Thus t = 1 is the optimal tax rate which maximizes
the social welfare.
The following theorem summarizes the main result on the optimal tax rate.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose there exists no corruption. When β < 1
α2
, the optimal
tax rate is zero and licensing takes place; when β > 1
α2
, the optimal tax rate is
one and no licensing takes place.
Government intervention is effective in implementing the environmental
goal. When he is output-oriented, licensing is preferred as it would intensify
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competition and lead to higher outputs. From Proposition 3.1, we know that
licensing takes place only when tax rate is low (i.e., 0 ≤ t < 1
2
). In this case, a
lower tax rate would not only raise the total output but also increase the total
pollution. Since the country is output-oriented, the government cares more
about the increase in total output. As a result, the tax rate would be set as
low as possible and the optimal tax rate is zero.
When the government is environment-oriented, he will charge a high tax
rate so as to prevent licensing to occur. This would in fact lower the total
pollution, following Proposition 3.2. In this case, as firm 1 is the monopoly, the
total output (or pollution) is decreasing in the tax rate. Since the government
cares more about the total pollution, the tax rate should be set as high as
possible and the optimal tax rate is one.
3.4 With Corruption
In the benchmark case, we assume that the bureaucrat is not corruptive so
that there is no scope for bribing to take place. Now we consider the case
where the bureaucrat is corruptive so that he may misreport the technology
of the firm being inspected. In this case, we will show that it is possible for
bribing to be the equilibrium, and licensing becomes more likely to occur. We
still use backwards induction to analyze this game.
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3.4.1 Equilibria
3.4.1.1 Stage 2: Competition
Since bribing may be the possible outcome in stage 1, we need to consider
three cases depending on the choice of firm 2 in stage 1: licensing, bribing and
no licensing and no bribing. The cases of licensing and no licensing and no
bribing are exactly identical to those in the situation where the bureaucrat is
non-corruptive. Thus we only need to focus on the case of bribing. If firm 2
has chosen to bribe the bureaucrat by paying the fixed amount b, then firms’
profits become
πB1 = (1− q1 − q2)q1 − αtq1,
πB2 = (1− q1 − q2)q2 − α′tq2 − b,
where α′ = (1 − σ)α + σ, and α < α′ < 1. Note that after bribing, firm 2’s
effective marginal cost reduces to α′t. Then we have
qB1 =
1 + (α′ − 2α)t
3
, qB2 =



















, qB2 = 0














, πB2 = 0,
if 1




2α′−α < 1. Otherwise
1
2−α < 1 <
1
2α′−α , and firm 2 will never
exit the market under bribing case, if the probability of being discovered is
low.
3.4.1.2 Stage 1: Firm 2’s Choice
Firm 2 has three possible choices: purchasing a clean technology from firm
1, bribing the bureaucrat or does nothing. Based these three choices, there
are there possible equilibria, the conditions of which are summarized in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Consider the equilibria in stage 2.
i) If πB2 < π
N




2 ≥ πN1 + πN2 ;
otherwise no licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium.
ii) If πB2 ≥ πN2 , then licensing is an equilibrium if πL1 + πL2 ≥ πB1 + πB2 ;
otherwise bribing is an equilibrium.
Following Lemma 3.3, we further characterize the conditions under which
each type of equilibrium arises in detail. In particular, our discussion will
focus on the case 0 < σ ≤ 1
2
, under which firm 2 may exit the market when
79
competing with firm 1 in stage 2, if he neither purchases the technology nor
bribes the bureaucrat. In other words, firm 2 will always be active if bribing
occurs. The analysis of the case 1
2
< σ ≤ 1 is similar, and will be presented in
the Appendix C.2.2.14 We consider two cases as below.
Case 1: No licensing and no bribing is better than bribing (πN2 > π
B
2 )
When the bribing cost is too high, bribing will never arise in any equilib-
rium. Thus there are only two possible equilibria: licensing equilibrium, and
no licensing and no bribing equilibrium. Clearly, the equilibrium depends on
the tax rate t.
First, when tax rate is low (i.e., 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
2−α), both firms will be active in















4(1 + (α− α′ − 1)t)(1− α′)t
9
≡ f(t).
Then we know licensing is an equilibrium if πL1 + π
L
2 ≥ πN1 + πN2 , i.e., 0 ≤
t ≤ 2




2−α . And no licensing and bribing is an
equilibrium if 2
5−3α < t ≤ 12−α .
Second, when the tax rate is high (i.e., 1
2−α < t ≤ 1), firm 2 will exit the
14The only difference is that firm 2 may also exit the market if bribing occurs in stage 2,
when tax rate is large enough.
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market, if he neither purchases the clean technology from firm 1 nor bribes
the bureaucrat in stage 1. In this case, πN2 > π
B
2 is equivalent to
b >
(











indicating that no licensing and bribing is an equilibrium. Since the joint
profit of the two firms is never improved after technology transfer, licensing













Figure 3.1: Equilibrium Region for Licensing and No
Case 2: Bribing is better than no licensing and no bribing (πB2 ≥ πN2 )
Following the argument the in previous case, we know that πB2 ≥ πN2 is
equivalent to b ≤ B(t), where
B(t) =
{
f(t), if 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
2−α ,
g(t), if 1
2−α < t ≤ 1.
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When bribing cost is low, no licensing and no bribing can never be optimal
for firm 2. In other words, there are two possible equilibria in stage 1: licens-
ing equilibrium or bribing equilibrium. We know that bribing is better than








(2 + (3α− 5α′)t)(α− α′)t
9
≡ h(t).
Therefore, under πB2 ≥ πN2 , bribing is an equilibrium if b ≤ min{B(t), h(t)};
otherwise, licensing is an equilibrium.
3.4.1.3 Summary
Based on the analysis of the two cases above, we further summarize the equi-
librium results in stage 1. The equilibria in stage 1 depend on the shapes of
functions f(t), g(t) and h(t). We first present the main properties of these
functions, which are useful for the equilibrium analysis below.
Lemma 3.4. The functions f(t) and g(t) have the following properties:
1. Consider t ∈ [0, 1
2−α ]. Then f(t) > 0, f
′(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, 1
2(1+α′−α)) and




2. Consider t ∈ [ 1






Lemma 3.5. The function h(t) has the following properties:
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1. h(t) < 0 for 0 < t < 2
5α′−3α , and h(t) > 0 for t >
2
5α′−3α .
2. h′(t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, 1
5α′−3α), and h
′(t) > 0 for t > 1
5α′−3α .
3. If 0 < σ ≤ 2
5
, h(t) < 0 for 0 < t ≤ 1; if 2
5
< σ ≤ √2 − 1, h(t) < 0 for
t < 2
5α′−3α < 1, and 0 < h(t) < g(t) for
2
5α′−3α < t < 1; if
√
2 − 1 <
σ ≤ 1
2
, h(t) < 0 for t < 2
5α′−3α , 0 < h(t) < g(t) for
2
5α′−3α < t < t
∗,
and h(t) > g(t) > 0 for t∗ < t ≤ 1, where t∗ is uniquely defined by
g(t∗) = h(t∗) and 2
5α′−3α < t
∗ < 1.
Note that the shapes of the functions depend on magnitude of σ, which
implies that the equilibrium results should also depend on σ. For 0 < σ < 1
2
,




< σ ≤ √2−1
and
√
2 − 1 < σ ≤ 1
2
. The following proposition summarizes the equilibria in
the case
√





2−1 < σ ≤ 1
2
. Recall that t∗ is defined such that
g(t∗) = h(t∗), where 2
5α′−3α < t
∗ < 1. The equilibria in stage 1 are:
1. If t ≤ 2
5−3α , licensing is an equilibrium;
2. If 2
5−3α < t ≤ 12−α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and bribing is an
equilibrium; otherwise, licensing is an equilibrium;
15The equilibrium results for the cases 0 < σ ≤ 25 and 25 < σ ≤
√




2−α < t ≤ 25α′−3α , then if b > g(t), no licensing and bribing is an
equilibrium; otherwise, licensing is an equilibrium;
4. If 2
5α′−3α < t ≤ t∗, if b > g(t), no licensing is an equilibrium; if g(t) ≤
b < h(t), licensing is an equilibrium; otherwise, bribing is an equilibrium;
5. If t∗ < t ≤ 1, then if b > g(t), no licensing and bribing is an equilibrium;
otherwise, bribing is an equilibrium.
The equilibria are depicted in Figure 3.2. From Figure 3.2, we can see that
the tax range which will result in licensing equilibrium has increased from
[0, 2
5−3α ] to possibly [0, t
∗].16 The choice of bribing will lower the licensing fee
charged by firm 1. Knowing firm 2 could easily bribe the bureaucrat and hence
compete with it in production, firm 1 has higher incentive to induce firm 2
to purchase the technology. When tax rate is relatively higher and cost of
bribing is low, it is optimal for firm 2 to choose bribe. In such case, firm 1
could no longer effectively lower the price of technology, since the bribing is too
attractive to firm 2. In any other cases, both purchasing the clean technology
and bribing the bureaucrat are too costly, and firm 2 keeps using the dirty
technology instead.















Figure 3.2: Equilibrium Region when
√
2− 1 < σ < 1
2
3.4.2 Consumer Surplus and Pollution
We further investigate how firm 2’s choice affects consumer surplus and total
pollution. The following proposition summarizes the result for any given tax
rate.
Proposition 3.4. For any given tax rate, licensing will yield highest consumer
surplus, followed by bribing (if possible), and then followed by no licensing and
no bribing. When 0 < t ≤ 1
2
, bribing is not possible, emission under licensing is
lower than that under no licensing and no bribing. When 1
2
< t ≤ 1, emission
under no licensing and no bribing is lowest. In this case, it is possible that
bribing yield lower emission than which under licensing.
Not surprisingly, licensing will always result in the highest consumer sur-
plus, since the clean technology transfer will reduce firm’s production cost and
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increase production level competition, and hence increase the total output. No
licensing and no bribing will result in firm 2 exiting the market, and firm 1
being the monopoly, which leads to the lowest consumer surplus. Whenever
bribing is an equilibrium, firm 2 will stay in market. Because of market com-
petition, consumers are better-off than they are in the case where firm 1 is the
monopoly.
Recall that from Proposition 3.1 and 3.2, we know that when technology
is sufficiently good, licensing will improve consumer surplus, but no licensing
will be equilibrium, when 2
5−3α < t ≤ 12 . However, with corruption as a
viable option for firm 2, when bribing cost is low, from Figure 3.2, we can see
that licensing equilibrium is possible when 2
5−3α < t ≤ 12 . Knowing the ease
of bribing, even though the technology is very efficient, firm 1 would like to
charge a lower price to ensure the technology transfer.
One possible implication from our model is how corruption may affect the
technology transfer within a country. Consider two countries with the same
taxation policy (i.e., the tax rate is the same, for example, t = 1
2
− ²). Suppose
technology is very efficient in reducing pollution, the country with corruption
will result in technology transfer, while the other country without corruption
does not. In this sense, corruption promotes the technology transfer.
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3.4.3 Optimal Taxation Policy
We have analyzed the choice of firm 2, which depends on the tax rate. Now we
proceed to investigate the optimal tax rate that maximizes the social welfare,
taking into account the effect of tax rate on firm 2’s choice.
We first calculate the welfare in each of the equilibria characterized in
stage 1. Note that the welfare functions under the cases where licensing or no
licensing and no bribing takes places are exactly identical to those in the case
where the bureaucrat is not corruptive. In the case where bribing takes place,
under 0 < σ < 1
2
, we know that firm 2 will always be active in the market.17
Thus the equilibrium social welfare is denoted by WB(t), where
WB(t) =
(2− (α + α′)t)2
9
− β(1 + α + (αα
′ − 2α2 + α− 2α′)t)2
9
.
Following the equilibrium analysis in stage 1, we know that it is possible
for licensing to be an equilibrium for any 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Thus, the largest
domain for WL(t) to be the equilibrium welfare is TL = [0, 1]. Similarly, the
largest domains for WN(t), WN
′
(t) and WB(t) to be the equilibrium welfare




N ′ = [ 1
2−α , 1] and T
B = [ 2
5α′−3α , 1] accordingly.
We then proceed by analyzing the optimal taxation policy. Since the social
welfare depends on β, which measures whether the country is more output-
17For the case 12 < σ < 1, when firm 2 exit in the market, i.e., t >
1
2α′−α , the social
welfare is the same as the case of no licensing and bribing. We have detailed discussion of
this case in Appendix C.2.2.
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oriented or environment-oriented. We will consider two cases depending on
the values of β similar to the analysis without corruption.
3.4.3.1 β < 1
α2
: output-oriented country
We want to show that the optimal tax rate is again zero. To show this, we
aim to argue that none of the other cases can arise in equilibrium.
Lemma 3.6. If β < 1
α2
, then WL(0) > W N
′
(t) for t ∈ [ 1
2−α , 1], W
L(0) >
WN (t) for t ∈ [ 2
5−3α ,
1
2−α ], and W
L(0) > W B(t) for t ∈ [ 2
5α′−3α , 1].
From Lemma 3.6, we know that if we focus on the largest possible domain
for WN (t), it is always smaller than WL(0). It suggests that WN(t) can never
be the equilibrium welfare for any possible t.18 Similar, WB(t) and WN
′
(t)
can not be the equilibrium welfare either.
Because government puts more weight on consumer surplus, it should set
a low tax rate to encourage technology transfer. The cost from pollution will
reduce, and hence firms are willing to produce more.
We summarize the equilibrium result in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose there exists corruption. When β < 1
α2
, the optimal
tax rate is zero and licensing takes place.
18Based on the proof of lemma 3.6, WN (t∗) is largest when the domain is largest. For any
smaller domains, for example 12−α < a < t < b <
2
5−3α , we still have W
L(0) > W N ( 12−α ) >
WN (a), if the optimal t∗ = a; and WL(0) > W N ( 25−3α ) > W
N (b), if the optimal t∗ = b.
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Similar to the case without corruption, government intervention is efficient,
when government’s emphasis is on consumer surplus. He will set a zero tax
to encourage the technology transfer, and production will be increased. In
this case, the fixed fee charged by firm 1 for the clean technology is zero,
since pollution is costless. In fact, it is more realistic to consider the case,
where government charges a low tax t = ²t > 0, and firm 1 charges a low
fee for the technology F = ²F > 0. Our result still holds that firm 2 will
purchase the technology.19 In fact, from figure 3.2, we can see that as long as
0 < t < 2
5−3α , licensing will always be the equilibrium, regardless of bribing
cost. It is socially optimal to charge t = 0, but in reality, to ensure the
technology transfer, the government could set any tax in that range. Note
also, according to Proposition 3.4, for any 0 < t < 2
5−3α <
1
2−α , licensing will
always yield highest consumer surplus and lowest pollution, comparing with
bribing and no licensing and no bribing.
Due to the presence of competition, firm 2 will always purchase the tech-
nology to increase his competitive advantage in the production stage. Due to
the low cost of the clean technology, there is no incentive for firm 2 to bribe
the bureaucrat, even when the probability of being caught is low.
19Because of the continuity of the welfare functions.
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3.4.3.2 β > 1
α2
: environment-oriented country
Before we provide general conditions for various equilibria outcomes in the
following theorem, define t˜ = h−1(b), and consider 2
5α′−3α < t˜ < 1.
20 The
following theorem summarizes the equilibrium results.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose there exists corruption. When β > 1
α2
, we have
1. When 0 < σ ≤ 2
5
, the optimal tax rate 1. If b > g(1), no licensing and




< σ ≤ √2 − 1, if b > g(1), the optimal tax rate is 1 and no
licensing and no bribing occurs in equilibrium; if h(1) < b ≤ g(1), the
optimal tax rate is 1 and licensing occurs in equilibrium; if b ≤ h(1),
and WL(t˜) > W B(1), the optimal tax rate is t˜, and licensing occurs in




2 − 1 < σ ≤ 1
2
, if b > g(1), the optimal tax rate is 1 and no
licensing and no bribing occurs in equilibrium; if b ≤ g(1), and WL(t˜) >
WB(1), the optimal tax rate is t˜ and licensing occurs in equilibrium;
otherwise, the optimal tax rate is 1 and bribing occurs in equilibrium.
20b > 0 in such case.
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On the one hand, Theorem 3 states that when firm 1 observes the bribing
cost is high, he will set a high fixed fee for the clean technology, yielding the
no licensing and no bribing equilibrium, and resulting firm 2 exit the market.
In this case, government intervention on charging tax rate at one, and hence
protecting the environment, is still effective. On the other hand, when firm 1
observes that the bribing cost is low, and bribing is easily a success, he will
charge a low price for the technology, trying to induce higher incentive for firm
2 to purchase the technology. In this case, the government intervention fails.
The result shows that bribing will make government regulation ineffective in
shutting down the heavily polluting firms.
As the anti-corruptive effort increases, i.e. 2
5
< σ ≤ 1
2
, and the bribing
cost becomes lower, there will be two conflicting effects on both firm 1 and
firm 2’s decisions. On the one hand, it becomes more risky for firm 2 to
bribe the bureaucrat. In such case, firm 1 will start raising the price of the
technology. On the other hand, firm 2 has higher incentive to bribe due to
the low bribing cost, and hence firm 1 wants to charge a lower price on the
technology. Depending on government tax rate, it is possible for licensing or
bribing to be the equilibrium outcome.
We present a sufficient condition for bribing or licensing to be the equilib-
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rium in the propositions below.21
Proposition 3.5. When 2
5
< σ ≤ 1
2
, if (1) the bribing cost is low, (2) the clean
technology is not efficient, and (3) government is even more environment-
oriented, then government should set tax rate at one, and bribing will be the
equilibrium.
Proposition 3.6. When 2
5
< σ ≤ 1
2
, the bribing cost is low and the clean
technology is very efficient, government should charge t = t˜, and licensing will
be the equilibrium.
When the government is environment-oriented, there is incentive for firm
2 to bribe the bureaucrat or purchase the clean technology in order for it
to stay in market. When the clean technology is not effective in reducing
pollution, and bribing cost is low, firm 2 will choose to bribe the bureaucrat
instead of purchasing the technology. In this scenario, it is socially optimal
to induce bribing equilibrium rather than licensing equilibrium. 22 Comparing
with licensing at t = t˜, bribing at t = 1 will lower the output and hence
pollution. The lower pollution effect dominates the lower output effect, due
to the environment-oriented policy, i.e. higher value of β.
21A rigorous presentation of this proposition can be found in Appendix C.1.
22In Proposition 3.4, we have shown that it is possible EB(1) < EL(1). Since emission
under licensing is decreasing in t, we must have EL(t˜) > EB(1), i.e. the equilibrium pollution
under bribing at t = 1 is lower.
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Knowing the bribing cost is low, either due to lack of anti-corruptive policy
or lower wage for the bureaucrat, the lowest pollution level under no licensing
and no bribing could never be reached. Government has two taxation mech-
anisms to reach the highest possible social welfare. On the one hand, if the
clean technology is inefficient in reducing the pollution, government may want
to charge tax rate at one, inducing bribing to be the equilibrium outcome.
In this scenario, firms reduce pollution through fewer production. This effect
dominates the effect from lowering consumer surplus. On the other hand, if
the technology is very efficient, government should charge a high tax rate,
t˜ 6= 1, incentivizing firm 2 to purchase the technology. In this scenario, the
effect of raising consumer surplus dominates the effect of higher pollution. In
conclusion, even though government regulation at t = 1 fails to achieve the
“first best” under corruption, bribing is still possible to be the “second-best”
in reducing pollution and maximizing social welfare.
In the Appendix C.2.2, we have also shown that when 1
2
< σ ≤ 1, i.e.
government puts a lot of efforts on anti-corruptive policy, bribing will no long
be the equilibrium when β > 1
α2
. In this case, it is optimal for government to
set tax rate at one, and firm 2 will always choose no licensing and no bribing.
When β < 1
α2
, government should still set tax rate at zero and licensing will
always be the equilibrium. In this way, government intervention will become
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effective, when the anti-corruption policy is strong.
Higher wage is clearly another efficient way to reduce corruption, since it
makes bribing more costly. As we can infer from Theorem 3.3, higher bribing
cost may induce firm 1 to charge higher price on the clean technology. In such
case, firm 2 will exit the market, and the environment-oriented government
could achieve the no licensing and no bribing equilibrium. However, consider
the non-optimal tax rate, i.e. 2
5−3α < t ≤ 12 , as we have interpreted before,
efficient clean technology will not be transferred. Therefore, higher wage may
hinder the technology transfer, which may result in lower consumer surplus
and higher pollution.23
In conclusion, we have shown that government intervention on shutting
down the heavily polluting firms fails when the bribing cost is low, as both
licensing or bribing could occur when government is environment-oriented.
But bribing may be socially optimal under optimal taxation. Corruption could
increase the likelihood of technology transfer.
3.5 Discussion: Outsider Innovator
It is natural to consider insider innovator and outsider innovator in licensing
literature. We have discussed firm 1 to be the licensor in the main text. In
23Note that, as we have shown, when 25−3α < t ≤ 12 , licensing yields higher social welfare
than no licensing. But firm will always choose not to license, since it is more profitable.
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this discussion, we assume that the technology is owned by domestic research
lab, with a fixed price F , which is exogenous. So there will no strategic
licensing effect in this model. Consider there is a monopoly producer in the
market. Without competition, we just need to consider the three options for
the monopoly, i.e. purchase the technology, bribing the bureaucrat and neither
purchase nor bribe, and then consider the optimal tax rate from government
point of view.
The detailed analysis are in Appendix C.2.4. Most of the analysis are
the same to the insider innovator case. When the government is environment-
oriented, it is possible that bribing is in the equilibrium. Therefore, production
level competition and strategic licensing are not necessary in generating cor-
ruption. One important difference between outsider and insider innovator case
is that when government is output-oriented, he can never reach the purchasing
equilibrium by setting the tax rate at zero. Due to the uncompetitive nature
of monopoly, if there is no pollution cost, there will be no incentive for the
monopoly to bribe the bureaucrat, nor to purchase the technology. It is nec-
essary for the government to raise the pollution cost, by setting some positive
tax rate,to incentivize the transfer of the clean technology.
Clearly, given any positive tax rate, purchasing the technology will yield
highest output level and hence consumer surplus. However, note also at a
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particular tax rate the emission under purchasing will also be higher than
which under no purchasing. Therefore, government needs to balance the effect
of raising consumer surplus and the effect of raising pollution.
3.6 Conclusion
When setting the optimal tax rate, the government always takes into account
the trade-off of tax rate on production and pollution. Setting a higher tax
rate has a negative effect on production and a positive effect on reducing pro-
duction. When government weighs more on consumer surplus, it is optimal
to charge lower tax rate in order to encourage technology transfer, and hence
increasing the total production level. When government puts more emphasis
on environment protection, it will always charge a higher tax rate, aiming to
shut down the heavily polluting firm 2. However, in the presence of corrup-
tion, government regulation may fail. When bribing cost is low, firm 2 tries
to purchase license or bribe the bureaucrat, in order to stay competitive in
market. When technology is not efficient in reducing pollution, technology
transfer may become an inferior option for firm 2, and bribing will be the
equilibrium.
Comparing two countries with different environmental policy, where gov-
ernment 1 is more output-oriented, while government 2 is more environment-
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oriented. Our results imply that technology transfer is more likely to occur in
country 1; while bureaucrat in country 2 are likely to be corrupted. If the two
countries are both environment-oriented, at the same tax rate, the country
with corruption may have lower social welfare and higher pollution. However,
it is also possible that licensing occur in the country with corruption, while no
licensing and no bribing occur in the other without corruption. In such case,
corruption leads to technology transfer, and hence higher consumer surplus
and lower pollution.
If the main goal of the government is to avoid or mitigate corruption, our
policy implication for the government is to set a low tax rate or offering a high
wage. On the one hand, when the tax rate is low, pollution does not lower
firms’ profits significantly and there is less incentive for the firms to bribe the
bureaucrat. On the other hand, a higher wage will decrease the bureaucrat’s
willingness to accept the bribe.
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Appendix A
Proofs and Details of Chapter
One
A.1 Proofs
For all our proofs, we are ignoring the term a− c, as it is constant and has no
effect on the results.
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 1.1
(i) For technology improvement, we need to show Kxno1 > x
ind
i . Equivalently,
we need to show f(α,K) = DindDno(Kxno1 − xindi ) > 0. Note that f(α,K)
is the numerator of Kxno1 − xindi . We will first show that f is increasing in
α. Then, by the all firm participating condition α > K(N−K+1)
N+1
, it suffices to
show that h(K; N) ≡ f(K(N−K+1)
N+1
, K)/[K(N + 1)(N − K + 1)] > 0 for all
2 ≤ K ≤ N .
Step 1: We need to show f is increasing in α. Let X ≡ α(N + 1)2, and define
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g(X,K) ≡ f(α,K). Then we have:
g(X,K) =K(N −K + 1)[X2 −N(N + 1)X + N2(N + 1)]−N [X2
− [N(K + 1) + K(N −K + 1)2]X + (N −K + 1)NK(N + 1)]
=[K(N −K + 1)−N ]X2
+ [N 2(K + 1) + NK(N −K + 1)2 −NK(N + 2)(N −K + 1)]X.
∂g(X, k)
∂X
=2[K(N −K + 1)−N ]X
+ [N2(K + 1) + NK(N −K + 1)2 −NK(N + 2)(N −K + 1)]
We have ∂g(X,K)
∂X
> 0 if and only if X > N(K+1)
2
or α > N(K+1)
2(N+1)2
, which is





. Hence, f is increasing in α.
Step 2: Since f is increasing in α, it suffices to show that f(K(N−K+1)
N+1
, K) > 0.
Define h(K; N) ≡ f(K(N−K+1)
N+1
, K)/[K(N + 1)(N −K + 1)]. Then we have
h(K; N) =K2(N + 1)(N −K + 1)2 −N(N + 2)K(N −K + 1)
−Nk(N + 1)(N −K + 1) + N [N(K + 1) + K(N −K + 1)2].
It suffices to show h(K; N) > 0, for all 2 < K < N . Note that h(2; N) =
(N − 2)2 + 3N2−12N+12
2(N−1) > 0, and h(N ; N) = 0 for all N > 2. It is easy to check
that h(2; 3) > 0. We just need to show h′(K; N) = 0 has only one root, when
N ≥ 4.
h′(K; N) =2K(N + 1)(N −K + 1)2
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− 2(N −K + 1)K2(N + 1)− 2KN(N −K + 1)
+ NK2 −N(N + 2)(N −K + 1) + N(N + 2)K + N2.
Note that h′(2; N) = (3N2−2N−4)(N−4)+(6N−4) > 0 and h′(N ; N) = 0.
Now
h′′(K; N) =(N + 1)[2(N −K + 1)2 − 8K(N −K + 1) + 2K2]
− 2N(N −K + 1) + 4KN + 2N(N + 2).
and h′′(N ; N) = 2(N+1)(N2−4N+1)+6N2+2N > 0. Hence, h′(N−ε; N) < 0
and h′(N+ε; N) > 0 for some ε > 0. Since h′(K; N) is a 3rd degree polynomial,
there exists only one k∗ ∈ (2, N) such that h′(K∗; N) = 0.




qindi . Let f(α,K) :=∑
qnoi −
∑
qindi . Define g(α,K) ≡ DindDnof(α,K), i.e. g(α) is the numerator
of f(α,K), where
g(α,K) = αK(K − 1)(N −K)(N + 1)(α(N + 1)−N).
Clearly g is increasing in α. By the all firm participating condition α >
K(N−K+1)
N+1
, it suffices to show g(K(N−K+1)
N+1
, K) > 0. Now that g(K(N−K+1)
N+1
) =
K2(K − 1)2(N −K + 1)(N −K)2 > 0, which completes the proof.
A.1.2 Propositions 1.2 and 1.3
Before proving Propositions 1.2 and 1.3, it is convenient to characterize the
equilibrium first.
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A.1.2.1 Equilibrium of Ex-ante Licensing
We will consider two cases: (1) L < N −K and (2) L = N −K.
Case (1): Using backward induction, we can solve:
xEx−antei =
((α− 1)N + α)(N + 1−K − L)
DEx−ante
(a− c) for all i ∈ K,
xEx−antej = 0 for all j ∈ L,
xEx−antem =
N(α(N + 1)−K(N + 1−K − L))
DEx−ante
(a− c) for all m ∈ N\(L ∪K),
and
qEx−antei =
α(N + 1)((α− 1)N + α)
DEx−ante
(a− c) for all i ∈ K ∪ L,
qEx−antem =
α(N + 1)(α(N + 1)−K(N + 1−K − L))
DEx−ante
(a− c)
for all m ∈ N\(L ∪K),
where DEx−ante = α2(N + 1)3 − α(N + 1)(K3 − 2K2(N − L + 1) + K(N2 +
N(3− 2L) + (L− 1)2) + NL + N)−KN(K −N + L− 1).
In the first stage, non-RJV firms will compete in auction, so that they
will be indifferent between winning or losing the bid, i.e. licensees and non-
licensees will end up with the same level of profits. Therefore, the winning bid
will be
B = (qEx−antej )
2 − ((qEx−antem )2 − αx2m) = (qEx−antei )2 − πEx−antem .
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Check the ”all-firm participating” condition, i.e. qEx−antem ≥ 0 which holds
if and only if α ≥ K(N+1−K−L)
N+1






Case (2): Let the minimum bid be B, and consider firm j ∈ N\K to be the
representative from the non-RJV firms. If firm j rejects B, and decides to do
R&D by himself, we come to the case where the number of licensees become
(n−k−1), which is an interior case. By the condition L ≤ (N−K)(K−1)/K,
we then require
2K ≥ N.
Therefore, ex-ante licensing to all non-RJV firms is possible if and only if
2K ≥ N . This condition requires the size of RJV to be large. One point
worth noting is that licensing to all non-RJV firms will never improve consumer
surplus comparing with no licensing case. The above inequality clearly violates
the condition (the RJV size is small) in Proposition 1.3.
Define πEx−antej (α,N,K,N − K − 1) be the firm j’s profit in this case,
where N −K − 1 is the number of licensees.
If all non-RJV firms, i.e. firms belong to N\K, accept the offer, B, then





i = (p− c +
∑
i∈K
xi)qi − αx2i +
N −K
K






j = (p− c +
∑
i∈K
xi)qj − αx2j − B for all j ∈ L.










α(N + 1)2 −K (a− c) for all j ∈ N,
x
(C)Ex−ante
j = 0 for all j ∈ L, and B = (q(C)Ex−antei )2 − πEx−antej (α,N,K,N −
K − 1).
Now we are ready to proof proposition 1.2.
A.1.2.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. We will consider two cases: (1) L < N −K and (2) L = N −K.
Case (1): Let f(L) = xEx−ante1 . Since f(0) = x
no





where Q = −α(N + 1)((α − 1)N + α)(α(N + 1)2 + K3 − 2K2(N − L + 1) +
K(N − L + 1)2 − N(N + 2)). We have f ′(L) = 0 if and only if K3 + α(N +
1)2−N(N +2)− 2K2(N −L+1)+K(N −L+1)2 = 0. Solving the equation,
we have
L∗ =




Clearly the determinant is smaller than 0, because α > K(N−K+1)
N+1
. Hence f ′(L)
has no real root. It is easy to see that the numerator of f ′(L) is a concave
quadratic function of L. Therefore f ′(L) < 0.
Case (2): We need to show xnoi − x(C)Ex−antei > 0 for all i ∈ K.
xnoi − x(C)Ex−antei
=
α(N + 1)2(N −K)(α(N + 1)2 −K2 + K(N + 1)−N(N + 2))
(α(N + 1)2 −K)Dno .
Let f(α) ≡ α(N + 1)2 − K2 + K(N + 1) − N(N + 2). It suffices for us
to show f(α) > 0. Clearly, f(α) is increasing in α. Take α = K(N−K+1)
N+1
.
Define g(K) ≡ f(K(N−K+1)
N+1
). Then after simplification, we have g(K) =
(N −K)(K − 1)(N + 2) > 0. Therefore f(α) > 0 for all α ≥ K(N−K+1)
N+1
.
A.1.2.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
We first restate Proposition 1.3 with technical details. Let α∗(N,K) ≡
K(N−K)(K−1)2+K3N+N2K(1−K)
(N+1)(N−K+K(2K−N)) .
Proposition 3. Unless α ≥ max{K,α∗(N,K)}, N > K(2K−1)
K−1 , and L <
min{L∗, N − K}. , consumer surplus in no licensing case is always higher
than that in ex-ante case.
We will consider two cases: (1) L < N −K and (2) L = N −K.
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−a(N + 1)((a− 1)N + a)Y
(Dex−ante)2
,
where Y (L) ≡ a(N + 1)(K(2K −N + 2L− 1) + N) + K(K3 − 2K2(N − L +
1) + K(N −L + 1)2−N(N + 1)). Now g′(L) = 0 if and only if Y (L) = 0. Let




[−αK + K2 −K3 − αKN + K2N
−
√




[−αK + K2 −K3 − αKN + K2N
+
√
(α−K)K2(N + 1)(α(N + 1)−N)].
Clearly, when α < K, there is no real root to g′(L) = 0. It is easy to check
the numerator of g′(L) has a negative coefficient on the L2 term. Therefore,
no real root implies g′(L) < 0. And hence, g(L) < g(0).
When α ≥ K, it is always L1 < 0. Note that L2 < 0 if and only
if N ≤ K(2K−1)
K−1 , or N >
K(2K−1)
K−1 with α < α
∗(N,K) where α∗(N,K) =
−K2+2K3−K4+KN−2K2N+2K3N+KN2−K2N2
−K+2K2+N−2KN+2K2N+N2−KN2 . There are two subcases: (a) L2 ≤ 0,
and (b) L2 > 0. Subcase (a). We have g(L) < g(0). Subcase (b). If
L2 < N − K, there exists L∗ ∈ [L2, N − K) such that g(L∗) = g(0) and
g(L) > g(0) for all L ∈ [0, L∗]. If L2 ≥ N − K, g(L) > g(0) for all
L ∈ [0, N −K).
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Therefore, ex-ante licensing improves consumer surplus if and only if α ≥
max{K,α∗(N,K)}, N > K(2K−1)
K−1 and L < min{L∗, N −K}.














α(N + 1)(N −K)(−K(K2 −K(N + 1) + N2 + N) + α(N + 1)((K − 1)K + N))
(α(N + 1)2 −K)Dno .
Similar to the proof above, we just need f(α) ≡ −K(K2 −K(N + 1) + N2 +
N) + α(N + 1)((K − 1)K + N) > 0. Again, f(α) is increasing in α, and let
g(K) ≡ f(K(N−K+1)
N+1





Before the proof of Proposition 1.4, we want to first state the equilibrium of
ex-post licensing.
A.1.3.1 Equilibrium of ex-post licensing
We will consider two cases: (1) L < N −K and (2) L = N −K.
Case (1): By backward induction, we have
xEx−posti =
(K + L)((α(N + 1)−N)(N −K + 1)−NL)
KDEx−post
(a− c) for all i ∈ K,
xEx−postj =
N(α(N + 1) + (K + L)(K −N + L− 1))
DEx−post
(a− c) for all j ∈ N\K,
qEx−poati =
α(N + 1)(α(N + 1) + L(K + L)−N)
DEx−post
(a− c) for all i ∈ K,
110
qEx−postj =
α(N + 1)(α(N + 1) + (K + L)(K −N + L− 1))
DEx−post
(a− c)
for all j ∈ N\K,
where DEx−post = −(−α2(N +1)3+α(N +1)(K3−2K2(N−L+1)+K(−4(N +
1)L+(N +1)2 +L2)−N(−K +N +2(L− 1)L−L)+ N2(L+1)+ N − 2L2 +
L) + N(K + L)(K −N + L− 1)). To ensure qEx−postj ≥ 0, the necessary and
sufficient condition is
α ≥ N(K + N(K − 1))
K2(N + 1)
.
The condition α ≥ K(N −K + 1)/(N + 1) is not sufficient for ex-post case,
as we can check
N(K + N(K − 1))
K2(N + 1)
≤ K(N −K + 1)
N + 1
which is equivalent to N ≤ K2.
Case (2): Consider j ∈ N\K. If he rejects the minimum bid B, his profit will
be






(a − c) in equilibrium. If he accepts B,
his profit will be





j − αx2j − B.
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j − (p − c + xj)qRejectj .





i = (p− (c−
∑
k∈K
xk))qi − αx2i +
N −K
K










j − αx2j −B(x1, ..., xN ) for all j ∈ N\K.




(−N3 + α(N + 1)2(−KN + K + N2))
kD(C)Ex−post




N(α(N + 1)2 −N2)
D(C)Ex−post




α(N + 1)(α(N + 1)2 + N(−(K + 2)N + K + N2)
D(C)Ex−post
for all i ∈ N,
where D(C)Ex−post = (α2(N +1)4 +α(N +1)2((N − 3)N2−K(N − 1)2)+N3).
Note that in equilibrium, qAcceptj = q
(C)Ex−post
i , since all the firms are
producing under the same technology level. The production quantity should
be the same for all firms. By the condition α ≥ K(N − K + 1)/(N + 1),
x
(C)Ex−post
j > 0 for all j ∈ N\K. It is easy to show that q(C)Ex−posti > 0 for all
i ∈ N .
A.1.3.2 Proof of Proposition 1.4
We first restate Proposition 1.4 with technical details. Let f(α) = α2(N +
1)4 − α(N + 1)2(K(−KN + K + 2N2 − 1) + 2N) + N2(K(N2 + N − 1) + 1),
and g(α) = α2(N + 1)3(K + N − 1) − α(N + 1)(K2(−(N − 1)) + K(N(N +
1The superscript “(C)” refers to a corner solution in the number of licensees that L =
N −K.
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1)2 − 1) + (N − 1)N2) + KN 4. Denote α(C)∗(N,K) and α(C)∗∗(N,K) be the
larger root of f(α) = 0 and g(α) = 0.
Proposition 1.4. An ex-post licensing leads to (a) a higher investment level
under if α > max{α∗∗(N,K,L), α(C)∗(N,K)}, and (b) a higher consumer sur-
plus if α > max{α(C)∗∗(N,K), K(K+L)((N−K)(N+1)+1)
(N+1)((N+1)p+K(2N−L+2)−N−2K2)}
Proof. (a) We first show higher investment level under α > max{α∗∗(N,K,L),
α(C)∗(N,K)}. We will consider two cases: (1) L < N −K and (2) L = N −K.
Case (1) The numerator of xex−posti − xnoi for i ∈ K is in the form of
α(N + 1)2L(aα2 + bα + c),
where a = (N −K +1)(N +1)3, b = (1+ N)(K4 +K2(1+N)(2+2N − 3L)+
N(1 + N)(2 + N − L) + K3(−3− 3N + L) + K(−N(3 + 2N) + 2(1 + N)2L))
and c = N(−2KN −K3(2+N)+N(1+N−L)+K(2+N(2+N))L+K2(2+
2N + N2 − (2 + N)L)) .
Clearly a > 0. Therefore, xex−post1 − xno1 > 0, if α > α∗∗(N,K,L), where
α∗∗(N,K,L) is the larger root of the quadratic equation.
Case (2): for firm i ∈ K, we have
x
(C)Ex−post
i − xnoi =
α(N + 1)2(N −K)2f(α)
DnoD(C)Ex−post
where f(α) ≡ α2(N + 1)4 − α(N + 1)2(K(−KN + K + 2N2 − 1) + 2N) +
N2(K(N2 + N − 1) + 1). Note f(α) is a quadratic function in α with positive
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coefficient of α2. Let α(C)∗(N,K) be larger root of f(α) = 0. Therefore, when
α > α(C)∗(N,K), x(C)Ex−post1 > x
no
1 .
(b) Then we show that higher consumer surplus if
α > max{ K(K+L)((N−K)(N+1)+1)
(N+1)((N+1)p+K(2N−L+2)−N−2K2) , α
(C)∗∗(N,K)}.
We will consider two cases: (1) L < N −K and (2) L = N −K.




qnoi ), which is the numerator
of the quantity difference. We have
h(α) =− α(N + 1)L((α− 1)N + α)(α(N + 1)(2K2 + K(−2N + L− 2)
− (N + 1)L + N)−K(K(N + 1)−N(N + 1)− 1)(K + L)).
Note that h(α) > 0 if and only if α > K(K+L)((N−K)(N+1)+1)
(N+1)((N+1)L+K(2N−L+2)−N−2K2) > 0
where the last inequality holds because the denominator (N+1)L+K(2N−L+
2)−N−2K2 is increasing in L, and it becomes (N−K+1)(2K−1)−(K−1) > 0
when L = 0.







α(N + 1)(K −N)2f(α)
DnoD(C)Ex−post
where g(α) = α2(N+1)3(K+N−1)−α(N+1)(K2(−(N−1))+K(N(N+1)2−
1)+(N−1)N2)+KN 4. Note g(α) is a quadratic function. Let α(C)∗∗(N,K) be







A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Let π(K) be the profit of a RJV firm in a RJV with K firms. We have
π (K) =
α (α (N + 1)−N)2 (α (N + 1)2 − (N −K + 1)2)
D
where D = (
(
α (N + 1)2 −N (K + 1)) (α (N + 1)2 −K (N −K + 1)2)−(N−
K)(N −K + 1)NK2)2. When K = 2, we have π (2) − π (1) = α((α + (−1 +
α)N)2) f(N,α)
g(N,α)2
, where g(N,α) = (α + (−1 + α)N)2(N − α(1 + N)2)2(2(−1 +
N)N + α2(1 + N)3 − α(2 + N + N2 + 2N3))2 and f(N,α) = −4α3 + 3α4 +
(−8α2−4α3 +14α4)N +(−4α−14α2 +11α3 +23α4)N2 +(12α−10α2 +12α3 +
12α4)N3+(3+3α−6α2−7α3−5α4)N 4+(−6−4α+4α2−12α3−2α4)N5+(3+
3α+11α2−11α3+9α4)N 6+(−6α+8α2−12α3+8α4)N7+(3α2−5α3+2α4)N8.
Note that f(N,α) > 0 when α ≥ 1.5.
Now consider K = N . We have π(N) − π(N − 1) = α((α + (−1 +
α)N)2) f(N,α)
g(N,α)2
, where g(N,α) = (α + (−1 + α)N)2(N − α(1 + N)2)2(2(−1 +
N)N +α2(1+N)3−α(−4+N2(5+N)))2 and f(N,α) = −16α2+8α3+11α4+
(16α− 12α2− 12α3 + 62α4)N + (−4− 12α + 56α2− 132α3 + 141α4)N2 + (8−
36α+120α2−242α3 +160α4)N3 +(−17α+97α2−168α3 +85α4)N4 +(−6α+
20α2−24α3 +6α4)N5 +(3α−11α2 +20α3−13α4)N6 +(−2α2 +6α3−4α4)N7
where f(N,α) < 0 when α ≥ 2.
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A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.6
Without loss of generality, we assume the K-firm RJV is larger, i.e. K ≥ N/2.
The other one is referred as (N − K)-firm RJV. By backward induction, we
have for all i ∈ K and j ∈ N\K,
xtwoi = −












α(N + 1)(α(N + 1) + K(K −N − 1))
Dtwo
(a− c),
where Dtwo = α2(N +1)3−α(N +1)(N −K(N +4)(K−N))+K(K +1)(K−
N−1)(K−N). (i) We want to show Kxtwo1 −xind1 ≥ 0. First, Kxtwo1 −xind1 ≥ 0
is equivalent to α(K − 1)(N + 1)2 + K(K(N + 1)(K −N) + N − 1) + N ≥ 0.
Let f(α,K) = α(K − 1)(N + 1)2 + K(K(N + 1)(K −N) + N − 1) + N . Clear
f is increasing in α. By the all-firm participating condition α > K(N−K+1)
N+1
, it
suffices to show f(K(N−K+1)
N+1




K(N −K + 1)
N + 1
, K) =K(K − 1)(N + 1)(N −K + 1)
+ K(K(N + 1)(K −N) + N − 1) + N
=N + K(N − 1) + K(N + 1)(2K − (N + 1)) ≡ g(K)
Clearly g(N+1
2
) > 0, and g(N
2
) = 0. Since g′ > 0, we have Kxtwoi − xindi ≥ 0










i ≥ 0 is equivalent to (K − 1)(2K − N) ≥ 0
which is true for K ≥ N
2
, which completes the proof.
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A.2 Detailed Calculations and Extentions
We first details all calculations for the motivating example in the main text.
Next, we show the welfare analysis of RJV size. Next, we consider the model
when research outputs between RJV firms may not be fully compatible, and
finally discuss the consequence of having spillover between RJV firms and
non-RJV firms.
A.2.1 Motivating 4-firm Example
We first consider individual research, 2-firm RJV and then ex-ante and ex-post
licensing.
A.2.1.1 Individual Research
First consider individual research case where no RJV has formed. The equi-
librium technology development, production and profit for firm i ∈ N =






25α− 4(a− c), and
πindi =
α(25α− 16)
(25α− 4)2 (a− c)
2.
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A.2.1.2 Research Joint Venture
































(125α2 − 150α + 24)2 (a− c)
2.
First, we have x1 + x2 > x3 = x4 so that research done by RJV is higher
than non-RJV firms. Second, to ensure non-negativity of production cost, we
need to have
α >




3a2 − 16ac + 48c2
25c
≡ Z.
Then from the four second order conditions of the profits maximization, we
have α > 9
25
and α > 16
25
. Finally, for non-negativity of productions (q1 = q2 >
0 and q3 = q4 > 0), we have α >
4
5
and α > 6
5
. Combining all the conditions,




when a = c, to ensure all firms will compete in the market,
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we have




We first consider ex-ante licensing, then ex-post licensing, and finally do a
comparison.
A.2.1.3.1 Ex-ante licensing
There are two cases: (1) licensing to firm 3 only, and (2) licensing to both
firms 3 and firm 4. Licensing to firm 4 only is the same as the case (1).
























(25α− 4)2 (a− c)
2.
The winning bid is
BEx−ante = α(xA14 )
2 =
16α
(25α− 4)2 (a− c)
2
Case (2): When the RJV licenses to both firms 3 and 4. First suppose firm 4
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does not accept the license. Then
qi =
(a− c) + 2(x1 + x2)− x4
5
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and
q4 =
(a− c) + 4x4 − 3(x1 + x2)
5
.
Profit maximization problems are
max πi = (qi)
2 − αx2i + B for i ∈ {1, 2},
max π3 = (q3)
2 − αx23 − B, and
max π4 = (q4)
2 − αx24.
Solve the problems to get:
x1 = x2 =
2
25α− 4(a− c), x3 = 0, x4 =
4
25α− 4(a− c), and
qi =
5α
25α− 4(a− c) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Therefore, firm 4’s profit in the outside option is:
π4 =
α(25α− 16)
(25α− 4)2 (a− c)
2
Now consider firm 4 accepts the license, all the firms will be having the
same amount of technological development, and hence, producing the same
amount of quantity:
qi =
(a− c) + (x1 + x2)
5
for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
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2 − α(25α− 16)
(25α− 4)2 (a− c)
2.






α(25α− 1)(25α− 4)2 + (25α− 2)(300α2 − 32α) + 100α2








(25α− 4)2 (a− c)
2.
With the above, we can show the following results with ex-ante licensing.

























i so that consumers will always be worse off under licensing. Similarly,




1 . Licensing will
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πi when α > 1.6012.
A.2.1.3.2 Ex-post licensing
There are two cases: (1) licensing to firm 3 only, and (2) licensing to both
firms 3 and firm 4. Licensing to firm 4 is the same as the case (1).




9(25α− 16) + 24












125α2 − 95α + 24(a− c),
qEx−post4 =
5α(5α− 6)




α(2500α3 − 525α2 + 510α− 576)






(125α2 − 95α + 24)2 (a− c)
2.
The winning bid is
BEx−post =
125α2(10α− 7)
(125α2 − 95α + 24)2 (a− c)
2
Case (2): Now consider licensing to both firms 3 and 4. First suppose firm 4
accepts the fixed fee, the profit of firm 4 will be ( a−c+(x1+x2)
5
)2−αx24. Otherwise,
the profit is ( a−c+4x4−3(x1+x2)
5




a− c + (x1 + x2)
5
)2 − (a− c + 4x4 − 3(x1 + x2)
5
)2




a− c + (xi + xj)
5




a− c + (x1 + x2)
5


























25α(25α− 2) + 64(a− c) for all i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
B =
1200α2(25α− 4)
(625α2 − 50α + 64)2 (a− c).






α(15625α3 + 24375α2 + 4800α− 1024)








(625α2 − 50α + 64)2 (a− c)
2
With the above, we can show the following results with ex-post licensing.
Remark A.2. First, we can show that the RJV will license to both firms 3 and













i so that consumers will always be better off under ex-post licensing.




1 when α > 1.74924. For








i when α > 1.45271.
A.2.2 Equilibrium Size of RJV
As noted in the Appendix, the term a− c only serves as a scaling factor. For
the numerical analysis below, we assume a− c = 1 for the ease of exposition.
A.2.2.1 No Licensing
Figure B.1 illustrates how the RJV firms’ profits changes with its size when
N = 30 and α = 10. From the graph, we can see there is a single peak, which is





Size of RJV, K
K-firm RJV
Independent
Figure A.1. Comparing firm’s profit
for a firm under independent licensing
and K-firm RJV.






Size of RJV, K
α = 4.7
α = 5
Figure A.2. Non-single peakedness of
a RJV firm’s profit for small α.
the equilibrium RJV size in the simple RJV formation game. However, single
peaked will not hold when α is small, as in Figure A.2.
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A.2.2.2 With Licensing
Figure A.3 shows how RJV firms’ profits change with RJV size K, industry
size N , research efficiency α, and number of licensee L.
Panel (a) is drawn under N = 30 and α = 20. For each RJV size, we
determine the equilibrium number of licensees, and therefore, plotting the
equilibrium RJV firms’ profits. The graph indicates that ex-post licensing
will always improve RJV firms’ profit; while ex-ante licensing will do so if
the size of RJV is small. On the one hand, as K increases, the production
level competition will become very high. On the other hand, the licensing fees
are shared among more firms. These two effects will both reduce RJV firms’
profits, which could explain the lower profit under ex-ante licensing. However,
under ex-post licensing, RJV firms have more incentive to do research, as the
cost of R&D could be covered by the licensing fees; and they are choosing
number of licensees optimally. This will overcome the profit reducing effects,
yielding higher profit for RJV firms.
Panel (b) is drawn under α = 20. For each N varies from 8 to 30, we
have determined the profit maximizing RJV size and the optimal number of
licensees. Similar trend is observed as panel (a). As the industry size grows,
the relative size of RJV becomes smaller. The intuition of decreasing in RJV
firm’s profit is the same as previous case.
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(d) Number of licensees
Figure A.3. Comparison for RJV Firms’ Profits in 4 Cases. Vertical axes
represents profits of a RJV firm. Horizontal axes are for RJV size, industry
size, research cost and number of licensees respectively.
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Panel (c) is drawn under N = 30, and α varies from 10 to 32. We can see
as research cost increases, RJV-firms under ex-ante licensing will have higher
profits comparing with the no licensing case. The result is confirming our
previous conclusion that when research cost is high, RJV firms will have more
advantage in developing technologies, due to the cost sharing nature of RJV.
And hence they will earn higher profits.
Panel (d) is drawn under N = 30, α = 10, and K = 4. We are able to
find the optimal number of licensees numerically that there is a clear peak at
about L = 10 for ex-post licensing. Interestingly, for the ex-ante licensing,
RJV firms’ profits do not vary too much with the number of licensees.
A.2.3 Welfare Analysis
A.2.3.1 No Licensing
We first present a very simple upper bound for the maximal technological
development RJV size KTD.
Remark A.3. There exists K∗(n, α) ∈ [2, n+1
2
], such that K∗-firm RJV has
the highest technological development.
Proof. Let f(K) = Kxno1 . We just need to show K
∗(N,α) solves f ′(K) = 0.
To find K∗, we need to solve the following equation:
g(K) =K4 + N − 2KN + N2 − 2K3(N + 1)
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− α(N − 2K + 1)(N + 1)2 + K2(N2 + N + 1) = 0.
Step 1: Note that g(2) = 4 + (5N − α(N + 1)2)(N − 3) < 0, when N > 3.





(N2 − 1)2 > 0.
Step 2: It suffices to show g(K) is monotone when K ∈ [2, N+1
2
].
g′(K) = 2[−N + α(n + 1)2 + K(1 + 2K2 + N + N2 − 3K(N + 1))].
Check g′(2) = 2(6 + α(N + 1)2 + N(2N − 11)) > 0 and g′(N+1
2
) = 2α(N +
1)2 −N(N + 3) > 0.
Step 3: Solve g′′(K) = 0, gives us Kˆ = 1
6
(3(N + 1) − √3(N2 + 4N + 1),
where Kˆ ∈ [2, N+1
2
]. Note that g′(Kˆ) > 0. As we have shown g′(K) > 0 for
all K ∈ [2, N+1
2
], g(K) will cut x-axis once and only once, which occurs at
K∗(N,α), i.e. g(K∗) = 0.
Figure A.4 shows KTD is quite close to the upper bound (N+1)/2 especially
when α is large or N is small. From Figure A.5, consumer surplus has a higher
impact on society, since the social optimal RJV size and the consumer optimal
RJV size are very close, i.e. KSW and KCS are nearly identical.
Table A.1 summarizes the RJV size that maximize RJV firms’ profits,
producer surplus, social welfare, consumer surplus and technology level re-
spectively. It is clear that there is too little incentive for firms to form RJV
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Figure.A.4 KTD and its upper bound










Figure A.5 KSW and KCS
N
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Kno 11 14 18 21 24 28 31 34
KPS 18 22 25 29 33 36 40 43
α = 30 KSW 19 25 30 35 39 43 46 49
KCS 19 25 31 37 42 46 51 54
KTD 15 19 23 27 31 34 38 41
Kno 11 14 18 21 24 28 31 34
KPS 25 30 33 36 40 44 48 52
α = 100 KSW 20 27 33 39 45 51 57 63
KCS 20 26 33 39 46 52 58 64
KTD 15 20 25 29 34 39 43 47
Kno 11 15 18 21 24 28 31 34
KPS 27 36 44 53 61 69 77 84
α = 1000 KSW 20 27 34 40 47 54 60 67
KCS 20 27 33 40 47 53 60 67
KTD 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Table A.1 RJV Size under the equilibrium simple formation game
Kno, producer-surplus-maximization KPS , social-welfare-maximization
KSW , consumer-surplus-maximization KCS and technolgical-development-
maximization KTD.
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on themselves, i.e. Kno is the smallest among all the RJV sizes. The social
planner is maximizing both producer and consumer surplus. We could also
conclude that firms doing individual research and industry-wide RJV are never
optimal, even from social welfare perspective.
A.2.3.2 Under Licensing
Figure A.6 illustrates how consumer surplus changes with the size of RJV.
For each RJV size, ex-post licensing delivers the highest consumer surplus,
as in Proposition 1.4. For ex-ante licensing, consumer surplus is higher than
individual research but is higher than no licensing if and only if RJV is small,
consistent with Proposition 1.3. As shown in the above remark, ex-post li-
censing performs better than ex-ante licensing for consumer surplus.











Figure A.6. Equilibrium consumer
surplus varies with RJV size when
α = 100 and N = 30.











Figure A.7. Equilibrium consumer
surplus varies with industry size when
RJV is determeind by the simple RJV
formation game and α = 100.
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Figure A.7 illustrates how consumer surplus changes with the size of in-
dustry when size of RJV is determeind by the simple RJV formation game.
Consumer surplus can be ranked in the following descending order: ex-post
licensing, no licensing, ex-ante licensing and finally individual research.
A.2.4 Imperfect compatibility
We consider the case of imperfect compatibility. Recall that the technological
development for firm k ∈ K is XK = xk + β
∑
i∈K\{k} xi where β ∈ [0, 1]
measures the degree of compatibility within the RJV. We use superscript im
to represent this case. Since the case of individual research remain the same
as the case with perfect compatibility, we now study industry-wide RJV.
A.2.4.1 Industry-wide RJV
First, the profit of firm i ∈ N is πim(all)i = (a−Q−(c−(xi+β
∑
j 6=i xj)))qi−αx2i .

















(N − β(N − 1))
α(N + 1)2 − (N − β(N − 1))(1 + β(N − 1))(a− c).




α(N+1)2−(N−β(N−1))(1+β(N−1))(a − c). Since (N −
β(N − 1))(1 + β(N − 1)) ≥ N if and only if N + β(N − 1)2(1 − β) ≥ N , we
have the following:
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Proposition 1.1*. Under an industry-wide RJV, for all i ∈ N , we have
q
im(all)




i ≥ xindi for all β ∈ [0, 1], with the equality at
β = 0 and β = 1.
The results above explain the relationship between research sharing in-
centive and free-riding effect among the RJV firms. When technologies are
perfectly incompatible, i.e. β = 0, firms are just doing individual research.
There is no research sharing and free riding. As β increases, firms are more
willing to do research due to the research sharing effect. However, the free-
riding effect will become dominant, when β becomes large, i.e. beyond 1
2
.
Eventually, when the technology becomes perfectly compatible, the RJV will
act as if firms doing research individually.
A.2.4.2 K-firm RJV
First, profits for firms i ∈ K and j ∈ N\K are
πimi = (a−Q− (c− (xi + β
∑
d 6=i,d∈K
xd)))qi − αx2i ,
πimj = (a−Q− (c− xj))qj − αx2j ,
The equilibrium production is then
qimi =












(a− c) + Nxj −
∑






















α(N + 1)(α(N + 1)− (1 + β(K − 1))(N − β(K − 1)))
Dim
(a− c).
where Dim = α2(N + 1)3−α(N + 1)(β2(K − 1)2(K −N − 1)− β(K − 1)(N −
1)(K −N − 1) + N(N + 2)) + N(−β(K − 1)− 1)(β(K − 1)−N).
Let X im ≡ (1 + β(K − 1))ximi the aggregate technological development for
the K-firm RJV with imperfect compatibility. Let xind and Xno technological
developments for individual research and K-firm RJV with perfect compatible




also limβ→1 ximi = x
no




j . For RJV firms, the aggregate
technological development when β approaches 1 is limβ→1 X im = kxnoi = X
no.
Theorem 1.1*. Consider a K-firm RJV under compatibility β. We have





2 ≥ (∑k∈N qindk )2 for all i ∈ K and j ∈ N , where













2 for all i ∈ K.
Proof. Define the aggregate cost reduction for the RJV firms, X im(β) ≡ (1 +











) = sign(N−1−2β(K−1)), since the rest of terms are
positive. There are two cases: (1) N−1 ≥ 2(K−1) and (2) N−1 < 2(K−1).
Case (1) : ∂X
im(β)
∂β
≥ 0 as N − 1 − 2β(K − 1) ≥ 0, given β ∈ [0, 1]. Since
X im(0) = xind and X im(1) = Xno, we have xind ≤ X im(β) ≤ Xno. Case (2):
These exist β∗ = N−1




X im(1) = Xno, then there exists β∗∗ ∈ (0, β∗), such that X im(β∗∗) = Xno.
The existence of β∗∗ is due to X im(0) = xind and Xno > xind.
Therefore, when β ∈ [β∗∗, 1], then X im(β) ≥ Xno > xind. When β ∈ [0, β∗∗),
then Xno > X im(β) ≥ xind.
For consumer surplus
Qim(β) =
α(N + 1)(β2(K − 1)2(N −K)− β(K − 1)(N −K)(N − 1) + n(α(N + 1)− n))
Dim
(a− c)




) = sign(N − 1− 2β(K − 1))
The rest of the proof for consumer surplus is similar to technological develop-
ment.
A.2.5 Spill-over among firms
We consider the case where patent protection is not perfect. There is spill-over
between RJV firms and non-RJV firms; there is also spill-over among non-RJV
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firms themselves. Note that RJV-firms have perfect spill-over, because they
are sharing their research results.
Let γ ∈ [0, 1] measures the spill-over effect. Note that γ = 0 corresponds
to standard no licensing case as we considered in previous sections, and γ = 1
corresponds to all firms form a single RJV case, since firms could access all
the other firms’ technologies for free. We use superscript so (which stands for
”spill-over”) to represent this case.
A.2.5.1 Individual Research
First, under this setup, profit of firm i ∈ N is
π
so(ind)

















Note that this is essentially the same problem as in the imperfect compatibility.
Therefore all relevant results directly applies.
A.2.5.2 K-firm RJV
Let X ≡ ∑i∈K xi and Y ≡ ∑j∈N\K xj be the aggregate cost reduction for
RJV-firms and non-RJV firms respectively. For all firms i ∈ K and j ∈ N\K,
the profits are
πsoi = (a−Q− (c− (X + γY )))qi − αx2i ,
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πsoj = (a−Q− (c− (xj + γ(X + Y − xj))))qj − αx2j ,
The equilibrium productions for firms i ∈ K and j ∈ N\K are
qsoi =




(a− c) + N(xj + γ(X + Y − xj))−
∑
d 6=j(xd + γ(X + Y − xd))−K(X + γY )
N + 1
.






j , and then compare individual research case
with spillover, i.e. we compare technological development and consumer sur-
plus as in section A.2.4.
When we fix number of firms, N ; size of RJV, K; and research cost param-
eter, α, our numerical results show that as spill-over effects becomes larger,
i.e. γ is sufficiently high, individual research is better than K-firm RJV for
both technological development and consumer surplus. When the patent pro-
tection for RJV-firms is very low, due to high spill-over, firms are reluctant to
do research and tend to free-ride one other.
When we fix N and α, our numerical results, as in Tables A.2 and A.3,
suggest that γ∗ is decreasing in K, where γ∗ is the threshold point, such that
for all γ ≥ γ∗, individual research is better than K-firm RJV both in terms
of technological development and consumer surplus. As RJV size is larger,
a small spill-over will benefit hugely to non-RJV firms. Therefore RJV-firms
have less incentive to do research, and hence the consumer surplus will be
reduced.
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N30 40 50 60 70
10 0.6893 0.7688 0.8160 0.8472 0.8693
12 0.6204 0.7176 0.7751 0.8132 0.8403
K 14 0.5516 0.6663 0.7343 0.7793 0.8113
16 0.4828 0.6151 0.6936 0.7454 0.7822
18 0.4140 0.5640 0.6527 0.7115 0.7532
Table A.2. Threshold γ∗ for technological development when α = 50.
N
30 40 50 60 70
10 0.4082 0.4348 0.4494 0.4587 0.4651
12 0.3830 0.4179 0.4368 0.4486 0.4567
K 14 0.3556 0.4000 0.4235 0.4381 0.4480
16 0.3256 0.3810 0.4097 0.4271 0.4391
18 0.2927 0.3606 0.3950 0.4158 0.4298
Table A.3. Threshold γ∗ for consumer surplus when α = 50.
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Appendix B
Proofs and Details of Chapter
Two
B.1 Proofs
B.1.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
According to Kaimen and Tauman (1986), all the firms will be purchasing the
technology, as long as the royalty fee is no greater than the cost reduction by
the technology.
By backward induction, we have
qi =






for all i ∈ N.
The maximization of manufacturer’s profit gives us dr = 1
2
(a− c + α²) and
rri = 0 for all i ∈ N .
B.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
The proof is in the main text.
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B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Under independent licensing, the equilibrium quantity is defined as follows:
qi1 =








(a− c− d) + α²− 2ri1 − 2ri2
n + 1
.
We have ri = min{1
4
(a − c − d + α²), ²(α − 1)}. Therefore, for the firms
3,4, ..., n to exit the market, by lemma 2 and 3, we require:
1
8
(a− c + α²) < (α− 1)²
⇐⇒ (7α− 8)² > (a− c)
First of all, we shall notice that the above inequality holds, if α is large,
i.e. 7α− 8 > 0.
Then we also require ² < n
2(2n+1)
(a− c). And hence, when α is sufficiently
large, 1
7α−8(a− c) < ² < n2(2n+1)(a− c). Now 17α−8 < n2(2n+1)(a− c) if and only





Therefore, the first case is valid, only when both ² and α are sufficiently
large.
Now we need to show that firms 3,4, ..., n exiting the market is indeed an
equilibrium. Without loss of generality, it suffices for us to check firm 3 does
not have profitable deviation, given all other firms’ choices.
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Given di = 1
2
(a − c + α²) and ri = 1
8
(a − c + α²). The case where firm 3
does not buy the technologies from firms 1 and 2 while the others still do:
q1 =








(a− c− d)− (n− 1)α² + (n− 2)r1 + (n− 2)r2
n + 1
,
q4 = ... = qn =















⇐⇒ α > 2
which violates 1 < α ≤ 2.
Therefore, q3 = 0 even if firm 3 does not purchase the technology.
B.1.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
There are two cases: (1) r = 1
3
(a− c− d + α²) and (2) r = α².
Case (1): we have 1
3




(a− c− d) (B.1)
For productions, we have
q1 = q2 =
1
3
(a− c− d + α²),
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q3 = ... = qn = 0.
Solve maxd Πm = dQ gives us d =
1
2
(a− c + α²).
Thus
q1 = q2 =
1
6
(a− c + α²),
q3 = ... = qn = 0.





Check that firms 3, 4, ..., n do not have profitable deviation.
If firm 3 does not purchase the technology, while others do:
q3 =






⇐⇒ ² < 1
5α
(a− c)
which contradicts to equation (B.2).
Therefore, when 1
5α
(a − c) < ² < n
2(2n+1)
















(a− c + α²),
qp3 = ... = q
p
n = 0.
Case (2): All firms stay in market . We have
dp =







n(a− c) + 2(n2 − n− 1)α²
2n(n + 1)
,
qp3 = ... = q
p
n =
n(a− c)− 2(2n + 1)α²
2n(n + 1)
.
Check that qp3 > 0 if and only if ² <
1
5α
(a− c) < n
2(2n+1)α
(a− c).
B.1.5 Proof of Theorem 2.1
Proof on consumer surplus:
First we have,
Qno =












n(a− c) + 2α²
2(n + 1)
.




⇐⇒ α < 2(n− 1)
n
When there is still substitutability between the technologies. firms 1 and
2 will compete by setting lower prices for their patents, and hence consumer
surplus is higher under independent licensing case.
Next, we check
Qi > Qno
⇐⇒ α < 2.
In conclusion, when α < 2(n−1)
n
, Qr > Qi > Qp > Qno. Otherwise, Qr >
Qp > Qi > Qno
Proof on aggregate producer surplus:
First we have
Πno =












(a− c + α²)2,
Πr =

















represent the aggregate producer surplus, when firms 3,4,...,
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n exit the market in independent licensing and patent pool cases respectively.
Lemma B.1. Πr > Πno
Proof.
Πr − Πno > 0
⇐⇒ ²(2(a− c)n(2 + n)(−2 + αn) + ²(8 + n(20− 8n2 + α2n(2 + n)))) > 0.
Clearly 2(a− c)n(2 + n)(−2 + αn) > 0.
²(8 + n(20− 8n2 + α2n(2 + n))) = 8² + 20n² + 2α2n2² + n²(−8n2 + α2n2).
It suffices for us to show 2n(n + 2)(αn− 2)(a− c) + n²(−8n2 + α2n2) ≥ 0.
2n(n + 2)(αn− 2)(a− c) + n²(−8n2 + α2n2)










n2 − 4)(a− c) ≥ 0 when n ≥ 4.
It is easy to check, when n = 3, Πr > Πno.
Lemma B.2. Πr > Πi and Πr > Πp
Proof.
Πr > Πi




⇐⇒ α²(n− 2)(α²n + 2(a− c)) > 0
Clearly, Πr > Πi
′










B.1.6 More results on consumer surplus and aggregate
producer surplus
More comparisons consumer surplus:
Proposition B.1. When firms without initial technology exit the market under
both independent licensing and patent pool, i.e. 1
7α−8(a−c) ≤ ² < n2(2n+1)(a−c),
then Qi
′










(a− c + α²) > Qno
⇐⇒ ² > n− 1
(n + 1)α− 4(a− c)
Check that
n− 1




⇐⇒ 4n2 − 2n− 2 > n2α + nα− 4n
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⇐4n2 − 2n− 2 > 2n2 + 2n− 4n as RHS is max at α = 2
⇐⇒ 2n2 − 2 > 0.
Therefore Qi
′
< Qno. This is intuitive. Drastic innovation in independent
licensing leads to a duopoly in the market. With little market competition,
consumers should be worse off than the case of no licensing, where the com-
petition level is relatively high.






(a− c + α²) > Qno
⇐⇒ ² > n− 2
2(n + 1)α− 6(a− c)




2(n + 1)α− 6 <
n
2(2n + 1)
⇐⇒ 2n2 − 2 < αn2 + αn
⇐⇒ α > 2(n− 1)
n
≡ αˆ.
Therefore, when α > αˆ, Qp
′
> Qno. Otherwise Qno > Qp
′
. When technologies
are compatible and drastic, even though the competition level is reduced by
forming a pool, the technological improvement is too high, consumers are still
better off. Compatibility does not affect consumer surplus in the case of no
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licensing. Given technology ² is significant, and α is large, the term α² will
overcome the loss from the reduction in production level competition.
Proposition B.2. When firms without initial technology exit the market under
patent pool, independent licensing yields higher consumer surplus than the case







⇐⇒ (n− 2)(a− c)− (5n− 4)α² + 6(n− 1)² > 0.
Note that LHS will reach minimum when α = 2, therefore it suffices for us to






⇐⇒ n2 − 2n− 2 > 0.
Therefore, Qi > Qp
′
.
More on aggregate producer surplus:






⇐⇒ ²((α− 2)n + 2)(²(α(3n− 2)− 2n + 2) + 2(a− c)) > 0
⇐⇒ (α− 2)n + 2) > 0
⇐⇒ α > 2(n− 1)
n
.
which completes the proof. (Consistent with Shapiro (2001).)
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B.2 Fixed Fee Compensation Scheme
First, we will consider two different cases: (1) downstream producers may
keep their technologies but does not transfer, and (2) downstream producers
may keep and transfer their technologies. The first case is more relevant when
imitation and/or patent protection is weak. Then, we consider the problem
from normative perspective: fair compensation based on marginal contribu-
tion. This is important if the court decides compensation has to be fair as in
Qualcomm case.
B.2.1 Firms keep the technology
We consider a game similar to the one described in the main text. Now
firms 1 and 2 have a choice on giving (possibly with a compensation) their
respective technologies to the manufacturer in the first stage. In the second
stage,the manufacturer set the price of the chip d, and charge royalty rates for
technologies, if he has any. Downstream firms engage in Cournot competition
in the last stage. Let superscript rn to denote this reverse licensing without
independent licensing game.
Proposition B.4. Consider the upstream manufacturer engage in reverse li-
censing but the downstream producer may keep their technology. The upstream
manufacturer will set the price of input to be drn = 1
2
(a− c+α²), charges zero
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royalty for licensing rrni = 0 for all i ∈ N , and offer a fixed fee compensation
F rn = ( (n−1)(a−c+α²)+(2n
2−3n−1)(α−1)²
2(n2−1) )
2 − ( 1
2(n+1)
(a − c + α²))2 to downstream
producers with advanced technology (firms 1 and 2). The production of down-





(a− c + α²).
Hence, the profits of the upstream manufacturer is πrnm = d
rnQrn − 2F rn,














(a− c + α²))2.
B.2.2 Firms may transfer their technologies
Now we consider the game similar to previous subsection, firms 1 and 2 have
a choice on giving their respective technologies to the manufacturer. If they
choose to keep their respective technologies, they could set royalty fees for the
technologies independently in the second stage. Let superscript rl to denote
this reverse licensing with independent licensing game.
Proposition B.5. Consider the upstream manufacturer engage in reverse li-
censing but the downstream producer may transfer their technologies. The
upstream manufacturer will set the price of input to be drl = 1
2
(a − c + α²),
charges zero royalty for licensing rrli = 0 for all i ∈ N , and offer a fixed fee
compensation F rn = ( (2n
3−13n+13)(n(2n(n+2)−5)+1)(a−c+α²)2
4(n(n(3n+4)−13)+2)2 − ( 12(n+1)(a− c+α²))2
to downstream producers with advanced technology (firms 1 and 2). The pro-
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(a− c + α²).
Hence, the profits of the upstream manufacturer is πrnm = d
rlQrl − 2F rl,





(a − c + α²))2 + F =
(2n3−13n+13)(n(2n(n+2)−5)+1)
4(n(n(3n+4)−13)+2)2 (a − c + α²)2, and πrn3 = ... = πrnn = ( 12(n+1)(a − c +
α²))2.
B.2.3 Fair Compensation
A normative analysis of fair compensation can be defined by the marginal
contribution of the technologies (Hougaard, Ko and Zhang 2016). Marginal
contribution of a downstream firm can be defined by the marginal increases of
total profit due to the presence of the technologies. Then fair compensation to
a downstream firm would be a share of it marginal contribution where the share
is based on the relative marginal contribution of each agent. We will have two
slightly different definition of fair compensation depending whether we include
the upstream manufacturer into the calculation of marginal contribution. 1
With the upstream manufacturer
In order to measure the marginal contribution, we consider a hypothetical
case, where firm 1 is the only leader in the market, who possess a technology
to reduce the production cost by ². In this case, firms 2, 3, ..., n are identical.
Now consider the game described in the main text. The only difference is
1We have detailed discussion in Appendix E.3.
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that firm 2 is no longer the leader, and the market technology level is only ².
Let superscript rm to denote this hypothetical marginal contribution game.




πrmi = (P − d− (c− ²)− ri)qi
In equilibrium, we have
rrm1 = r
rm












(a− c + ²).
Comparing πrmi and π
r
i , for all i = 1, 2, ..., n. The marginal contribution of
firm 2’s technology to firms 1, 2, ..., n’s profit is defined to be
πrmi − πri =
1
4(n + 1)2
((a− c + α²)2 − (a− c + ²)2), ∀i = 1, 2, ..., n
Note that firm 2 is also benefited from his own technology.
The marginal contribution to the manufacturer is
πrmm − πrm =
n
4(n + 1)
((a− c + α²)2 − (a− c + ²)2)







Note that, for example, firm 2 will also need to ”pay” the marginal contri-
bution 1
4(n+1)2
Φ to himself. And thus, the fee he actually collected from other
firms (including the manufacturer) is given by n(n+2)−1
4(n+1)2
Φ.
Lemma B.3. All firms (including the manufacturer) are still making positive
profit, if each firm is paying the marginal gain as a fee to firms 1 and 2.
Proof. It suffices to show
2(a− c + ²)2 − (a− c + α²)2 > 0
⇐⇒ (a− c)2 + (4²− 2α²)(a− c) + (2− α2)²2 > 0
If 2− α2 > 0, then the above inequality holds, as every term is positive.
If 2 − α2 < 0, because ² < n
2(2n+1)






Without the upstream manufacturer
Another way to define the compensation is actually to consider the marginal
contribution to only the downstream firms, i.e. F = n
4(n+1)2
Φ. The reason be-
ing that only downstream firms are competing in the same market. However,
since the upstream firm is also benefited from the additional piece of technol-
ogy, he is required to share this lump-sum cost F .
Let us define the cost sharing rule. The total benefit of the economy is given
by n(n+2)
4(n+1)2




the proportion of his benefit in the whole economy is n+1
n+2
. And similarly, the
proportion of firms 1, 2, ..., n’s benefit is 1
n(n+2)
.
Therefore, the upstream firm need to pay n+1
n+2
F to firms 1 and 2 respec-
tively, and firms 1, 2, ..., n will only pay 1
n(n+2)
F to firms 1 and 2 respectively.
Note that firms 1 and 2 also pay to themselves.
Firms 3, 4, ..., n are better off, because they are paying less as compared








B.2.4 Comparison of the different compensation schemes
There are pros and cons for using fixed fees as compensation. On one hand, it
greatly simplifies the computation, enables us to do comparisons with all dif-
ferent licensing schemes. On the other hand, however, it is non-distortionary.
Consumer surplus is not affected by the various schemes of compensation. It
is just the surplus transfer from the upstream firm to downstream firms.
Lemma B.4. Consumer surplus is unchanged before and after the compensa-
tion.








B.2.5. Proofs on Fixed Fee Compensation
B.2.5.1. Proof of Proposition B.4
Now we would like to check that surrendering the technologies in the first stage
is not an equilibrium of the game, meaning that firms have profitable deviation
by keeping the technologies for themselves. In order for the upstream firm to
acquire the technologies, he must be paying some compensation, F rn, to both
of the leading firms. We will investigate this compensation in the following
paragraphs.
Consider firm 1 still surrenders the technology to the manufacturer, while
firm 2 does not. In this case, firm 2 should pay the same royalty rate as firms
3, 4, ..., n. But he could enjoy a technology level of α², while firms 1,3,...,n will
only have cost reduction of ². So the profits for firms are: 2




πi = (P − d− (c− ²)− ri)qi for i ∈ N\{2}, and
π2 = (P − d− (c− α²)− r2)q2
Note that r2 = r3 = ... = rn ≡ rj in equilibrium.
Using backward induction, we have:
q1 =
a− c− d + (2− α)²− nr1 + (n− 1)rj
n + 1
,
2We omit the superscript for this deviation analysis.
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q2 =
a− c− d + nα²− (n− 1)² + r1 − 2rj
n + 1
,
q3 = ... = qn =









= 0. We have only 2 independent equations,
and hence:
r1 = −d + a− c + ²
2
,
rj = −d + (n− 1)(a− c + ²) + (α− 1)²
2(n− 1) .
As the manufacturer is charging fees for both chips and technologies, we
can define r∗1 ≡ r1 + d = a−c+²2 and r∗j ≡ rj + d = (n−1)(a−c+²)+(α−1)²2(n−1) , for all
j ∈ N\{1}.
Check that r∗1 < r
∗
j , as firm 1 provides the technology, the manufacturer
should be giving him some discount.
For notations to be consistent with the rest of the paper, we assume d = 0,
and therefore r∗1 = r1 =
a−c+²
2
and r∗j = rj =
(n−1)(a−c+²)+(α−1)²
2(n−1) . We conclude
the equilibrium with the following lemma:
Lemma B.6. If firm 2 chooses to keep the technology, the equilibrium is
d = 0,
r1 =












(n− 1)(a− c + α²) + (2n2 − 3n− 1)(α− 1)²
2(n2 − 1) > 0,
q3 = ... = qn =
(n− 1)(a− c) + (3n− 1)²− 2nα²
2(n2 − 1)
=
(n− 1)(a− c + α²)− (3n− 1)(α− 1)²
2(n2 − 1) .
First, without loss of generality, we check q3 > 0.
When 1 < α < 3n−1
2n
< 2, 3n− 1− 2nα > 0, then q3 > 0.
Otherwise, 3n−1−2nα < 0. Then q3 > 0 if and only if ² < n−12nα+1−3n(a−c).




Next,we could check that q1 < q2 if and only if α > 1. Therefore, firm
2 is indeed making higher profit than firm 1 by keeping the technology. He
becomes the only leader in the market, with production cost reduced by α².
We compare firm 2’s profit with the case that he must surrender the tech-
nology without any choice. He indeed wants to keep, if and only if π2 > π
r
2, if
and only if (2n2 − 3n− 1)(α− 1)² > 0.
Now we can define F rn = π2 − πr2 to be the compensation. Manufacturer
needs to pay F rn to both firms 1 and 2, so that they will be indifferent between
surrendering the technology and keeping the technology.
Lemma B.7. The manufacture is still making profit after paying the compen-
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sation to both firms 1 and 2, i.e. πrm − 2F rn > 0.
The lemma shows that under the reverse licensing regime, the manufacturer
is still making positive profit, after paying the compensation to both of the
leading firms.
Proof of lemma B.7
Proof.
πrm − 2F > 0
⇐⇒ n
4(n + 1)
(a− c + α²)2 − 2F > 0
⇐⇒ (a− c)2(−1 + n)2n(1 + n) + 2(a− c)²(−1 + n)(−2− 6n + 4n2
+ α(2 + 5n− 4n2 + n3))− ²2(2(1 + 3n− 2n2)2 − 8α(1 + 4n− 5n3 + 2n4)
+ α2(6 + 19n− 9n2 − 15n3 + 7n4))
> 0
First of all, note that (2(1 + 3n− 2n2)2− 8α(1 + 4n− 5n3 + 2n4) + α2(6 +
19n − 9n2 − 15n3 + 7n4)) is quadratic in α, with maximum occurs at α = 2.
The minimum point of the expression is at α = 8(1+4n−5n
3+2n4)
2(6+19n−9n2−15n3+7n4) < 2.
If we let α = 2, the above equation simplifies to
(a− c)2(−1 + n)2n(1 + n) + 4(a− c)²(−1 + n)(1 + n(2 + (−2 + n)n))
− 2²2(5 + n(12 + n(−13 + 2(−1 + n)n)))
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With ² much smaller than (a− c), the negative term is dominated by the first
two positive. And hence, the manufacturer’s profit will be positive, and he is
willing to pay for the fixed fee to both firms 1 and 2.
B.2.5.2 Proof of Proposition B.5
Similar to the analysis of previous section, we would like to check that sur-
rendering the technologies in the first stage is not an equilibrium of the game.
In order for the upstream firm to acquire the technologies, he must be paying
some compensation, F rl, to both of the leading firms. We will investigate this
compensation in the following paragraphs.
Without loss of generality, we consider firm 2 keep his technology, while
firm 1 still surrender his to the manufacturer. Let rrli for all i ∈ N be the
royalty fees charged by the upstream firm. Let r2 be the royalty fee charged
by firm 2 to firms 1, 3, ..., n. Note that after purchasing patent from firm 2, all
the downstream firms possess a technology which will reduce production cost
by α².
The profits for firms are




πi = (P − d− (c− α²)− rrli − r2)qi for i ∈ N\{2}, and
π2 = (P − d− (c− α²)− rrl2 )q2 + r2(q1 + q3 + ... + qn).
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By backward induction, we have in equilibrium, rrl2 = r
rl
3 = ... = r
rl
n . For
simplicity, we use rrl2 as the royalty fee charged by the upstream firm to firm
2, 3,... , n.
q1 =




(a− c− d + α²)− 2rrl2 + rrl1 + (n− 1)r2
n + 1
,
q3 = ... = qn =




(a− c)(n− 1)(n + 3)− n(n + 2)(rrl2 − α²)− 3α²− 4rrl1 + 7rrl2 + 3d
2(n− 1)(n + 3) .
Note that from the positive production condition, i.e. q3 = ... = qn > 0,




(n(n(2n + 3)− 8)− 1)
2n(n(3n + 4)− 13) + 4(a− c + α²),
rrl2 = ... = r
rl
n =
((n− 1)n(n + 3)− 2)
n(n(3n + 4)− 13) + 2(a− c + α²).
Check that rrl1 < r
rl
2 , because firm 1 provides the technology, and he could
enjoy some discount on the chips.
Check also
r2 = min{ (n− 1)
2(n + 3)
n(n(3n + 4)− 13) + 2(a− c + α²),
(n(n(2n + 7)− 6)− 19)(a− c + α²)
4(n(2n(n + 4)− 3)− 23) }
=
(n(n(2n + 7)− 6)− 19)
4(n(2n(n + 4)− 3)− 23)(a− c + α²).
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And therefore, in this case,
q1 =
(n− 1)(n + 3)
2n(2n(n + 4)− 3)− 46(a− c + α²),
q2 =
(n(n(2n + 7)− 6)− 19)
4(n(2n(n + 4)− 3)− 23)(a− c + α²),
q3 = ... = qn = 0.
Firm 2 is unable to charge higher royalty rates to achieve highest profit by
keeping and licensing the technology.
We can now define the compensation to be
F rl = (q2)
2 + r2(q1 + q3 + ... + qn)− πr2
Lemma B.8. The manufacture is still making profit after paying the compen-
sation to both firms 1 and 2, i.e. πrm − 2F rl > 0.
Proof. We need to check
n
4(n + 1)
(a− c + α²)2 − 2F > 0
⇐⇒ 4n7 + 20n6 + 9n5 − 45n4 − 56n3 − 198n2 − 25n + 547 > 0
the inequality holds with n ≥ 3, because 4n7− 45n4 > 0, 20n6− 56n3 > 0 and
9n5 − 198n2 − 25n > 9n5 − 223n2 > (9× 27− 223)n2 > 0.
Under the reverse licensing regime, the manufacturer is still making positive
profit, after paying the compensation to both of the leading firms.
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B.2.5.3 Prove lemma 9 when n = 3
We can show the relationships by numerical methods, here we just present an




(2(α + 2)(a− c)² + ((20− 9α)α− 8)²2 + 3(a− c)2),
πrlm =






(−(α2 − 2)²2 − 2(α− 2)(a− c)² + (a− c)2).
Now
πrnm − πmcm > 0
⇐⇒ 1
8
(−1 + α)²(4(a− c) + (7− 3α)²) > 0
The inequality holds, as α ∈ (1, 2].
πrnm − πrlm > 0
⇐⇒ 6111(a− c)2 + 2(8836 − 2725α)(a− c)²
− (35344− 88360α + 46905α2)²2 > 0
Now maxα(35344 − 88360α + 46905α2) = 46244 when α = 2. Now max ² =
1
4
(a− c). Therefore max(35344 − 88360α + 46905α2)²2 = 2890.25 < 6111.





Proofs and Details of Chapter
Three
C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof for Lemma 3.1
First, we want to show WL(0) > W N
′
(t) for t ∈ [ 1








(t) is maximized at t = 1
2−α for t ∈ [ 12−α , 1]. Moreover, we have
WL(t) > W N
′




have shown WL(0) > W N
′
(t) for t ∈ [ 1
2−α , 1].








, and we consider the optimal choice of the tax rate (t∗)
depending on the value of β.
If β < βN , then WN(t) is convex. It can be checked easily that WN (t) is
decreasing in t for 2
5−3α ≤ t ≤ 12−α , and thus is maximized at t = 25−3α .
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If β = βN , then WN(t) is linear and decreasing in t, and thus is maximized
at t = 2
5−3α .





2(1 + α)(1− β(1 + α2 − α))
(1 + α)2 − 4β(1 + α2 − α)2 .




∗ = tN if 2
5−3α <
tN < 1




2−α . We know that t
N < 2
5−3α if β < β
N
and tN > 1
2−α if β > β
N









The following lemma summarizes the result on the optimal tax rate.
Lemma C.1. When β < βN , the optimal tax rate is t∗ = 2




, the optimal tax rate is t∗ = tN ; when β
N
< β < 1
α2
, the optimal tax
rate is t∗ = 1
2−α .






9(5−3α)2 , if β < β
N ,
WN (tN ) = (1−α)
4β
4(1−α+α2)2β−(1+α)2 , if β






(2−α)2 , if β
N
< β < 1
α2
.
Now we are ready to show WL(0) > W N(t∗).
If β < βN , the optimal tax rate is t∗ = 2
5−3α . Note that W
N( 2
5−3α) and
WL(0) are both linear and decreasing in β. It is easy to check that when
β = 0, WL(0) > W N( 2
5−3α); and when β =
1
α2
, WL(0) = 0 > W N( 2
5−3α).





< β < 1
α2
, the optimal tax rate is t∗ = 1








if and only α > −1.
If βN < β < β
N
, the optimal tax rate is t∗ = tN . It can be checked that
WN (t∗) > W L(0) if β < β1 or β > β2, where β1 and β2 are two thresholds
such that β1 < β2; and W
N(t∗) < W L(0) if β1 < β < β2. Since we have
WN (βN ) < W L(0) and WN (β
N
) < W L(0), then for any βN < β < β
N
,
WN (t∗) < W L(0).
C.1.2 Proof for Lemma 2
First of all, we want to show WN
′
(1) > W L(t) for t ∈ [0, 2
5−3α ]. Note that 0 >
WN
′
(t) > W L(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Since WN ′(t) and WL(t) are both increasing
in t, WL(t) is maximized at t = 2
5−3α , and W






Second, we want to show WN
′




Lemma 1, we know that for β > 1
α2
, WN (t) is maximized at t = 1
2−α for
t ∈ [ 2
5−3α ,
1





N ′(t) is increasing in
t, we must have WN
′
(1) > W N ( 1
2−α).
C.1.3 Proof for Propositon 3.2








2−α < t < 1, Q






. For any t, we have
QL(t) = 2(1−αt)
3
and EL(t) = αQL(t).
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Clearly QL(t) > QN(t) and QL(t) > QN
′
(t), indicating licensing will always
give us higher consumer surplus.
It is also easy to verify that EL(t) > EN
′
(t).
Check that EL(t) < EN(t) if and only if 2− (1+α)t < 1+α+α(1−2α)t+
(α− 2)t if and only if t < 1
2




. This completes the proof.
C.1.4 Proof for Lemma 3.3
Consider the three possible equilibria in stage 2: licensing equilibrium, bribing
equilibrium, and equilibrium with no licensing and no bribing.
1. Licensing equilibrium
In any licensing equilibrium, denote the equilibrium licensing fee by F ∗. Then
we have two cases:
First, if πB2 ≥ πN2 , then the equilibrium conditions are
πL1 ≥ πB1 ,
πL2 ≥ πB2 ,







+ b > 0. In other
words, the equilibrium condition becomes
πL1 + π
L
2 ≥ πB1 + πB2 .
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Second, if πB2 < π
N
2 , then the equilibrium conditions are
πL1 ≥ πN1 ,
πL2 ≥ πN2 ,







> 0. We can also
rewrite the condition as
πL1 + π
L
2 ≥ πN1 + πN2 .
2. Bribing equilibrium
First, firm 2 does not want to deviate by not bribing, i.e.,
πB2 ≥ πN2 .
Second, firm 1 cannot profitably deviate by licensing to firm 2, i.e. for any






+ b, and the conditions are
πB2 ≥ πN2 ,
πB1 + π
B
2 ≥ πL1 + πL2 .
3. Equilibrium with no licensing and no bribing
First, firm 2 does not want to deviate by bribing the bureaucrat, i.e.,
πN2 ≥ πB2 .
168
Second, firm 1 cannot profitably deviate by licensing to firm 2, i.e., for any






, and the conditions are
πN1 + π
N
2 ≥ πL1 + πL2 ,
πN2 ≥ πB2 − b.
4. Summary
If πB2 ≥ πN2 , then licensing is an equilibrium if πL1 + πL2 ≥ πB1 + πB2 , otherwise
bribing is an equilibrium. If πB2 < π
N
2 , then licensing is an equilibrium if
πL1 + π
L
2 ≥ πN1 + πN2 , otherwise no licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium.
C.1.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4















Because of Proposition 3.2, it suffices for us to show QL(t) > QB(t), which is
trivial, and QB(t) > QN
′
(t), if and only if 1+(α−2α′)t > 0. Note that bribing
could be an equilibrium only when 0 < σ < 1
2













and EB(t) = α
1 + α′t− 2αt
3
+






Check EB(t)−EN ′(t) > 0 if and only if (2αα′−α2 +2α−4α′)t+2−α > 0.
Note (2αα′ − α2 + 2α− 4α′) < 0, therefore it suffices for us to show EN ′(1) <
EB(1), if and only if (2 − α)(1 − α)(1 − 2σ) > 0. Note that bribing could
be an equilibrium only when 0 < σ < 1
2
. Therefore, for all t where bribing
equilibrium is possible, we have EB(t) > EN
′
(t).
Now we prove that it is possible that EB(t) < EL(t). Consider t = 1, we
have EB(1) < EL(1) if and only if 1−α+ασ−2σ < 0 if and only if α > 1−2σ
1−σ ,
which is one of the sufficient condition for bribing to be better than licensing in
equilibrium. And hence, we conclude that when bribing is possible, we have,
at least, EB(1) < EL(1). Therefore, it is possible that bribing yield lower
pollution than licensing.
C.1.6 Proof for Lemma 3.6
The proof for WL(0) > W N (t) for t ∈ [ 2
5−3α ,
1
2−α ] and W
L(0) > W N
′
(t)
for t ∈ [ 1
2−α , 1] is identical to that in Lemma 3.1. We just need to show
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WL(0) > W B(t) for t ∈ [ 2
5α′−3α , 1].





2(α′ + α)− β(1 + α)(−αα′ + 2α2 − α + 2α′)




(αα′ − 2α2 + α− 2α′)2 ,
βB ≡ 8(α
′ + α)
(1 + 7α)(−αα′ + 2α2 − α + 2α′) ,
βˉB ≡ (α
′ + α)(2− α′ − α)
(1 + α + αα′ − 2α2 + α− 2α′)(−αα′ + 2α2 − α + 2α′) .





The following lemma summarizes the result on the optimal choice of the
tax rate (t∗) depending on the value of β.
Lemma C.2. When β < βB, the optimal tax rate is t∗ = 2




, the optimal tax rate is t∗ = tB; when β
B
< β < 1
α2
, the optimal tax
rate is t∗ = 1.





β(αα′−2α2+α−2α′)2−(α′+α)2 , if β











, if β > β
B
.
Following the same argument as in Lemma 3.1, WL(0) > W B(t∗).
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C.1.7 Proof of Theorem 3.3
We will focus on Part (3) of Theorem 3. The proof of Part (1) is trivial, and
the proof of Part (2) is similar to that of Part (3). To show this, we follow
three steps.
First of all, we want to show WL(t) can never be optimal. Note that
0 > W N
′
(t) > W L(t) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Note also WN ′(t) and WL(t) are both
increasing in t. Let t˜L ≡ arg maxt WL(t), and clearly WN ′(1) > W L(t˜L).
Second, WN(t) can never be optimal. Following the proof of Lemma 3.1,
we know that for β > 1
α2




N (t) is max-
imized at t = 1





N ′(t) is increasing
in t, we must have WN
′
(1) > W N( 1
2−α).
Lastly, WB(t) can never be optimal. When β > 1
α2
, WB(t) is increasing in
t. Let t˜B ≡ arg maxt WB(t), then it suffices for us to show WN ′(1) > W B(1)
and hence WN
′
(1) > W B(t˜B).
Lemma C.3. WN
′
(1) > W B(1).




(1) = 0 > W B(1).
Now consider the slope of WN
′






and SB(α) ≡ −1
9




(α) = SB(α), we have α = 1, α = 2 and α = 2(2σ−1)
5+2σ
< 0.
Therefore WB(1) always has a steeper slope, and hence WN
′
(1) > W B(1) for
all β > 1
α2
.
Therefore, we can conclude that when
√
2−1 < σ < 1
2
, if b > g(1), WN
′
(1)
will be the equilibrium outcome.
The rest of the proof can be easily shown in figure 3.2.
C.1.8 Proof for Proposition 3.5
First, we express this proposition in detail:
Proposition 3.5*. (Sufficient condition for bribing to be the equilibrium)










2 − 1, if b < h(1), then government should set tax
rate at 1, and bribing is the equilibrium.
(2) When
√
2 − 1 < σ < 1
2
, if b < g(1), then government should set tax
rate at 1, and bribing is the equilibrium.
Next, we prove the theorem.
In both cases, define t˜ = h−1(b) < 1, we need to compare WB(1) with
WL(t˜). But we know that when β > 1
α2
, WL(t) is increasing in t. Therefore
the sufficient condition for bribing to be the equilibrium is to show WB(1) >
WL(1).
173
It is easy to show that when β = 1
α2
, WL(1) = 0 > W B(1).




and SB(α) ≡ −1
9
(1 + 2α + αα′ − 2α2 − 2α′)2
Solve SL(α) = SB(α), we have α = 1, α = 1−2σ





1−σ < α < 1, 0 > S
B(α) > SL(α), indicating WL(1) has






which solves WL(1) = WB(1). Thus WL(1) > W B(1) when 1
α2
< β < β∗;
otherwise, WB(1) > W L(1).
C.1.9 Proof of Proposition 3.6





2− 1, if b < h(1); or when √2− 1 < σ ≤ 1
2
, if b < g(1);
in addition, if β > 1
α2





should charge t = t˜, and licensing will be the equilibrium.
We know that WL(t) is increasing with the minimum occurs at WL( 2
5α′−3α).
The sufficient condition for licensing to be the equilibrium requires WL( 2
5α′−3α) >
WB(1).
When β = 1
α2
, WL( 2
5α′−3α) = 0 > W
B(1).
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and SB(α) ≡ −1
9
(1 + 2α + αα′ − 2α2 − 2α′)2









2(5σ2+3σ−2) , 0 > Sˉ
L(α) > SB(α),





C.2.1 Detailed discussion on firms’ equilibrium decision
when 0 < σ < 12
We present the equilibrium decisions in the main text for the case
√
2 − 1 <
σ < 1
2




Proposition C.1. Suppose 0 < σ < 1
2
. Then the equilibria in stage 2 are
summarized as below:
• Case 1: 0 < σ < 2
5
1. If t ≤ 2
5−3α , licensing is an equilibrium;
2. If 2
5−3α < t <
1
2−α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < f(t), licensing is an equilibrium.
3. If 1
2−α < t < 1, then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is an
equilibrium; if b < g(t), licensing is an equilibrium.





1. If t ≤ 2
5−3α , licensing is an equilibrium;
2. If 2
5−3α < t <
1
2−α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < f(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
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3. If 1
2−α < t <
2
5α′−3α , then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < g(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
4. If 2
5α′−3α < t < 1, then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if h(t) < b < g(t), licensing is an equilibrium; if
b < h(t), bribing is an equilibrium.
• Case 3: √2− 1 < σ < 1
2
1. If t ≤ 2
5−3α , licensing is an equilibrium;
2. If 2
5−3α < t <
1
2−α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < f(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
3. If 1
2−α < t <
2
5α′−3α , then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < g(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
4. If 2
5α′−3α < t < t
∗, if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is an
equilibrium is an equilibrium; if g(t) < b < h(t), L; b < h(t), bribing
is an equilibrium;
5. t∗ < t < 1, b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium;
b < g(t), bribing is an equilibrium.




















































Figure C.2.3: Equilibrium Region for Case 3
C.2.2 Government puts effort on anti-corruption
Our discussion will focus on the case 1
2
< σ < 1, under which firm 2 may exit
the market in No licensing and no bribing case and Bribing case.
The competition analysis between firm 1 and 2 are the same as presented
in the main text. We will focus on firm 2’s choice and government optimal
tax.
C.2.2.1 Firm 2’s Choice
In this case, firm 2 will exit the market in bribing case, when 1
2α′−α < t ≤ 1.




f(t), if 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
2−α ,
g(t), if 1
2−α < t ≤ 12α′−α .
Note the difference between B(t) in the main text and Bˆ(t) is the range of
g(t). The properties of functions f(t), g(t) and h(t) remain the same. But
the relationship among them changes due to the possible exit of firm 2 in
the bribing case. Nevertheless we have Figure C.2.4 and C.2.5, analogous to












Figure C.2.4: Equilibrium Region for Licensing and No
C.2.2.2 Optimal Taxation Policy
The social welfare functions are exactly the same as in the main text. The
only difference is the largest domain for WB(t) becomes to 2
5α′−3α < t <
1
2α′−α .
1We have three different cases depending on value of σ. Here we just present one possible
case, where 12 < σ <
4















Figure C.2.5: Equilibrium Region when 1
2
< σ < 4
5





2(α′ + α)− β(1 + α)(−αα′ + 2α2 − α + 2α′)
(α′ + α)2 − β(αα′ − 2α2 + α− 2α′)2 .






α(−αα′+2α2−α+2α′) . Then we have 0 < β





only difference with the proof of Lemma 3.6 is that βˉB
′
< βˉB.
The following lemma summarizes the result on the optimal choice of the
tax rate (t∗) depending on the value of β.
Lemma C.4. When β < βB, the optimal tax rate is t∗ = 2




, the optimal tax rate is t∗ = tB; when β
B′
< β < 1
α2
, the optimal tax
rate is t∗ = 1
2α′−α .
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β(αα′−2α2+α−2α′)2−(α′+α)2 , if β











(2α′−α)2 , if β > β
B′
.
We summarize this part with the two theorems below:
Theorem 3.2*. When β < 1
α2
, in any equilibrium, the government sets the
optimal tax rate to be zero and licensing takes place.
Theorem 3.3*. When β > 1
α2
, in an equilibrium, the optimal tax rate is 1.
No licensing and no bribing takes place.
Note that government regulation works again, when the anti-corruptive
effort is strong. In this case, there is no room for corruption, as the bribing
cost is too high for both the firm and the bureaucrat.
C.2.2.3 Detailed Discussion on Firms’ Equilibrium Decision
First of all, we shall discuss the properties of h(t). h(t) is U-shape and




2−α . When 0 < t <
2




2−α , when α
′ > 4+α
5
, if and only if σ > 4
5
.











if and only if 2
√
2− 2+(3+2√2)α > α′, if and only if σ < 2(√2− 1).
In this case, there exists a unique t∗ such that h(t∗) = g(t∗), where 1
2−α <
t∗ < 1
2α′−α and h(t) > g(t) if t > t


















2−α and f(t) > h(t) if t < t
∗∗.
Therefore, we have the following Proposition analogous to Proposition 7.
Proposition 7*. Suppose 1
2
< σ < 1. Then the equilibria in stage 2 are
summarized as below:
• Case 1: 1
2
< σ < 4
5
1. If t ≤ 2
5−3α , licensing is an equilibrium;
2. If 2
5−3α < t <
1
2−α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < f(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
3. If 1
2−α < t <
2
5α′−3α , then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < g(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
4. If 2
5α′−3α < t < t
∗, then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if h(t) < b < g(t), licensing is an equilibrium; if
b < h(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
5. If t∗ < t < 1
2α′−α , then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is an
equilibrium; if b < g(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
6. If t > 1
2α′−α , no licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium.
• Case 2: 4
5




1. If t ≤ 2
5−3α , licensing is an equilibrium;
2. If 2
5−3α < t <
2
5α′−3α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing
is an equilibrium; if b < f(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
3. If 2
5α′−3α < t <
1
2−α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing
is an equilibrium; if h(t) < b < f (t), licensing is an equilibrium; if
b < h(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
4. If 1
2α−α < t < t
∗, then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if h(t) < b < g(t), licensing is an equilibrium; if
b < h(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
5. If t∗ < t < 1
2α′−α , then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is an
equilibrium; if b < g(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
6. If t > 1
2α′−α , no licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium.
• Case 3: 2(√2− 1) < σ < 1
1. If t ≤ 2
5−3α , licensing is an equilibrium;
2. If 2
5−3α < t <
2
5α′−3α , then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing
is an equilibrium; if b < f(t), licensing is an equilibrium;
3. If 2
5α′−3α < t < t
∗, then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if h(t) < b < f (t), licensing is an equilibrium; if
b < h(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
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4. If t∗ < t < 1
2−α ,then if b > f(t), no licensing and no bribing is an
equilibrium; if b < f(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
5. If 1
2−α < t <
1
2α′−α , then if b > g(t), no licensing and no bribing is
an equilibrium; if b < g(t), bribing is an equilibrium;
6. If t > 1
2α′−α , no licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium.



























































Consider the case where the welfare function is linear in both output and the
level of pollution, i.e., W = Q − βE, where β > 0. Welfare expressions for
different types of equilibria under the largest possible domains are as below
WL(t) = 2(1−βα)(1−αt)
3





















5α′−3α < t <
1
2α′−α .
Given WL(t), WN(t), WN
′
(t) and WB, we have the following properties:













> 0 if and only if β > βN =
1+α







> 0 if and only if β > βB =
α+α′




5. If β < 1
α
, then WL(t) > W N
′







< 0; if β > 1
α
, then WL(t) < W N
′
(t) < 0 for t ∈ [0, 1], and
dW L(t)
dt




The equilibrium results are summarized in the following theorem:
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Theorem C.1. Suppose welfare is linear in total output and pollution. When
the government puts less emphasis on environment (β < 1
α
), the optimal tax
rate is 0 and licensing is always an equilibrium.
When the government puts more emphasis on environment (β > 1
α
), then:
(1) If 0 < σ < 2
5
, the optimal tax rate is always 1. When b > g(1), no






2 − 1, when b > g(1), the optimal tax rate is 1 and no
licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium; when h(1) < b < g(1), the optimal
tax rate is 1 and licensing is an equilibrium; when b < h(1), if WL(t˜) >
WB(1), then the optimal tax rate is t˜ ∈ ( 1
2−α , 1) and licensing is an equilibrium;
otherwise, the optimal tax rate 1 and bribing is an equilibrium.
(3) If
√
2 − 1 < σ < 1
2
, when b > g(1), the optimal tax rate is 1 and
no licensing and no bribing is an equilibrium; when b < g(1), if WL(t˜) >
WB(1), then the optimal tax rate is t˜ ∈ ( 1
2−α , 1) and licensing is an equilibrium;
otherwise, the optimal tax rate 1 and bribing is an equilibrium.
(4) If 1
2
< σ < 1, the optimal tax rate is always 1 and no licensing and no
bribing is an equilibrium.
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C.2.3.2 Proof of the Theorem
To show the above theorem, we consider two different cases depending the
value of β.
Case 1: β < 1
α










< 0, we must have WL(0) > W N
′
(t) for t ∈ ( 1
2−α , 1]. Thus
it is never optimal to set t ∈ ( 1
2−α , 1]. Then we need to compare W
L(0) with
WN (t) and WB(t).




2−α). We know that
dW N (t)
dt





N (t) is maximizes at t = 2
5−3α . Comparing W
L(0) with WN ( 2
5−3α), it
can be shown that WL(0) > W N( 2
5−3α). If βN < β <
1
α
, WN(t) is maximized
at t = 1
2−α . Comparing W
L(0) with WN( 1







L(0). Therefore, WL(0) is always better than WN (t).
Second, for WB(t), we also need to focus on the largest domain, i.e., t ∈
( 2
5α′−3α , 1]. We know that
dW B(t)
dt
< 0 if and only if β < βB <
1
α
. Then if β <
βN , W
B(t) is maximized at t = 2
5α′−3α . Comparing W
L(0) with WB( 2
5α′−3α),
and it can be shown that WL(0) > W N( 2




is maximized at t = 1. Comparing WL(0) with WB(1), it can be shown
WL(0) > W B(1). Therefore, WL(0) is always better than WB(t).
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In sum, the equilibrium tax rate is 0 and licensing takes place.
(2) Consider the case 1
2
< σ < 1
The analysis is similar to the case of 0 < σ < 1
2
, except that the largest
domain for WB(t) becomes t ∈ ( 2
5α′−3α ,
1
2α′−α). All the previous analysis is still
valid, except that if βB < β <
1
α
, we need to compare WL(0) with WB( 1
2α′−α).
And it can be shown easily that WL(0) > W B( 1
2α′−α).
In sum, the optimal tax rate is also 0 and licensing takes place in equilib-
rium.
Case 2: β > 1
α
(1) Consider 0 < σ < 1
2
Then we know WL(t) < W N
′
(t) < 0 for all t, and dW
L(t)
dt




0. Then we have WN
′
(1) > W L(t) for t ∈ [0, 1]. We need to consider three
cases:
If 0 < σ < 2
5
, when b > g(1), WN
′
(1) is optimal; when b < g(1), we know





2−1, when b > g(1), WN ′(1) is optimal; when h(1) < b < g(1),
WL(1) is optimal; when b < h(1), we need to compare WL(t˜) w-ith WB(1). If
WL(t˜) > W B(1), then licensing is an equilibrium and the optimal tax rate is
t˜ ∈ ( 1





2 − 1 < σ < 1
2
, when b > h(t∗) = g(t∗), WN
′
(1) is optimal; when
g(1) < b < h(t∗), we need to compare WN
′
(1) with WB(t). Since it can be
shown easily that WN
′
(1) > W B(1), thus WN
′
(1) must be optimal. When
b < g(1), we need to compare WL(t˜) with WB(1). And the result is the same









2 − 1 and √2 − 1 < σ < 1
2
, we provide sufficient
conditions below under which bribing is an equilibrium.
(2) Consider the case 1
2
< σ < 1













Given that WL(t) < W N
′
(t) < W N
′













(1) is always optimal.
The following lemma provide sufficient conditions under which bribing is
an equilibrium.
Lemma C.5. (Sufficient conditions for bribing to be an equilibrium) Suppose
1−2σ
1−σ < α < 1 and β > β










2 − 1 and b < h(1), the optimal tax rate is 1 and bribing is an
equilibrium; (b) when
√
2 − 1 < σ < 1
2
and b < g(1) the optimal tax rate is 1
and bribing is an equilibrium.
In both cases, let t˜ = h−1(b) < 1. We just need to compare WL(t˜) with
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WB(1). To show bribing is an equilibrium, a sufficient condition is WB(1) >




(α′ − α + (1− 2α′ + αα′)β).
We know that the slope 1 − 2α′ + αα′ is negative if and only if 1−2σ
1−σ < α < 1.







There is clean technology for sale at fixed price F , which is exogenous.2 We
do not have the strategic licensing effect in this case. There is one monopoly
in the market with zero marginal cost of production. The production is Q and
pollution emission is E = Q. Firm’s profit is measured by π = PQ−tE. If the
monopoly purchases the technology, his pollution will become E = αQ, where
α ∈ (0, 1), which measures the efficiency of technology in reducing pollution.
If the monopoly chooses to bribe the bureaucrat, with the minimum bribe fee
σw
1−σ , the bureaucrat will report the monopoly possessing clean technology, even
it does not. With probability σ, the bureaucrat will be discovered, and the
monopoly still have to pay pollution tax tQ. Otherwise, the bribe is successful,
the monopoly only needs to pay tαQ.
2We assume the technology is owned by domestic research lab, so that the incurred cost
F does not enter the social welfare function.
192
First, consider the monopoly is making decision on purchasing, bribing or
neither. And then consider the government optimal choice on tax.
C.2.4.1 Monopoly’s Choice
Consider the three options for the monopoly. If he neither purchases the
technology, nor bribe, the profit function, equilibrium production and social
welfare will be3
πN = (1−Q)Q− tQ ,QN = 1− t
2
, and WN(t) = (1− β)(1− t
2
)2.
If he purchases the technology at the fee F ,4
πL = (1−Q)Q− tαQ− F, QL = 1− αt
2
, and WL(t) = (1− α2β)(1− αt
2
)2.
If he bribes the bureaucrat, his expected profit will be5
πB = σ((1−Q)Q− tQ− b) + (1− σ)((1−Q)Q− tαQ− b).
Let α′ ≡ σ + (1− σ)α, and note that α < α′ < 1, we have
πB = (1−Q)Q− tα′Q− b, QB = 1− α
′t
2




We have three equilibria in different subgames to compare.
3let superscript N denote this case.
4let superscript L denote this case.
5let superscript B denote this case.
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C.2.4.1.1 Compare Purchasing and No purchasing and no bribing.
Purchasing is better than No if and only if6
F ≤ (1− αt
2





(1− α)t(2− αt− t) ≡ cL(t).








for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Thus if
F > 1−α
4(1+α)
, we always have F > cL(t) and No is always better than purchasing.
If F ≤ 1−α
4(1+α)
, by solving F = cL(t), we have
tLmin =
(1− α)−√(1− α− 4(1 + α)F )(1− α)
(1− α2) , and
tLmax =
(1− α) +√(1− α− 4(1 + α)F )(1− α)
(1− α2) .
Then for all t ∈ [tLmin, tLmax], cL(t) > F and purchasing is better than No;
otherwise, No is better than purchasing.7
C.2.4.1.2 Compare Bribing and No.
Bribing is better than No if and only if
b ≤ (1− α
′t
2





(1− α′)t(2− α′t− t) ≡ cB(t).
Similar to the previous case, solving b = cB(t), we have
tBmin =
(1− α′)−√(1− α′ − 4(1 + α′)b)(1− α′)
(1− (α′)2) , and
6Subsequently, we will use “No” as a short hand notation for “No purchasing and no
bribing”
7Note that 0 ≤ tLmin ≤ 11+α ≤ tLmax, and tLmax ≤ 1 if and only if (1−α)
2
4 ≤ F ≤ 1−α4(1+α) .
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tBmax =
(1− α′) +√(1− α′ − 4(1 + α′)b)(1− α′)
(1− (α′)2) .
If b < 1−α
′
4(1+α′) , for all t ∈ [tBmin, tBmax], we have cB(t) > b and bribing is better
than No.8 Otherwise, No is better.
C.2.4.1.3 Compare Purchasing and Bribing.
Purchasing is better than Bribing if and only if
F − b ≤ cL(t)− cB(t) = 1
4
(α′ − α)t(2− α′t− αt) ≡ cLB(t).
Similar to the previous cases, solving F − b = cLB(t), we have
tLBmin =
(α′ − α)−√(α′ − α− 4(α′ + α)(F − b))(α′ − α)
(α′ − α)(α′ + α) , and
tLBmax =
(α′ − α) +√(α′ − α− 4(α′ + α))(F − b))(α′ − α)
(α′ − α)(α′ + α) .
If F − b < α′−α
4(α′+α) , then for all t ∈ [tLBmin, tLBmax], we have cLB(t) > F − b and
licensing is always better than Bribing. Otherwise, Bribing is better.
C.2.4.2 Choice of Tax Rate
Depending on the government environmental policy β, we have three cases to
discuss: (1) government puts little emphasis on environment, 0 < β ≤ 1, (2)
the emphasis is moderate, 1 < β ≤ 1
α2
and (3) the emphasis is strong, β > 1
α2
.
8Note that 0 ≤ tBmin ≤ 11+α′ ≤ tBmax, and tBmax ≤ 1 if and only if (1−α
′)2




C.2.4.2.1 0 < β ≤ 1, government is more output-oriented










Lemma C.6. It is possible that WL(max{tLmin, tLBmin}) > W N(0).
Proof. We solve:
WL(t) = WN(0)




Because WL(t) is decreasing in t, when max{tLmin, tLBmin} < tˆL, WL(max{tLmin, tLBmin}) >
WN (0).
Lemma C.7. WB(tBmin) < W
N(0).





(1 − β) =
WN (0).




} and max{tLmin, tLBmin} < tˆL,
we have WL(max{tLmin, tLBmin}) > W N (0), i.e. government should charge
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t = max{tLmin, tLBmin}, and the monopoly will purchase the clean technology. In
all other cases, government should charge t = 0 and the monopoly will neither
purchase the technology nor bribe. Bribing never appears in equilibrium.
When government puts less emphasis on environment protection, it is most
likely to charge zero tax rate, leading to the monopoly neither purchase the
clean technology nor bribe the bureaucrat. But still, under reasonable condi-
tions, government should charge a positive tax rate, inducing the monopoly
to purchase the clean technology. The conditions are as follows: first, the
technology is cheap; second, the bribing cost should be sufficiently high, which
could be ensured by the high probability of being discovered or higher wage;
and third, the tax rate may not be too high.
C.2.4.2.2 1 < β ≤ 1
α2
, government favors neither output nor environ-
ment
In this case,WN (t) and WB(t) are increasing in t, while WL(t) is decreasing in
t. We have WN(1) = 0 > W B(tBmax), and W
L(tLmin) > 0 = W
N(1). Therefore,
purchasing is always the socially optimal outcome. The equilibrium tax is
t = tLmin.
C.2.4.2.3 β > 1
α2
, government is more environment-oriented
In this case, WN (t), WL(t) and WB(t) are all increasing in t. We have
WN (1) = 0 > W B(tBmax), and W
N (1) = 0 > W L(tLmax).
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Therefore, when government is more environment-oriented, it is socially
optimal for the monopoly neither purchases the clean technology nor bribes
the bureaucrat. And hence, he will set the tax, t = 1. However, it is possible
that tBmax = 1 when b <
(1−α′)2
4
; and tLmax = 1, when F <
(1−α)2
4
. We have the
following proposition to conclude this case.
Proposition C.3. When F < (1−α)
2
4
, government should set tax rate at




and F > (1−α)
2
4
, government should set tax rate at one, and no pur-
chasing and no bribing is socially optimal. When b < (1−α
′)2
4




government should set tax rate at one, and bribing is socially optimal.
There is another interpretation of Proposition C.3. In any of the cases,
government should always set tax at one. It is the monopoly, who will make
decision optimally, i.e. maximize his profit. It is easy to see πL(1) > πB(1) >
πN (1), and hence, when price of the technology is low, he will purchase the
technology; when bribing cost is low, he will bribe; otherwise he does noth-
ing. This explanation shows that government intervention may fail. As the
government goal is to reach the no purchasing and no bribing equilibrium, i.e.
driving the monopoly out of the market, but the monopoly may still choose
purchasing or bribing to stay in the market, as which maximizes his profit.
Theorem C.2 below summarizes the equilibrium of this monopoly game.
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Theorem C.2. Consider a monopoly is in the production market. 1) If the
government is output-oriented (0 < β < 1), we have equilibrium summa-
rized in Proposition C.2. 2) If the government is neither output-oriented nor
environment-oriented (1 < β < 1
α2
), government should charge a positive tax,
and the firm will always purchase the clean technology. 3) If the government
is environment-oriented (β > 1
α2
), we have equilibrium summarized in Propo-
sition C.3.
Even if there is no competition in the market, firm still have incentive to
bribe the bureaucrat when the government is environment-oriented, bribing
cost is low and technology price is high. In this case, firm will remain active
in the market. Otherwise, if he chooses no purchasing and no bribing, he will
have to leave the market, due to the high cost of pollution tax.
Purchasing the technology will yield highest output level. When govern-
ment is output-oriented, he can never reach the purchasing equilibrium by
setting the tax rate at zero. There will be no pollution cost, and hence there
is no incentive for the monopoly to bribe the bureaucrat, nor to purchase the
technology. It is necessary for the government to raise the pollution cost, by
setting some positive tax rate, to incentivize the transfer of the clean technol-
ogy, .
Clearly, consumer surplus under firm using clean technology is higher than
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the case using a dirty one. So our policy implication is that comparing gov-
ernments with different environment policies. The one with output-oriented
policy will always lead to a transfer of clean technology, leading to a better
environment through technology diffusion. Consumers will be better-off, due
to higher total production level.
The interpretation for environment-oriented government is similar to the
insider innovator case. If the country sets a very high goal on environment
protection, and hence a high tax rate,it is possible that bribing is the equi-
librium. In such case, government intervention on tax fails. Especially when
the government is aiming to shut down heavily polluting industry, it may not
come true.
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